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Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value 
William W. Bratton· 
This Article addresses the implications that the Enron coUapse holds out for the self-
regulatory system of corporate govemance. The case shows that the incentive structure that 
motivates actors in the system generates much less powerJiJi checks against abuse than many 
observers have believed Even as academics have proclaimed rising govemance standards, 
some standards have decline4 particularly those addressed to the numerology of shareholder 
ralue. The Articles inquiry begins with Enron s business plan. The Article asserts that there 
may be more to Enron s "virtual firm" strategy than meets the eye beholding a firm in coUapse. 
The Article restates the strategy as an appheation of the incomplete contracts theory of the firm 
that prevails in microeconomics today and asserts that Enron failed because its pursuit of 
immediate shareholder value caused it to misapply the economi~ mistaking its own inHated 
stock market capitalization for fimdamental value. The Article proceeds to Enron s coUapse. 
telling four causation stories. This er ante description draws on infonnation available to the 
actors who forced Enron into bankruptcy in December 2001. The discussion accounts for the 
behavior ofEnron s principals by reference to the shareholder value nonn and Enron s corporate 
culture. Finally. the Article takes up the self-regulatory system of corporate govemance. 
asserting that the case justifies no fimdamental refonn. The costs of any significant new 
regulation can outweigh the compliance yiel4 particularly in a system committed to open a wide 
field for entrepreneurial risk taking. Ifwe seek high re~ we must discount for the risk that 
rationality and reputation will sometimes prove inadequate as constraints. At the same time. we 
should hold critical gatekeepers, particularly auditors, to high professional standards. The 
Article argues that present refonn discussions respecting the audit fimction do not adequately 
COMont the problem of capture demonstrated in this case. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Each economic expansion brings forth an investment so good that 
people treat it as having broken the iron law of risk and return-the 
economic teaching that those who want big returns have to take big 
risks. fu the 1920s, the investment was common stocks bought on 
margin. fu the 1960s, it was Nifty Fifty growth stocks. fu the 1970s, it 
was commodities whose prices were going to rise forever. fu the 
1980s, it was the junk bond, a miracle of fmancial science that offered 
a super-normal return without a greater risk of defau1t. fu the late 
1990s, it was new-economy stocks that levitated on heroic productivity 
stories and predictions of a 36,000 Dow. And then came Enron. 
Enron flew high. When its stock price peaked at close to ninety 
dollars in August 2000, it was America's seventh largest fIrm by 
market capitalization.\ fu one category it even had the number one 
slot-Fortune Magazine hailed it as America's most innovative fIrm 
for fIve years running.2 Enron also came in number one when it fell. 
It went into Chapter 11 on December 2, 2001, as the largest 
bankruptcy reorganization in American history.3 Meanwhile, its stock 
1. The price/earnings ratio was sixty, however. 
2. Pratap ChatteIjee, Enron: Pulling the Plug on the Global Power Broker, 
CORPWATCH, at 6, available athttp://www.corpwatch.orglissuesIPRTJsp?articIeid=1016 (Dec. 
13,2001). 
3. Wendy Zellner et aI., The FaJI ofEnron, Bus. WK., Dec. 17,2001, at 30, 33. 
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had fallen to around sixty cents a share,4 victim to two more Enron 
superlatives-history's biggest fmancial fraud and its biggest audit 
failure. 
At ftrst the nation's fmancial system took the crack up in stride, 
adjusting the share prices of Enron's biggest lenders a notch 
downwards. Growing worries about other frrms' fmancial reports 
fmally caused a major market correction two months latee The 
residuum of insecurity will continue to raise risk premiums and 
depress stock prices.6 But the most visible victims are Enron's 
stockholders and employees, especially the employees who were 
shareholders. Even as 4000 were laid off around the time of the 
bankruptcy filing, all faced the grim realization that in the company's 
fmal weeks management had locked down their 40l(k) plan, which 
had been sixty-percent invested in Enron stock.' 
Corporate failures as big and fast as this one tend to be held out 
as examples for future business regulation. Enron's failure is no 
exception, implicating a long list of regulatory topics well before 
completion of formal investigations into the company's management 
and the collapse's cause. On its face Enron raises issues for the future 
of energy deregulation, the mandatory disclosure system under the 
securities laws,S the regulation of the accounting profession, and 
4. Peter Coy et aI., Enron: Running on Empty, Bus. WK., Dec. 10,2001, at 80,80. 
S. Gretchen Morgenson, UVnies of More Enrons to Come Give Stock Prices a 
Pounding, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at Cl. 
6. Steve Liesman, The Outlook: Enron Fallout May Cut Stock Prices in General, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2002, atAl. The insecurity also has caused a marked contraction of the 
commercial paper market, which, in turn, will cause borrowing costs to rise significantly at 
corporations losing access to this inexpensive source of credit. Gregory Zuckerman, Cash 
Drought: A Dwindling Supply of Shan-Term Credit Plagues Corporations, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
28,2002, at AI. 
7. 401(k) plans are not subject to ERISA's constraints on investments by dermed 
benefit pension plans, which are subject to a ten percent cap on investment in the employer 
finn's stock. Enron is by no means the only company whose employees' 401(k) plans are 
heavily invested in their own stock. Each of the plans of Coca-Cola, Anheuser-Busch, Dell 
Computer, Abbott Laboratories, and Proctor & Gamble was invested with more than eighty 
percent in company stock as of December 200 1. Ellen E. Schultz, Employers Fight Limits on 
Firm's Stock in 401(k)s, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2001, at Cl. 
For an excellent discussion of the implications of the 401 (k) diversification question, see 
David Millon, Enron and the Dark Side of Worker Ownership (working paper) (on file with 
author). 
8. The fact that Enron made special disclosures about investments in Special 
Purpose Entities (SPE) to investors in the entities has created a stir on the ground that SPE 
investors should not have more information than other investors in the marketplace. See 
Diana B. Henriques & Kurt EichenwaId, A Fog Over Enron, and the Legal Landscape, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at MB 1. Why this should be is a puzzle, at least apart from the recently 
promulgated Regulation FD. Under the materiality convention of Generally Accepted 
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internal corporate governance systems.9 For employee pensions, the 
wheels of action started to turn even before the end of 2001 as bills 
were introduced in the House and Senate to limit the amount of 
company securities in 401(k) retirement plans to ten or twenty 
percent. 10 Legislation has since been presented covering a range of 
subjects.ll 
The claims of regulatory failure have a sharp edge due to Enron's 
proftle as one of corporate America's most aggressive political players. 
Deregulatory politics lay at the core of the company's business plan. 
Its primary business, energy trading, only came into existence in the 
wake of deregulation of electricity and natural gas production and 
supply. Led by its founding chief executive officer (CEO), Kenneth L. 
Lay, Enron went from state to state to prod local regulators to mandate 
the unbundling of vertically integrated utilities.12 It succeeded in 
twenty-four states/3 clearing a field for the creation of new markets it 
could exploit. These political successes earned Enron admiration in 
Accounting Principles (GAAP), see DAVID R. HERWI1Z & MATTHEW J. BARRETI, 
ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 71 (3d ed. 2001), fmancial statements do not report all details 
respecting a business for fear of incoherent results. Meanwhile, to induce a private investor 
to join in a particular project is to provide detailed information about that project, subject to a 
confidentiality agreement. Such an inequality of information is a necessary result when 
reporting companies do project fmance, joint ventures, and private placements. 
9. Even the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act has come in for questioning on the 
ground that the losses of Citibank and the Morgan Bank might have been lower had they not 
been providing Enron with investment banking services. Jeanne Cummings et aI., Enron 
Lessons: Finns Need to Have Assets, and Auditors Oversight, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2002, at 
AI. 
10. Schultz, supmnote 7, at CI. 
11. See, e.g., S. 2003, 107th Congo (2002) (providing for a variety of reforms 
respecting fmancial accounting); Auditor Independence Act of 2002, S. 1896, 107th Congo 
(2002) (prohibiting auditors from providing management services); Independent Investment 
Advisers Act of2002, S. 1895, 107th Congo (2002) (requiring investment advisors to disclose 
ties with companies being analyzed by them); Fully Informed Investor Act of2002, S. 1897, 
107th Congo (2002) (requiring disclosure of the sale of securities by an officer to be made 
available quickly to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)). In addition, SEC 
Chairman Harvey Pitt, responding to an immediate need to restore confidence in the audit 
process, has proposed a new internal disciplinary structure for the accounting profession. 
See, e.g., Michael Schroeder, SEC Proposes Accounting Disciplinmy Body, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
17,2002, at CI. 
12. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Editorial, Enron = Deregulation?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 
2001, at A19. Enron started out as a natural gas pipeline at a time when oil was lower-priced. 
Its natural gas business began to flourish after the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) changed its rules in 1985 to permit utilities to shop for gas and pipelines and to 
search for customers. Wendy Zellner et aI., Enron s Power Play, Bus. WK. ONLINE, at 
http://www.businessweek.coml2001/01_07/b3719001.htm (Feb. 12,2001). 
13. Leslie Wayne, Enron, Preaching Deregulation, Worked the Statehouse Circuit, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2002, at BI. 
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business circles as a center of innovation and entrepreneurship. 14 
Jeffrey Skilling, who succeeded Lay as Enron's CEO in February 2001 
(to resign the following August as stonn clouds gathered), described a 
ftnn with a mission against entrenched monopoly and its paid 
protectors in government. Enron was "on the side of the angels": 
In every business we've been in, we're the good guys. That's why they 
don't like us. Customers love us, but the incumbents don't like us. 
We're bringing the benefits of choice and free markets to the world. 
You have no idea how frustrating it was in the early days of gas. They 
had built all the rules to protect their monopolies.ls 
But even as Enron fought and won battles against protected energy 
monopolies, it succeeded to and surpassed their influence activities.16 
Enron spent copiously on politics. For example, the $2.4 million 
of political contributions it paid in 2000 exceeded by 100% those of 
the next-most-generous energy company.17 In 2000, Enron also paid 
$2.1 million to a dozen or so Washington lobbying ftnns.IS Enron 
obtained good results from such investments, notably in connection 
with the passage in 2000 of the Commodity Futures Modernization 
14. Zelineret aI., supra note 3, at 30. 
15. OnLine Extra: Q &- A with Enrons Skilling, Bus. WK. ONLINE, at 
http://www.businessweek.coml2001l01_071b371901O.htm (Feb. 12, 200 I). 
16. Enron's state-level political activities were not in a strict sense ever directed to 
securing deregulation of energy production and distribution. For Enron, deregulation meant 
special legislative protection for its own business model. It encouraged the states to mandate 
their utilities' unbundling along lines suited to Enron's lines of business, leaving open no 
playing field for the operation of competing business models. See Jenkins, supra note 12, at 
A19. 
Enron at first joined the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, a forum organized by 
academics in 1991. In 1994, it withdrew its support from the group due to disagreements 
about the shape restructurings should take. Letter from Professor Richard Pierce (Feb. 12, 
2002) (on file with author). 
It also is noted that Enron's operations abroad have earned the opprobrium of human 
rights activists, in particular \vith respect to its $3 billion joint venture with the state utility of 
Maharashtra in India. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented 
human rights abuses on the part oflocal police officers acting as a private security force for 
Enron. They accuse Enron's cops of beating local opponents of the power plant and of 
dragging citizens out of their homes and then beating them for refusing to cooperate with the 
firm. Chatterjee, supra note 2, ~ 33. 
17. Enron spent $10.2 million on influence in Washington between 1997 and 2000. 
During his political career, George W. Bush has received $774,100 from Enron itself and 
Enron's management, $312,500 of which he received during his gubernatorial campaign. 
Chatterjee, supra note 2. 
18. Robert Kuttner, Editorial, The Lesson of Enron: Regulation Isn't A Dirty U0r~ 
Bus. WK., Dec. 24, 200 I, at 24. One of these representatives was Marc Racicot, now the 
Republicans' national chairman. 
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Act. 19 Senator Phil Gramm, spouse of Wendy Gramm, one of Enron's 
outside directors and a member of its audit committee,20 assured that 
the legislation included the ''Enron Point;' a complete exclusion for 
energy trading companies from rmancial or disclosure requirements 
respecting portfolios of over-the-counter derivative securities. Enron 
thereby achieved something available to no other leading dealer in 
derivative contracts--complete exemption of its activities from federal 
supervision and oversight. 21 
Yet none of Enron's political friends came forward when it 
approached the Treasury for a bailout in late 2001. Washington 
Republicans kept the fIrm at a conspicuous distance.22 Even so, Enron 
associations now soil politicians on a per se basis.23 Any sign of past 
proximity to the rIrm drives the press into a frenzy. The same goes for 
the business community, where scrutiny extends to the conduct of its 
largest lenders, IP. Morgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup, llC.24 
Remarkable extremes have been reached by a press eager for scandal: 
19. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 
2763 (2000). 
20. She is alleged to have received between $915,000 and $1.85 million in 
compensation from Euron between 1993 and 2001. Bob Herbert, Editorial, Enron and the 
Gramms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,2002, atA29. How much of the deferred portion of this she 
now gets to collect remains in question. 
21. Makers of comparable products are either banks, broker-dealers, commodities 
dealers, or exchanges or their members, and thereby subject to regulation under one or 
another federal regime. 
22. See, e.g., Cummings et aI., supra note 9, at AI; Michael Schroeder, Enron 
Debacle Will Test Leadership of SECs New Chief, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2001, at AlO 
(discussing comments of President George W. Bush on Euron). 
23. For an analysis along these lines, see Albert R. Hunt, Editorial, A Scandal 
Centerpiece: Enron s Political Connections, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17,2002, atAl5. 
Vice President Cheney takes the worst of this by virtue of his energy policy portfolio. 
Unfortunately for Cheney, his contacts were not limited to policy discussion. At Lay's 
request, he met with Indian officials in June 2001 to pressure them for concessions in respect 
of an ongoing political battIe between Euron and the Maharashtra state utility. Richard A. 
Oppel, Jr., Despite WamJiJg Enron Chief Urged Buying of Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,2002, 
atA1. 
24. The SEC is investigating Morgan for delaying full disclosure of its Euron losses. 
These ftrst were said to be $900 million, a ftgure later raised to $2.6 billion because 
guarantors of Morgan's position have refused to pay. The matter is in litigation. Jathon 
Sapsford & Anita Raghavan, Trading Charges: Lawsuit Spotlights J.R Morgan s Ties to the 
Enron Debacle, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2002, atAl; Anita Raghavan et aI., SEC Examines Ties 
Between Banks and Enron, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2002, at C1. Citigroup seems to have 
engineered a preference for itseIf-a $250 million bootstrap from unsecured to secured status 
for itself in respect of the last rounds of prebankruptcy lending. Jathon Sapsford & Mitchell 
Pacelle, Citigroup s Enron Financing Stirs Controversy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2002, at C I. 
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You get your name in the paper simply by virtue of being a purchaser 
of a private placement note of an Enron equity a1Iiliate.25 
As with the political community, Enron failed to rmd significant 
sources of support in the business community as it struggled to stay 
solvent. Many saw it as an arrogant, uncooperative player.26 It had 
insisted on, and succeeded in, getting its own way with business 
counterparties as well as government regulators.27 Its famously opaque 
rmancial statements showed that Enron found it neither necessary nor 
desirable to share a clear picture of its operations and rmances with 
either its own shareholders or the wider rmancial community. This 
was a firm whose CEO, Skilling, publicly castigated as an "asshole" 
an analyst who had the temerity to ask a critical question about Enron's 
rmancial reports.2S When rmancial journalist, Bethany McLean, asked 
early questions about the company, in Is Enron Overpriced?,29 Skilling 
accused her of being unethical for publishing an underresearched 
piece.30 
Two schools of thought show up prominently in discussions of 
the meaning of Enron's collapse. On one side stand supporters of 
deregulation, many of whom once touted Enron and now rmd it more 
than a little embarrassing. Its collapse, they tell us, should be taken as 
an exemplar of free market success.3l If Enron was a house of cards, it 
was free market actors who blew it down, with a free market 
administration keeping its hands off. Any violations of law will be 
brought to light through investigations by the Congress, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Justice Department, along 
with fact rmding connected with a raft of pending lawsuits. 
25. Gretchen Morgenson, Many May Be Surprised to Be Enron Investors, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at C1. 
26. See ZeHner et aI., supra note 3, at 34. 
27. Enron used its clout as a source offees to buHy actors in the fmancial community 
to participate in increasingly dubious off-balance sheet fmancings. Wendy Zellner et aI., The 
Man Behind the Deal Machine, Bus. WK., Feb. 4, 2002, at 40,40-41. 
28. Special Report-Enron: TheAmazing Disintegrating Finn, ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 
2001, at 61 [hereinafter Special Reporij. The incident occurred in April 2001. Heather 
Timmons, Men Execs Protest Too Much, Bus. WK., Jan. 14,2002, at 8,8. 
29. Bethany McLean, IsEnron Overpriced?, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2001, at 123 
30. Felicity Barringer, 10 Months Ago, Questions on Enron Came and ~nt with 
Little Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, atAl1. 
31. For a bizarre example of this thinking, see John Rossant, Editorial, Mya Few 
Enrons U0uld Do Europe Good, Bus. WK., Dec. 31, 2001, at 58,58 (asserting that Enron 
shows that government support for industry is a bad thing). 
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Meanwhile, the histories of rogues and outliers like Enron never 
provide a sound basis for new regulatory initiatives.32 
On the opposite side stand those, including this Article's author, 
predisposed to draw regulatory inferences from business disasters. 
Enron, with its reputation as America's corporate shock troop for 
radical reliance on market discipline and concomitant dismantling of 
the New Deal regulatory legacy,33 provides an especially attractive 
basis for argument. These assertions encompass power supply, the 
deregulation of which, according to one recent commentator, 
"guaranteed that sharks such as Enron would emerge to cream profits 
by manipulating supply.,,34 They encompass campaign finance reform, 
in the eyes of many a necessary prerequisite to any other law reform 
triggered by Enron.35 And they encompass business law, in particular 
corporate and securities law's system of self-regulatory corporate 
governance. 
This Article addresses the self-regulatory regime of corporate 
governance, to which Enron comes as a considerable shock. In the 
1990s, corporate self-regulation had been widely thought to have 
reached a high plateau of evolutionary success due to proliferating 
good practices and sophisticated institutional monitoring. Yet the 
failure in this case stemmed not from business reversal, which often 
cannot be avoided, but from legerdemain, which usually can be 
controlled. The breaking stories defied explanation-$30 million of 
self-dealing by the chief fmancial officer, $700 million of net earnings 
going up in smoke, $1.2 billion of shareholders' equity disappearing as 
if by erasure of a blackboard, more than $4 billion in hidden 
liabilities-and all in a company theretofore viewed as an exemplar. 
How could this happen in a corporate governance and disclosure 
system held out as the envy of the world? Either deeply concealed 
skullduggery or some hidden regulatory defect requiring legislative 
correction must have been at work. 
As the scandal deepens and the criminal justice system comes to 
bear, the concealed skullduggery characterization becomes more 
32. For this point of view, see Editorial, Investigating Enron, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 
2001, atAI4; Jenkins, supmnote 12. 
33. Paul Krugman, Editorial, Laissez Not Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,2001, atA27. 
34. Kuttner, supm note 18, at 24. Many accuse Enron of manipUlation and 
profiteering in connection with California's power shortage of 2000 and 2001. See, e.g., 
Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Signs Enron Bet on Price Increase Before California Power Shortage, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,2002, at CI. 
35. See Stephen Labaton, Auditing Firms Exercise Power in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 19,2002, atAI (quoting Professor James Cox). 
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prominent. The principals emerge as rogues, to be roughly expelled by 
the respectable business community. There lies much truth in the 
characterization. But the rogue characterization serves a double 
function-it deflects attention from the respectable community's own 
business practices. 
This Article aspires to counterbalance with a picture of Enron's 
collapse that deemphasizes the rogue to focus on the regular. It 
reviews the particulars of the case, emphasizing the points of 
continuity between Enron and respectable fIrms. It asserts that Enron 
in collapse was wrought into the fabric of our corporate governance 
system every bit as much as Jack Welch's General Electric (GE) was in 
success. Like GE under Jack Welch, Enron under Ken Lay and Jeff 
Skilling pursued maximum shareholder value. Like GE's managers, 
Enron's pursued a plausible and innovative business plan. The fIrm 
collapsed for the most mundane of reasons-its managers suffered the 
behavioral biases of successful entrepreneurs. They overemphasized 
the upside and lacked patience. They pursued heroic short-term 
growth numbers that their business plan could not deliver. That pursuit 
of immediate shareholder value caused them to become risk-prone, 
engaging in levered speculation, earnings manipulation, and 
concealment of critical information. 
They were rogues to be sure, but the self-regulatory system 
nevertheless is deeply implicated in their company's failure. Enron's 
collapse reminds us that our corporate governance system takes some 
significant risks in the name of encouraging innovation and 
entrepreneurship and economizing on enforcement costs. Enron's 
principals abused the system in plain view, taking advantage of the 
considerable slack it extends to successful actors. Although they did 
not disclose everything, they disclosed more than enough to put the 
system's layers of monitors on notice that their earnings numbers were 
soft and their liabilities understated. Similarly aggressive accounting 
and soft numbers are commonplace in business today. They have 
become wrought into the practice of shareholder value maximization. 
The theory of shareholder value maximization tells a different 
story, of course. Academics defme shareholder value by reference to 
management practices that enhance productivity-corporate 
unbundling and concentration on core competencies, the return of free 
cash flow to shareholders, compensation schemes that align incentives, 
and prompt restructuring of dysfunctional operations. But in the 
transfer from theory to practice, the set of economic instructions 
diffuses into a norm. The norm is informed by the demands of 
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shareholders themselves in addition to the official economics. As the 
nonn becomes more capacious it takes on a dark side, a negative 
aspect quite apart from the pain it inflicts on millions of employees for 
whom the cost-cutting entailed in restructuring means termination. 
For equity investors in recent years, the practice of shareholder value 
maximization has not meant patient investment. Instead, it has meant 
obsession with short-tenn perfonnance numbers. For managers, the 
shareholder value nonn accordingly has come to mean more than 
astute investment and disinvestment. It also means aggressive 
management of reported figures responsive to the investment 
community's demands for immediate value. Enron stated its 
adherence to the nonn in its Annual Report for 2000--it was a 
company "laser-focused on earnings per share.,,36 
Enron forces us to confront a discomfiting fact: even as 
academics have proclaimed rising governance standards, some 
standards have declined, particularly those addressed to the 
numerology of shareholder value. The decline has not been limited to 
companies subject to enforcement actions, like CendanC and 
Sunbeam.38 Investigations and criticisms touch reputable names like 
Xerox 39 Lucent 40 Qualcom 41 American International 42 Coca-Cola 43 
, " " 
IBM44 and GE itse1£45 The number of accounting restatements, cases 
in which companies lower previously reported earnings, averaged 49 
36. ENRON, 2000 ANNuAL REpORT 2 (2001). 
37. See In reCendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.N.J. 2000), aff(l, 264 
F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001). 
38. Chad Terhune & Joann S. Lublin, Unlike Others, Dollar General Issues a Mea 
Culpa, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2002, at Bl (noting Dollar General's public apology for its 
accounting irregularities in the same week that "Chainsaw" AI Dunlop paid a $15 million 
settlement stemming from Sunbeam's fraudulent fmancials). 
39. Claudia H. Deutsch & Reed Abelson, Xerox Facing New Pressures Over 
Auditing, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9,2001, at Cl. 
40. Simon Romero, Lucents Books Said to Draw the Attention of the S.E.C, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 10,2001, at Cl. 
41. John A. Byrne & Ben Elgin, Cisco: Behind the Hype, Bus. WK., Jan. 21, 2002, 
at 54. 
42. Christopher Oster & Ken Brown, AlG: A Complex Industry, A ~1Y Complex 
Company, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at C16. 
43. Betsy McKay, Coca-Cola: Real Thing Can Be Hard to Measure, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
23,2002, at C16. 
44. WiIIiamM. Bulkeley, IBM' 'Other Income 'Can Mean Other Opinion, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 23, 2002, at Cl; Steve Liesman, Deciphering the Black Box, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 
2002, at Cl. The Joumalholds these companies out as exemplars of what is called "black 
box" accounting. It's a black box when you can't figure it out. 
45. Jeremy Kahn, Accounting in Wonderland' Jeremy Kahn Goes Down the Rabbit 
Hole with GEs Books, FORTUNE, Mar. 19,2001, at 134; Rachel Emma Silverman & Ken 
Brown, GR' Some Seek More Light of the Finances, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at Cl. 
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per year from 1990 to 1997. By 2000, the annual number was up to 
156.46 Clearly, the line between appropriate and inappropriate behavior 
has dissolved for many under real-world pressure to produce 
shareholder value. Exploitation and expansion of the gray area has 
become routine. The resulting loss of perspective facilitated Enron's 
step across the line to fraud. Special regulatory attention accordingly 
devolves on its auditor, the actor in the self-regulatory system whose 
primary function is to deter fraud. 
This Article's inquiry into Enron's implications for corporate self-
regulation (and the legal theory that supports it) begins, in Part IT, with 
Enron's business plan. When Enron rode high, it aspired to embody 
and realize the ideal of a contractual rmn rooted in the touchstone 
economics of Michael Jensen and the late William H. Meckling.47 
Enron would transform itself into a "virtual" corporation, a center for 
market making and hedging by high-tech experts, rather than an asset-
heavy energy producer. Thus viewing itself as a real time nexus of 
contracts, Enron looked out at the field of traditional large, vertically 
integrated, asset-based companies and saw a great arbitrage 
opportunity. Those lumbering behemoths with low returns on assets 
were just waiting to be dismantled, their coordinative functions to be 
replaced by Enron's proprietary trading markets. The strategy was 
lionized in the business press in early 2001 as Skilling ascended 
Enron's throne. By the year's end it was derided. Paul Krugman has 
called it "death by guru"-little more than a "perfect PowerPoint 
presentation:>43 It was so trendy that "few analysts were willing to fly 
in the face of fashion by questioning Enron's numbers:>49 
Certainly, few asked any questions.so But there may be more to 
Enron's strategy than meets the eye beholding a fmn in collapse. Part 
IT argues that the strategy may be restated as an application of the 
46. Liesman, supra note 44, at C1. 
47. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EeON. 305 (1976). It is noted that 
Jensen has taken the occasion ofEnron's collapse publicly to castigate managers who seek to 
maximize stock prices through legerdemain rather than enhancement of fundamental value. 
Joseph Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Editorial, Dare to Keep }Our Stock Price Low, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 31, 2001, atA8. The authors have expanded their op-ed piece into a short paper. See 
Joseph Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Just Say No to Wall Street, available at 
http://www.papers.ssrn.com/abstract=297156(Feb. 17,2001). 
48. Paul Krugman, Editorial, Death By Guro, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,2001, atA23. 
49. Id 
50. One that did was Veba, a German firm which walked away from a proposed 
merger with Enron in 1999 after Price Waterhouse took a close look at Enron's books. 
Edmund L. Andrews et aI., '99 Deal Failed Mer Scrutiny ofEnron Books, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
27, 2002, at 1. 
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incomplete contracts theory of the finn that prevails in 
microeconomics today. Enron failed because its pursuit of immediate 
shareholder value caused it to misapply the economics. It asked for 
too much from the strategy in terms of immediate increases in 
earnings per share, mistaking its own inflated stock market 
capitalization for fundamental value. Meanwhile, the arbitrage play it 
proposed remains to be made against the prevailing pattern of vertical 
industrial organization, only by a more level-headed management 
team. The virtual corporation and the regulatory and social challenges 
it presents remain on table. 
Part ill moves on to Enron's collapse, telling four causation 
stories. This ex ante account draws on information available to the 
actors who forced Enron into bankruptcy in December 2001, avoiding 
inquiry into the culpability ofEnron's principals. The first story looks 
at Enron at the beginning of 2001 to show a company with some 
profound but very conventional problems in need of solution. This 
account provides a backdrop for the stories that follow. The second 
story depicts Enron as Long-Term Capital Management-a derivative 
play gone bad. The problem with this very good story is that even as 
the allegations pile up there remains little evidence to support it. The 
third story depicts Enron as a den of thieves. Here we encounter the 
famous $30 million fee collected by Enron's chief financial officer, 
Andrew Fastow, along with shenanigans with Special Purpose Entities. 
The discussion asserts that there was no prima facie breach of 
fiduciary duty bound up in the Fastow deal at the time the Enron board 
approved it. At the same time, to look at Fastow and the SPE 
transactions is fmally to encounter fraud, as Enron does shady deals 
with its CFO's limited partnership to conceal losses and generate 
earnings. Public disclosure of these activities triggers a reputational 
crisis for Enron but no negative financial results large enough to bring 
it down. We get those with the fourth story-the revelation of $4 
billion of hidden contingent liabilities. This triggers a credit rating 
downgrade, a liquidity crisis, and a ticket to Chapter 11. 
Part ill accounts for these actors' behavior by reference to the 
shareholder value norm and Enron's corporate culture. More 
particularly, the two stories, Part IT's story of Enron in success and Part 
ill's story of Enron in collapse, combine to imply that the principals 
saw themselves as players in a tournament. Their job was not just to 
make money, but to make the most money-to be the superstar fIrm. 
For a superstar finn, success did not mean merely doing better than the 
next finn. It meant destroying the next finn and much of industrial 
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organization along with it and always delivering good numbers. This 
single-minded pursuit of frrst-place competitive victory caused Enron's 
managers to destroy their frrm.sl 
Part N turns to corporate self-regulation for a conventional, but 
sobering account of responsibility. To help maintain focus, attention is 
limited to Enron's officers, directors, auditors, and shareholders.52 
Enron's top executives and board of directors bear the primary blame. 
Yet the directors went though the motions dictated by the book of good 
corporate practice. Negative implications accordingly arise for the 
monitoring model of the board of directors. But, despite the author's 
disposition to draw regulatory inferences from business disaster, there 
follows no plausible reform prescription. Secondary blame attaches to 
Enron's auditors, who manifestly should have refused to give a 
favorable opinion on Enron's fmancials. Here arise the case's strong 
regulatory implications. It is clear that Enron had captured its auditor, 
denuding the relationship of its necessary adversary aspect. Similar 
situations of capture are ubiquitous in America's corporate landscape. 
Secondary blame also attaches to members of the community of 
institutional investors. Our self-regulatory system assumes that these 
actors make a governance contribution when they monitor large 
companies like Enron. Here they failed to do so even though Enron's 
fmancials provided enough information about shady deals to give 
them cause to demand explanations. If actors with billions of other 
people's money invested do not require managers and boards to make a 
coherent informational account of themselves before disaster strikes, 
despite clear signs of trouble, then we must put a heavy qualification 
on our reliance on the monitoring system. ill contrast, the legal system 
will work as intended in this case so far as concerns ex post 
enforcement, given multiple prima facie violations of the securities 
51. As they did so they shed the behavior pattern of the rational actor to display the 
behavioral infIrmities described in learning on securities fraud. See Kimberly D. Kra\viec, 
Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the Rogue Trader Mystery, 79 ORE. L. REv. 301 (2000); 
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Dlusions: A Behavioral Theory of My Corporations 
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101 
(1997) [hereinafter Langevoort, Organized Dlusions]; Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope., 
Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law fiom Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and 
Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 627 (1996) [hereinafter Langevoort, Selling 
Hope]. 
52. This leaves out a secondary list of participants, including Enron's counsel, Vmson 
& Elkins, its creditors, particularly its lead lenders, and the investment institutions 
participating in its off-balance sheet vehicles. They \vin receive attention enough elsewhere. 
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laws and an emerging picture of widespread culpability.s3 The 
disturbing thing is that the system's standing army of civil and criminal 
enforcers had no deterrent effect. 
Enron shows that the incentive structure that motivates actors in 
our self-regulatory governance system generates much less powerful 
checks against abuse than many observers have believed. This point 
does not by itself validate any particular regulatory corrective. The 
costs of any regulation can outweigh the compliance yield, particularly 
in a system committed to open a wide field for entrepreneurial risk 
taking. Such a system can no more break the iron law of risk and 
return than could Michael Milken and his junk bonds. If we seek high 
returns, we must discount for the risk that rationality and reputation 
will sometimes prove inadequate as constraints. 
II. ENRON AND THE CONTRACTARIAN IDEAL 
A. The VIIiual Corporation 
In early 2001, Enron was in a process of transfonnation, 
determined to leave behind its original business, an asset-laden 
producer and transporter of natural gas, to become a pure fmancial 
intennediary. Its intennediary business had two aspects. First, there 
was a proprietary marketplace in which Enron matched up energy 
producers, carriers, and users.S4 Enron was expanding this business to 
cover anything which could be traded-pulp and paper, metals, even 
broadband services. There was reason for optimism-Enron had just 
started up an exemplary online operation which made access to its 
market cheap and user fiiendly.ss Enron acknowledged few limits to its 
marketplace. Only ''unique'' products-''knickknacks''-could not be 
brought within its trading model.s6 Second, Enron sold risk 
management products. These over-the-counter derivative contracts 
covered its customers' exposure to price risks, making participation in 
Enron's market more attractive. 
53. See WILLIAM: C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REpORT OF INvEsTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL 
INvEsTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. (2002), available at 
2002 WL 198018 [hereinafter POWERS REpORT]. 
54. A back-office scheduled pipeline and transmission capacity to effect actual 
deliveries of gas and electricity. Zellner et aI., supra note 12, ~ 13. 
55. The site is said to have handled 550,000 transactions with a notional value of 
$345 billion in its first year. A Survey of Energy: A Bdghter Future?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 
2001, at 57, availableat2001 WL 7317640 [hereinafter Survey: EnergJ-j. 
56. OnLineExtra: Q&A with Enrons Skilling, supra note 15. 
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To get a better look at Enron's intermediary operation, let us 
hypothesize Enron's entry as a trader into a new market, say pulp and 
paper. To effect entry as a seller, Enron fIrst had to assure itself of 
sources of supply, whether through contracting or through direct 
ownership of the sources of the product, here timber tracts. Once it 
established itself as a seller, Enron would start bringing other sellers 
together with timber buyers. As Enron saw it, such a new market 
could grow spectacularly if many timber users had captive sources of 
supply. In this scenario, the vertically integrated forest products 
companies notice the Enron market and see that it has sufficient 
volume to supply their needs. They begin to draw on it for marginal 
supplies. It becomes clear that Enron's market offers timber at lower 
prices than do their captive timber sources. Ultimately, these 
companies unbundle themselves, selling off their forest tracts, 
pocketing the gain, and relying on Enron's market for future supplies. 
Enron claimed to provide a level of intelligence higher than that 
of a marketplace, traditionally conceived. As claimed in Enron's 2000 
Annual report: "[We] provide high-value products and services other 
wholesale service providers cannot. We can take the physical 
components and repackage them to suit the specifIc needs of 
customers. We treat term, price and delivery as variables that are 
blended into a single, comprehensive solution."s7 
One key to this addition of value was diversifIcation. Enron's 
network of contacts respecting supply of a given product caused a 
reduction of risk for buyers of the product, a risk reduction effect 
unachievable by isolated producer-sellers in an industry. Skilling 
explained: 
[T]he fundamental advantage of a virtually integrated system vs. a 
physically integrated system is you need less capital to provide the same 
reliability. . .. Nondelivery is a nonsystematic risk. If a pipeline blows 
up or a compressor goes down or a wire breaks, the bigger your 
portfolio, the greater your ability to wire around that. 
So, if for example, I'm just starting in the gas merchant business and 
I'm selling gas from central Kansas to Kansas City, if the pipeline 
[between those places] blows up, I'm out of business. For Enron, if that 
pipeline blows up, I'll back haul out of New York, or I'll bring Canadian 
gas in and spin it through some storage facilities. If you can diversify 
your infrastructure, you can reduce nonsystematic risk, which says 
57. ENRON, supm note 36, at 2. 
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there's a ... very strong tangible network effect. ... But you've got to 
get big, you've got to get that initial market share, or you're toase~ 
One obstacle to this market creation scenario concerned price risk 
to buyers. Product users who procure captive sources of supply seek 
insulation from price fluctuations, particularly upward price 
fluctuations in times of high demand. To divest one's source of supply 
and rely on a trading market, particularly another fIrm's proprietary 
trading market, is to expose oneself to this risk. The solution to the 
problem, for both Enron and the product user, lay in derivative 
contracts entered into with a market intermediary. These can provide 
protection against price increases at reasonable cost, at least for the 
short and intermediate durations. Thus did Enron supplement its 
activities as a market maker by entering into these contracts with its 
customers. As Enron stated in its 2000 Annual Report: 
In Volatile Markets, Everything Changes But Us. When customers do 
business with Enron, they get our commitment to reliably deliver their 
product at a predictable price, regardless of the market condition. 
This commitment is possible because of Enron's unrivaled access to 
markets and liquidity .... 
. . . We offer a multitude of predictable pricing options. 
Market access and information allow Enron to deliver 
comprehensive logistical solutions that work in volatile markets or 
markets undergoing fundamental changes, such as energy and 
broadband. 59 
Enron, in short, aspired to be better than a market. It was 
reducing the costs of fmding, contracting with, and communicating 
with outside suppliers and customers--costs that formerly meant 
bringing disparate operations under a single corporate roof From this 
there followed a staggering claim: Enron would apply enough raw 
intelligence and superior information to the provision of products and 
risk services to cause a change in the prevailing mode of industrial 
organization. Said Skilling: 
There's only been a couple of times in history when these costs of 
interaction have radically changed .... One was the railroads, and then 
the telephone and the telegraph. . .. [W]e're going through another 
right now. The costs of interaction are collapsing because of the 
Internet, and as those costs collapse, I think the economics of 
58. OnLine Extra: Q&A with Enrons Skilling, supra note 15 (alterations in 
original). 
59. ENRON, supra note 36, at 6. 
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temporarily assembled organizations will beat the economics of the old 
vertically integrated organization.60 
Skilling continued, in a different setting: 
The old way they reduced the risk is they'd vertically integrate. If 
you were Ex.xon in the old days, you integrated across the whole 
chain. . .. If you were afraid crude-oil prices would go down, you'd 
own the refmery, too, because you liked it if crude prices went 
down .... That made a lot of sense ... because it was very expensive to 
make sure you could get reliable supplies of crude oil to go into a 
refmery if you didn't own the crude oil. 
Well, now you go on your computer and get it instantaneously. . .. If 
you have somebody [like Enron] who comes along and says hey, look, 
I'm going to virtually vertically integrate because it's a whole lot 
cheaper, you're not going to be cost-competitive.61 
In Skilling's projection, virtual integration force would force Big Oil, 
Big Coal, or Big Anything to split up into multitudinous micro-fIrms, 
each working a niche. Enron would put the whole back together 
through its trading operation, all the while securing lower prices for 
all.62 
The "nexus of contracts" fIrm hypothesized by Jensen and 
Meckling in 1976 would be realized in fact. Jensen and Meckling 
took the large fIrm and explained it as a byproduct of equilibrium 
contracting by rational economic actors. Given the complexity of 
relations among actors in the complex, agency cost reduction emerged 
as the problem for solution in the economics of fIrm organization.63 
Enron was going to use real-world market contracting to unwind 
Jensen and Meckling's contractual complexes into simpler, more 
transparent units. With each unit directly disciplined by the market for 
its own product, agency costs inevitably would be less of a problem. 
Skilling saw one further implication: assets were a bad thing to 
have. This followed from the shareholder value maximization norm. 
Skilling liked the numbers on return on equity capital yielded by 
60. Jerry Useem, And Then, Just Men IVu Thought the ''New Economy" Was Dead, 
Bus. 2.0, Aug. 200 I, at 7. 
61. OnLine Extra: Q &A with Enrons Skilling, supra note 15 (fIrst four alterations 
in original). 
62. Survey: Energy, supra note 55. For the path-breaking discussion of the virtual 
fIrm in the legal literature, see Claire Moore Dickerson, Spinning Out of ControL' The 
Virtual Organization and Conflicting Govemance ~ctor.s-, 59 U. Pm. L. REv. 759,759-804 
(1998). 
63. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 47, at 310. For an explication of the theory, see 
William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Per.s-pectives ffom 
History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1478-80 (1989). 
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fmancial institutions, insurance companies, and pension funds better 
than the returns capital yielded in the energy industry: "[I]t's very hard 
to earn a compensatory rate of return on a traditional asset 
investment. . .. In today's world, you have to bring intellectual content 
to the product, or you will not earn a fair rate of return.',64 Under this 
line of thinking, Enron could justifY owning a bricks and mortar 
operation or other hard asset only to the extent necessary to support a 
trading operation-as with the timber tracts in the foregoing example 
or Enron's building of a national broadband network as the start point 
for a broadband trading market. Meanwhile, Enron would divest its 
extensive collection of pipelines and other properties. Wall Street 
applauded-here was a fmn that "doesn't linger over troubled assets," 
dumping them in order to ''help fund its vast ambitions.,,6s 
It should be noted that Enron's plan to become the real-world 
embodiment of the contractarian ideal has profound implications for 
industrial organization. Of course, there is nothing new about 
restructuring, downsizing, and unbundling. These became everyday 
events in corporate America as the shareholder value maximization 
norm came to drive management decisions in the 1990s. But even as 
many corporations regrouped around "core competencies" they 
remained big, asset-rich entities, vertically integrating the production, 
supply, and distribution functions feeding in and out of their cores. 
Enron's vision held out a much more radical degree of divestiture, 
leading to smaller entities under tighter market constraints and 
deprived of institutional stability. 
For a glimpse of the world Skilling envisioned for everybody 
else, we need only look within Enron's glass box in Houston to see the 
way he treated his own employees. Questions about executive 
decisions were not tolerated. Nor were fairness complaints. 
Employees labored under tremendous pressure to take significant risks 
and bring in favorable results in the short term.66 And the end justified 
the means. In 2000, Skilling publicly praised the employee who 
started Enron's online trading operation even though she had been 
explicitly forbidden to do SO.67 Said an officer present at that meeting: 
64. OnLine Extra; Q&A with Enrons SIdlling, supra note 15 (alteration in 
original). 
65. Zellner et ai., supra note 12. 
66. John Schwartz, As Enron Purged Its I?anks- Dissent Was Swept Away, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at Cl. 
67. John Schwartz, Darth Hider. Machiavelli SIdlling Set Intense Pace., N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 7, 2002, at Cl. 
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"The moral of the story is, 'You can break the rules, you can cheat, you 
can lie, but as long as you make money, it's all right.">6S 
Enron's whiz kid recruits entered a perpetual tournament, termed 
the "rank or yank" system.69 Each got to pick ten other employees to 
rank his or her performance.70 But the system also allowed coworkers 
to make unsolicited evaluations into an online database.71 At year's 
end, Skilling threw everybody's results onto a bell curve, and those on 
the wrong end of the curve were terminated.72 Those who remained 
scratched and clawed to get or stay in the winners' circle.73 Wmners 
got million dollar bonuses and were privileged to accompany Skilling 
for glacier hiking in Patagonia or Land Cruiser racing in Australia.74 
Differences between winners and losers within Enron became 
starker as 2001 unfolded. All of the employees became losers as their 
401(k)s gave up a billion dollars in value.7s Management froze the 
plan accounts in October 2001, the same month Enron revealed a third 
quarter loss of $638 million.76 Meanwhile, top executives holding 
Enron stock, purchased through the stock option plan, were not 
similarly restricted and continued the heavy selling in which they had 
been engaged for some months. Sales of personal Enron stock yielded 
Kenneth Lay proceeds of$23 million in 2001.77 Redemptions of Lay's 
stock by Enron itself during the year netted him an additional $70.1 
million.7$ Skilling sold $15.6 million worth before he resigned and 
$15 million thereafter.79 Amalgamated Bank, the plaintiff in a lawsuit 
against Enron's officers and directors, alleged gross sales of $1 billion 
of Enron stock by its officer and director defendants over a three-year 
period.~o 
68. Id 
69. Alexei Barrionuevo, Jobless in a Flash, Enrons Ex-Employees Are Stunned, 
Bitter, Ashamed, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11,2001, at BI. 
70. Id 
71. Id 
72. Id 
73. Id 
74. Seeid 
75. Millon, supmnote 7, at 8. 
76. Id at 9. 
77. Rachel McTague, Andersen Charges Enron with Withholding Key Infonnation 
Affecting Balance Sheet, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rept. (BNA) 1770 (2001). 
78. Joann S. Lublin, As Their Companies Crumbled, Some CEOs Got Big-Money 
Payouts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2002, at B 1. 
79. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Fonner Head ofEnron Denies Wrongdoing, N.Y. TThfES, 
Dec. 22, 2001, at CI. 
80. Reed Abelson, Enron Board Comes Under a Stonn of Criticism, N.Y. TTh1ES, 
Dec. 16, 2001, at MB4. 
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We will see that Enron planted the seeds of its own destruction 
with its implementation of Skilling's "asset lighf' strategy. This, 
although a logical extension of the strategy-in-chief, was not necessary 
for its implementation. For the core of Enron's virtual fIrm strategy, 
then, the question remains: Has the strategy gone down with Enron, as 
Paul Krugman has asserted, or does a valuable arbitrage play remain 
on the table to be picked up by a successor? 
R Enron s Virtual Corporation and the Theory of the Finn 
The theory of the frrm suggests that value may indeed lie in the 
unbundling of vertically combined frrms. The point follows directly 
from Ronald Coase's touchstone paper of 1937. Transacting on the 
market, said Coase, entails costs of learning and bargaining, costs that 
loom large in respect of long-term arrangements. Internalizing a 
production function economizes on these costs by interposing 
directions from a governance structure. But internalization carries its 
own costs stemming from increased rigidity and error. The boundary 
between the frrm and the market lies at the point where transaction 
cost savings equal the incremental costs of rigidity and error. Sl Viewed 
through the Coasian lens, Jeff Skilling's claims look almost modest. 
Enron, utilizing contemporary information technology, had put 
together a set of components-an information network, a derivative 
product line, and online access-which drastically reduced the cost of 
contracting for a range of products. Such a risk reduction causes the 
frrm's boundary line to shrink and the zone of cost-effective arm's 
length contracting to expand. The shrinkage does indeed imply the 
unbundling of vertically integrated firms. 
Coase's insight is further articulated in the contemporary property 
rights theory of the frrm. This theory, like Coase's, suggests that 
beneath Enron's hyperbole there may indeed lie untapped sources of 
value. 
Property rights theory asserts that long-term contractual 
relationships inevitably are incomplete; it never will be cost effective 
for parties to specify up front all future uses of productive assets.82 A 
81. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-95 (1937). 
82. The theory puts human assets to one side, on the ground that they cannot be 
bought and sold and accordingly are not among the subject matter of lInn contracts. The 
lInn thus is conceived in terms of its nonhuman assets-fIxed assets, client lists, intellectual 
property, and contract rights. Id; Oliver Hart, An Economists Perspective on the Theory of 
the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1757, 1766-73 (1989). There is no necessary conflict between 
this perspective and Enron's vision of a proprietary market generated by human intelligence, 
unburdened by signifIcant fIxed assets. Enron was posing the profIle of a contemporary 
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problem follows. Absent an exhaustive set of terms, a party to a 
contractual relationship may be subject to a holdup-an action by the 
counterparty directed to the division of the relationship's ex post 
surplus. To the extent the relationship's structure invests a 
counterparty with bargaining power, the holdup diverts the surplus to 
that counterparty. The theory accordingly directs its attention to the ex 
post allocation of control over assets (hence the name "property 
rights"). The insight is that ex post bargaining power goes to the owner 
of the assets, and that the allocation of asset ownership therefore 
powerfully impacts productive incentives ex ante. 
For an example of the theory's operation, consider the 
relationship between a Shipper (5) and a Trucker (1) hypothesized by 
the economists George Baker and Thomas Hubbard.83 S contracts with 
Tfor a point-to-point haul from A to B. An additional contract will be 
made for the back haul, from B to A or anywhere else, only to the 
extent S needs that service at the time it makes the contract. Even if no 
back haul contract is entered into ex ante it remains possible that Swill 
need a back haul and will want such a contract after T starts 
performing the point A to point B contract. If T starts performing the 
contract \vithout a back haul contract, T will spend resources, 
including time, on a search for a back haul contract during 
performance of its contract with S. In addition, if Tfmds a back haul 
contract and it turns out that S needs a back haul when T arrives at B, 
Twill be in position to use the back haul contract to bargain with S for 
a greater share of the gains on the back haul. Meanwhile, T is the 
party who maintains the truck. The question is whether Tshould own 
the truck or S should own the truck in a vertically integrated fIrm. 
The answer depends on the facts. If Towns the truck, Tbears all 
of the value consequences of decisions respecting maintenance; T 
accordingly has a high-powered incentive to keep the truck well 
maintained and perform hauls so as to reduce wear and tear. If S owns 
the truck, it may be rational for Tto slack off on maintenance because 
financial institution against that of an old economy industrial. Financial institutions are built 
on assets just like industrials, it is just that contract rights and intangibles loom larger than 
physical things. Control of these rights leads to effective, if not direct, control over the human 
assets that make the business run. For a contrasting view of the theory of the rmn, centered 
on human assets, see Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The 
Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 IL. ECON. & ORG. 199 (1988). 
83. The discussion draws on Oliver Hart, Nonns and the Theory of the Finn, 149 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1701,1708-12 (2001), which draws in turn on GEORGEP. BAKER & THOMAS N. 
HUBBARD, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. REsEARCH, CONTRACTIBILITY AND AsSET OWNERSHIP: 
ON-BOARD COMPUTERS AND GOVERNANCE IN U.S. TRUCKING, WORKING PAPER No. W7634 
(2000). 
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T does not bear all of the value consequences. On the other hand, if T 
owns the truck, T will engage in back haul search activity, which is 
costly to S even as T keeps the truck well maintained. The vertical 
integration question comes down to a trade-off-the deadweight cost 
to S of rent seeking by T respecting the back haul versus the 
maintenance disincentives following from ownership by S. 
Assume that rent seeking respecting back haul is very costly to S. 
S accordingly internalizes the trucking function, and along with it the 
management problem of incentivizing its drivers to minimize wear and 
tear on the trucks. Now assume that Enron enters the trucking market, 
creating a cheap and accessible marketplace in which carriers and 
shippers buy and sell truck haul capacity. So long as maintenance 
remains a problem and the Enron market offers S adequate capacity, 
the Enron market easily could prove substantially cheaper than the 
internally owned trucks. Divestiture therefore will make sense for S. 
The Enron market lowers the cost of search for T and reduces S's 
dependence on Tin the event a back haul becomes desirable to S, with 
the clear result that Tshould own the truck. 
More generally, property rights theory teaches that where two 
assets are sufficiently complementary and contracts respecting their 
deployment are sufficiently incomplete, common control dominates 
over separate ownership. Extreme complementarity obtains when, as 
between assets separately owned by two actors, neither actor can profit 
from increased output of either asset unless she has access to both; that 
is, absent the other asset, each is useless.84 In that case, integration is 
the only way to produce. Contrariwise, where complementarity is not 
extreme, a given asset by defInition can be used for different purposes. 
Vertically to integrate a fInn owning such an asset with another fInn 
requiring only a subset of the possible uses, is potentially to sacrifIce 
value. Since the owner-manager of the acquired fIrm loses ownership 
rights, there is a diminished incentive to invest in the asset on the part 
of those responsible for deploying the assees Generalizing, as a fInn's 
operations grow away from a core of complementary assets, there arise 
increasingly severe incentive problems respecting the peripheral assets. 
Productivity decisions at the periphery will tend to be directed in the 
interest of the core, a species of holdup. 
At this point the theory yields a presumption against integration. 
Because integration in a large organization increases the number of 
84. Hart, supra note 82, at 1770. Separate ownership only creates opportunities for 
holdUps. Id 
85. Id at 1767-68. 
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potential holdups, absent significant gains from complementarity, 
nonintegration tends to be more productive than integration.86 Emon's 
business plan built on this latter point. The sudden appearance of a 
cheap and reliable trading market where none existed previously 
reduces complementarities among assets across the economy. 
But universal unbundling does not necessarily follow. It all 
depends on particulars respecting costs in the case. As an example, 
consider a result yielded by Baker and Hubbard's trucking study. Their 
survey of the industry shows that 18 in need of back hauls resort to a 
thin spot market managed by brokers, and that rent seeking by 18 
respecting back hauls is very costly to SS. Meanwhile, the introduction 
of computer trip monitoring technology made it possible for Ss to draft 
incentive contracts with drivers that substantially ameliorate incentive 
problems respecting maintenance of Sowned trucks. In the market 
described by Baker and Hubbard, then, technological innovation 
caused the cost balance to tip toward intemalization.87 This, of course, 
still leaves open the possibility that the introduction of a more efficient 
market for trucking capacity could shift the balance back. 
In addition, it should be noted that complementarities among 
assets expand as investment in assets becomes relationship specific. 
Here consider the famous example of General Motors (GM), which 
manufactured cars, and Fisher Body, which manufactured car bodies, a 
principal componenes The two firms became integrated after a period 
of relational contracting, in which Fisher proved unresponsive to GM 
demands for stepped-up production. Could Emon have solved their 
problems with an online market for car bodies? That would depend on 
numerous technical and cost factors. GM and Fisher became involved 
in a problematic relational contract because GM needed bodies 
manufactured according to its own specifications, which manufacture 
required a considerable start-up investment on the part of its supplier.89 
86. Id at 1770. 
87. See Baker & Hubbard, supra note 83. 
88. See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropdable Rents, and the 
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 IL. & EeoN. 297 (1978). 
89. In order to be induced to make the investment in the production facility, Fisher 
required a long-term purchase commitment from GM. The contract needed a price term that 
prevented GM from squeezing Fisher down to its variable costs after the costs were sunk. 
Fisher accordingly got a ten-year requirements contract, which priced the bodies on a cost-
plus percentage basis, protecting GM from price gauging by Fisher. But then Fisher turned 
the tables on GM. A run-up in demand made it rational for GM to want Fisher to invest in a 
new plant. A new plant would mean a lower cost per unit. But that investment made no sense 
to Fisher, which would make more money producing with its old equipment at higher cost 
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Once the supplier makes the investment, there results a significant 
complementarity. Nothing about a cheap, online business-to-business 
market guarantees the existence of products meeting particular 
specifications or of incentives to make buyer-specific investments. 
Additional, intrinsic limitations on the Enron model should be 
mentioned. Enron's promise to provide the product over time at a 
predictable price can be fulfIlled only to the extent that derivative 
hedges cost-effectively can insulate against price fluctuations. Such 
insulation comes cheapest on a short-term basis. Transaction costs go 
up as the duration extends to an intermediate term. Derivative 
protection on a long-term basis comes at a much more substantial cost. 
Such innovative, long-term contracts did figure into Enron's business.90 
But as yet we have no performance track record for them, so their 
viability as a substitute for ownership remains to be proven.91 The 
upshot is that the Enron trading market was not yet a perfect substitute 
for vertical ownership. To the extent that a long-term price 
commitment is material, vertical integration still could dominate. 
Finally, consider Oliver Hart's point that the greater the quantum 
of trust in the environment, the more actors can be expected to use the 
under the cost plus fonnula. Finally, GM bought all of Fisher's stock. Klein, supmnote 82, 
at 200-02. 
90. See The Fall of Enron: How Cold It Have Happened?: Hearings Before the 
United States Senate Comm. on Govemmental Affairs, 107th Congo (2002), at 
http://www.senate.gov/-gov_affairs/012402partnoy.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2002) 
[hereinafter Enron Hearings] (providing testimony of Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law, 
University of San Diego School of Law). 
91. Long-tenn derivative contracts implicate substantial problems of valuation. 
There also can be liquidity problems. Consider in this regard the story ofMetallgesellschaft 
(MG), a large Gennan company, that went to the brink of bankruptcy in 1994 following a 
misconceived hedge. The fInn had sold a series of nonderivative, long-tenn, fIxed-price 
delivery contracts for oil. These contracts resulted in a long-tenn exposure to a rise in the 
price of oil. MG only partially hedged this risk with long-tenn derivative purchase contracts, 
which trade in a thin market and tend to be illiquid. It made up the gap by buying short-tenn 
oil futures contracts and rolling them over every three months. The strategy behind this "false 
hedge" was as follows. For some years, short-tenn oil prices had been higher than long-tenn 
prices, and the two had moved up and down together. On this price pattern, a rise in prices 
would result in profIts in the short-tenn futures market that covered MG's losses on its long-
tenn forward contracts. But it did not work out that \vay. The price pattern broke abruptly 
when OPEC failed to agree on production cutbacks in the fall of 1993. Short-tenn prices fell 
sharply, causing MG losses on the short-tenn positions. MG attempted to unwind the short-
tenn positions and shift to long-tenn hedges. But traders in the thin long-tenn market 
awaited it and the long-tenn price rose slightly. What had been modest profIts on the hedge 
became a series of large losses, said to amount to $1.2 billion. See Richard C. Breeden, 
Directors, Control}vur Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1994, at A14; Metallgesellschafl: 
Not So Clever, ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 1994, at 83, 83. 
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market and stay separate.92 The credibility of Enron's projections of a 
disintegrated future depended on a strong assumption about the 
trustworthiness of the substitute marketplace. It therefore appears that 
Enron's collapse does bear importantly on the credibility of predictions 
of future vertical disintegration. Enron's market was not a free public 
space in which buyers and sellers came together to transact directly 
with one another. It was instead an intermediary space owned and 
controlled by a single corporate entity. Such a market's viability as an 
alternative to ownership entirely depends on the corporate proprietor's 
fmancial health, validated by an investment-grade credit rating. Any 
buyer or seller materially relying on the existence of an Enron product 
market got a rude shock when Enron lost its credit rating due to 
concealed ill-health and tumbled into Chapter 11 two weeks later. 
The foregoing analysis introduces some significant qualifications 
to the notion of the virtual firm. It thereby deflates Enron's pumped-
up vision of micro companies tied together by a single giant corporate 
intellect. But it does not at all rebut the suggestion that we could see 
significant disintegration beyond the 1990s practice of corporate 
unbundling. 
m. ACCOUNTING FOR ENRON'S COLLAPSE-FoUR STORIES 
A. Enron as Conventional Market Reversal 
Enron's results for 1998, 1999, and 2000 suggest some interesting 
comparisons. The firm's revenues increased by $10 billion from 1998 
to 1999, and by $60 billion (to $100 billion) from 1999 to 2000. 
During the period, revenues contributed by Enron's old economy asset 
businesses-its pipelines and water companies-stayed stable. The 
revenue growth93 came from Enron's new economy trading business. 
Meanwhile, net after-tax income rose much more slowly, as the chart 
below shows. Pre-tax profits (not depicted on the chart) increased by 
$1 billion in 1998, and then by only $500 million in each of 1999 and 
2000. These simple horizontal analyses suggest declining returns in 
92. Hart. supra note 83, at 1710. It is noted that Hart shows that the point is not an 
absolute; on some scenarios trust favors a large organization. Id at 1711-13. 
93. Even with this simple point-the statement of revenues-there is a little bit of 
smoke and mirrors in the financials. Enron's spectacular revenue growth stemmed from the 
fact that when it effected a transaction, it followed the energy industry pmctice of booking the 
entire contmct sale price as a revenue, instead of booking only its commission-accounting 
like a retailer mther than a broker-dealer. The cost to Enron of commodities tmded are 
booked as expenses. The growth of expenses, termed "costs of gas, electricity, metal and 
other products," accordingly was just as spectacular as the growth of revenues-from $34.7 
million in 1999 to $94.5 million in 2000. See ENRON, supra note 36, at 31. 
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the trading business.94 More particularly, even as Enron had opened 
more and more new trading territory, entrance barriers were low. As 
time went on, Enron had to deal with dozens of competitors who hired 
away its employees to compete in what had become its bread-and-
butter business, undercutting its profit margins. According to one 
analyst, Enron's trading margins collapsed from 5.3% in early 1998, to 
1.7% in the third quarter of 2001.95 Investor attention to the problem 
was deferred for a time because the California energy crisis and the 
attendant period of sky-high electricity prices led to extraordinary 
returns to all traders in that market. As California's prices dropped 
back to normal, Enron's shrinking trading returns became more 
apparent.96 
ENRON STOCK PRICEIREVENUES/EARNINGS 
(Source: Enron Annual Report 2000) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 
HIGH 23 22.5 29 44 
Low 17 17.5 19 28 
12/31 CLOSE 22 21 29 44 
REVENUE 13.2 20.2 31.2 40.1 
($MILLIONS) 
NET INCOME 493 515 698 957 
($MILLIONS) 
2000 
90 
41 
83 
100.7 
1,266 
Enron's managers saw that rapid maturation of its new markets 
presented a problem for its growth numbers. Their strategy for dealing 
with it was to step up the process of market creation, moving into new 
commodities like pulp and paper, steel, and, most daringly, bandwidth. 
In addition, in 1999 they successfully launched EnronOnLine, an 
Internet-based commodity trading platform. But these initiatives did 
not make up for the shrinking returns in Enron's bigger volume energy 
trading business. And there was another problem. Good as they were 
at opening markets, Enron's managers were less adept at the old 
economy discipline of cost control.97 Indeed, extravagant spending was 
an everyday incident of life at the fmn.98 
94. Special Report, supra note 28, at 61-62. 
95. Id 
96. Jenkins, supra note 12. 
97. Bill Keller, Editorial, Enron for Dummies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, atA15. 
98. Neela Banerjee et aI., At Enron, Lavish Excess ODen Came Before Success, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2002, at Cl. 
HeinOnline -- 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1301 2001-2002
2002] DARK SIDE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE 1301 
Bandwidth emerged as a special problem. Enron had invested 
$1.2 billion to build and operate a fiber optic network. m 2001, it 
found itself with an operation with 1700 employees that devoured 
$700 million a year with no sign of profitability. These numbers 
emerged just as severe overcapacity and fmancial distress hit the 
broadband business as a whole. The negative implications for Enron's 
stock price far outstripped the drain on cash flow. According to some 
outside analysts, when Enron's stock peaked in August 2000, priced at 
ninety with a price earnings ratio of sixty, a third of the price stemmed 
from expected growth in the broadband-trading operation.99 
Old economy-related factors also contributed to Enron's 
problems. A number of big-ticket investments abroad-most 
prominently, the $3 billion power plant in Dabhol, mdia, a $1.3 billion 
purchase of the main power distributor to Sao Paulo, Brazil, and the 
$2.4 billion purchase of the Wessex Water Works in Britain-all were 
performing badly. These global mistakes were adding up in public 
view. 100 
Finally, Enron's managers, "laser-focused" on earnings as they 
were, had to keep an eye on its portfolio of "merchant investments." 
This contained many large block holdings of stock in technology and 
energy companies. Many of these positions were illiquid; hedges were 
either expensive or unavailable. 101 Enron accounted for these 
investments as trading securities. Under this treatment, unrealized 
increases in the stocks' prices had flowed through to its income 
statement as gains.I02 Thus had the rising stock market benefited 
Enron's numbers. A falling market would have the opposite effect, 
however. 
The combination of the foregoing conditions and the stock 
market's general decline caused Enron's stock to fall precipitously even 
before resignations and scandals beset the company. The stock lost 
99. Zellner et aI., supra note 3, at 34-35. 
100. Id at 32. In mid-2000, Enron came close to dumping the lot in a sale to a group 
of wealthy Middle Eastern investors for a tidy $7 billion. Unfortunately, the deal aborted. 
David Barboza, Enron Sought to Raise Cash Two Year.sAgo, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,2002, at Cl. 
A contract to sell Enron's interest in Wessex Water has been entered into the Chapter 11 
proceeding, netting $777 million in cash. Suzanne Kapner, Enron Selling Wessex ~ter for 
$777 Million, N.Y. TU\1ES, Mar. 26, 2002, at C13. 
After Enron's banlauptcy filing, it was alleged that Enron officers, seeking to protect its 
net earnings totals, point blank refused to write-off expenses booked as assets in overseas 
projects that had manifestly failed. Kathryn Kranhold, Enron Disputes Investors' Charge of 
Manipulated Cost Accounting, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9,2002, at B7. 
101. See POWERS REpORT, supra note 53, at 77-92. 
102. HERwl1Z & BARREIT, supra note 8. 
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thirty-nine percent of its value in the fIrst six months of 2001.103 Had 
Emon gone into Chapter 11 at this point in the story due to these 
factors (taken together with a recession), the story would be 
umemarkable. The distress would stem from garden variety risks and 
problems faced by all fmns. Such failures bespeak erroneous business 
judgment and bad luck on the part of managers, but present no policy 
problem for business regulation. Emon captures our interest because 
these causes were necessary but not sufficient for its collapse, at least 
on the present state of the record.104 
R Enron as Derivative Speculation Gone Wrong 
As we have seen, risk management through derivative contracting 
was a central component of Emon's trading business. These risk 
management services imply risks to the service provider. Emon nicely 
described these in its 2000 Annual Report: 
Wholesale Services manages its portfolio of contracts and assets in 
order to maximize value, minimize the associated risks and provide 
overall liquidity. In doing so, Wholesale Services uses portfolio and 
risk management disciplines, including offsetting or hedging 
transactions, to manage exposures to market price movements 
(commodities, interest rates, foreign currencies and equities). 
Additionally, Wholesale Services manages its liquidity and exposure to 
third-party credit risk through monetization of its contract portfolio or 
third-party insurance contracts. Wholesale Services also sells interests 
in certain investments and other assets to improve liquidity and overall 
return, the timing of which is dependent on market conditions and 
management's expectations of the investments' value .... 
The use of fInancial instruments by Enron's businesses may expose 
Enron to market and credit risks resulting from adverse changes in 
commodity and equity prices, interest rates and foreign exchange 
rates. !Os 
The last sentence just quoted makes a critical point respecting the 
risk profIle of fmns that deal in derivatives. The degree of risk 
103. Zellner et aI., supra note 3, at 33. 
104. The assertion in the text assumes that Enron's balance sheet and income 
statement figures respecting its trading and energy production operations were fundamentally 
sound. The assumption could turn out to be heroic. Analysts are already starting to ask 
questions. One, for example has been comparing numbers reported in regulatory filings with 
numbers Enron claimed to be generated by Enron OnLine, noting a huge discrepancy. 
Gretchen Morgenson, How 287 Tumed Into 7: Lessons in Fuzzy Math, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 
2002, at MB 1. 
105. ENRON, supra note 36, at 23, 28 (Management's Discussion and Analysis) . 
• 
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exposure depends on whether the "rocket scientists" in the fInn's 
derivatives department fully or partially hedge their positions. 
Anything other than full hedging can mean a loss (or windfall gain) in 
the event of price volatility. Management's Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A) in Enron's 2000 Annual Report makes a state-of-the-art 
governance assurance: 
Enron manages market risk on a portfolio basis, subject to parameters 
established by its Board of Directors. Market risks are monitored by an 
independent risk control group operating separately from the units that 
create or actively manage these risk exposures to ensure compliance 
with Enron's stated risk management policies.106 
What Enron's "stated risk management policies" actually said 
was not disclosed. Some observers of Enron's fall suspect that, 
whatever the "stated policy," the practice might have been imprudent. 
More particularly, they hypothesize that Enron's derivatives traders had 
been pumping up its earnings with bets that energy prices would rise. 
Such bets would have meant signifIcant profIts in 1999 and 2000.107 In 
2001, however, such betting would have meant signifIcant losses as 
energy prices fell.lOs On this scenario, Enron's fall mimics the 1998 
case of Long-Term Capital Management, with two differences. Here 
the high-tech bets were on energy prices rather than on interest rates, 
as there, and here there was no bailout engineered by the Federal 
Reserve, as there. 
Others press a different, but concomitant, derivative story. They 
allege that Enron's trading floor was a nest of corruption. The traders, 
it is said, routinely overstated their own trading profIts, impelled no 
doubt by the tournament system's demand for good numbers. The 
traders also abused the fair value accounting that now applies to their 
operation. Under this, some derivative positions are "marked to 
market" (MTM) each reporting period. Under MTM accounting, even 
though the position remains open and gain or loss has not yet been 
realized, the frrrn's income statement reflects the gain or loss implied 
by the contract's current value. For over-the-counter derivatives, no 
trading market sets this fIgure. The contract's value must be derived 
106. Id at 27 (Management's Discussion and Analysis). 
107. Professor Partnoy offers an analysis ofEnron's income statement showing that ail 
of its profits for its last three years came from derivatives. Enron Hearings, supra note 90, 
PartID.C. 
lOS. Enrons Fall: Upended, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1,2001, at 65; Michael Schroeder & 
Greg Ip, Out of Reach: The Enron Debacle Spotlights Huge Void in Financial Regulation, 
WALL ST. 1., Dec. 13,2001, at AI. 
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from an economic model. Unfortunately, generally accepted 
approaches to valuation did not yet exist for many items in Enron's 
vast stock of innovative derivative products, particularly those with 
longer terms. An opportunity for income statement legerdemain 
resulted, and it is alleged that Enron's traders took liberal advantage.109 
Similar accounting treatment,110 along with similar problems of 
speculative valuation, applied to Enron's long-term energy trading 
contracts. Here Enron aggressively exploited a special rule procured 
by the energy industry. Under this, the fInn books estimated gains for 
the lives of long-term supply contracts on a present basis, rather than 
spreading the recognition of revenues over the lives of such contracts 
as would be done under conventional accounting. Indeed, it now 
appears that Enron marketed these and similar transactions to potential 
counterparties, selling accounting and tax treatments along with 
energy and fmancial products, with the treatments importing more 
substance than the transactions themselves.111 
If some or all of the foregoing allegations turn out to be true-
and many have turned out to be true already-then derivatives trading 
very well may have brought Enron down in 2002 or thereafter. But in 
2001, when Enron fIled for bankruptcy, none of the foregoing was 
known to the fmanciers and related actors who determined Enron's 
fate. Strictly speaking, then, a malfunctioning derivatives operation 
did not bring Enron down.112 Whether the lion's share of these 
allegations prove out remains to be seen.113 
A cautionary, counterfactual note enters the story nonetheless: 
Even ifEnron's derivative positions were appropriately managed, many 
observers were ready to believe the company to be a candidate for 
derivative distress in light of the direction of energy prices in 2001. 
Given that distress stemming from other quarters would make it 
difficult for Enron to maintain its credit rating and liquidity, and thus 
109. Enron Hearings, supra note 90, Part ill.C. 
110. See Emerging Issue Task Force (EITF) Issue 98-10: Accounting for Contracts 
Involved in Energy Trading and Risk Management Activities. 
Ill. See David Barboza, Enron Offered Management Aid to Companies, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 10, 2002, at Cl. 
112. Cf.Michael Schroeder, As Enron sDedvatives Trading Comes Into Focus, Gap in 
Oversight Is Spotlighted, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2002, at C1 (noting Professor Partnoy's 
testimony and noting the absence of oversight, but citing no corroboration of the allegations). 
113. It bears noting that in January 2002, UBS Warburg purchased Enron's energy 
trading operation from the Chapter 11 debtor in possession, implying a judgment of 
soundness. On the other hand, that deal involved a contingent consideration. Daniel Altman, 
New Economy: Many Think that Enron s Business Model for VntuaJ Trading Remains 
Sound Despite the Companys Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at C4. 
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its relationships with contract and derivative counterparties, suspicions 
respecting derivatives exposure could not have helped matters. Enron's 
famously opaque fmancials only fueled suspicions. 
If Enron's derivative operation turns out to have been corrupt, 
there arise two powerful regulatory implications. First, the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act should not have exempted 
Enron and similarly situated fIrms from oversight.1I4 Second, the 
achievement of transparency respecting derivative positions for all 
fmancial intermediaries should take fIrst place on the federal 
regulatory agenda. 
C. Enron as a Den of Thieves 
Disclosures of self-dealing transactions in the fall of 2001 
seriously destabilized Enron. The disclosures concerned a complex of 
side deals involving two limited partnerships of which Enron's CFO, 
Andrew Fastow, was the manager of the general partner. These 
arrangements put $30 million into Fastow's pocket, and resulted in an 
overstatement of Enron's earnings over four years of at least $591 
million. I IS This Part starts with some accounting, laying out basic rules 
governing parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, and other entities and 
showing how those rules created problems for Enron's middle 
managers as they worked to realize Skilling's vision. The Part goes on 
to the Fastow arrangement and the $30 million and fmally turns to 
earnings manipulation. 
1. Accounting Rules and Chewco's Phantom Equity Investor 
Enron listed more than 3000 affiliated entities in its 1O-K., 
variously accounting for them as consolidated subsidiaries, equity 
affiliates, and Special Purpose Entities (SPEs). 
When one fInn owns a majority of the stock of another fInn, the 
accountants require the two fInns' fmancial statements to be 
consolidated. The two fInns' income numbers are combined and a 
common balance sheet shows all assets and liabilities. Transactions 
between the two fInns drop out and do not generate revenues for either 
fIrm's income statement. Enron had many such subsidiaries. But 
subsidiaries did not fIgure prominently in Skilling's "asset lighf' 
114. The Act should be amended to remove the ''Enron Poinf' in any event. 
115. The number comes from an Enron SEC filing. Bigger numbers now circulate. 
The Powers Committee would later suggest that $1.1 billion is a more accurate figure for the 
overstatement respecting the Fastow partnerships. POWERS REpORT, supra note 53, at 127-28. 
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restructuring program. Enron had to minimize the amount of debt 
appearing on its balance sheet in order to preserve its credit rating. 
The viability of its trading and derivatives operation depended on an 
investment grade endorsement. Accordingly, when Enron sought to 
enhance returns on an equity investment through heavy leverage, it 
made sure it owned less than a majority of the investee company. It 
had such fIfty percent (and under) investments in an array of hard-
asset companies, which it termed "equity affiliates." Accounting for 
these stock holdings proceeded under the "equity method." Under 
this, the investee's fmancials are not consolidated; the investee's debt 
accordingly does not appear on the stockholder's balance sheet. On 
the other hand, intercompany transactions drop out and cannot 
generate revenues for either firm's income statement. Finally, the 
stockholder company shows a pro rata share of the investee's earnings 
on its income statement.1l6 
A third accounting category permits a corporation to set up an 
unconsolidated affiliate and transact with it so that the profIts from the 
transactions do flow through its income statement-the qualifIed 
Special Purpose Entity. SPEs tend to be high-leverage shells. The 
party in Enron's position (the "transferor" or "originator") transfers a 
fmancial asset to the SPE in exchange for consideration other than 
equity in the SPE. The SPE can raise the consideration for the asset 
transferred in any number of ways. If the asset has a rock-solid 
payment stream, it can borrow the consideration from a third party or 
in the public markets. It also can raise substantial outside equity 
capital. If the asset's creditworthiness is dubious, outside borrowing is 
precluded. But the SPE still can return its own debt paper to the 
originator. Multitudinous Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) rules apply, mainly focused on the nature of the sales 
transaction between the originator and the SPE.1I7 There is also a 
critical SEC rule-three percent of the SPE's total capital must come 
from an outside equity investor,118 who must in addition have the power 
116. See HERWITZ & BARREIT, supra note 8, at 524-27. 
117. A statement of the current accounting rules are set out in Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial 
Asserts and Extinguishment of Liabilities (Mar. 2001). The previous rules are set out in 
SFAS No. 125, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and 
Extinguishment of Liabilities (June 1996). 
118. The three percent test is an SEC accounting rule. It originated in a 1991 letter of 
the Chief Accountant of the SEC issued in respect of a leasing transaction. The GAAP 
authorities are EITF Topic D-14: Transactions Involving Special Purpose Entities; EITF 90-
15: Impact of Non substantive Lessors, Residual Value Guarantees, and Other Provisions in 
Leasing Transactions; EITF Issue 96-21: Implementation Issues in Accounting for Leasing 
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to control the disposition of the asset in the SPE.119 This means that the 
outside equity holder must hold at least a majority of the SPE's 
equity:20 In addition, the outside equity holder's capital must be "at 
risk"-the originator cannot guarantee the investment's results. 121 
Finally, a legal determination as to the ''banlauptcy remote" status of 
the SPE from the transferor also must be made.122 This all may sound a 
little sinister, but respectable fIrms use SPEs every day as vehicles for 
off-balance sheet securitization of fmancial assets such as accounts 
receivable and loan portfolios. In the case of accounts receivable, the 
transferor fIrm lowers its borrowing costs.l23 In the case of a loan 
portfolio, the transferor fIrm gains liquidity and an opportunity to 
diversify its investments. 
Enron used Fastow's limited partnerships as means to stay in 
compliance with the SPE rules. Fastow's entities served as the outside 
equity investor-the source of the qualifYing three percent-for SPEs, 
which served no economic purpose other than to pump-up Enron's 
accounting earnings. As to entities such as these, arm's length outside 
equity investors understandably can be hard to fmd. The famous 
Chewco SPE, which preceded the Fastow limited partnerships in $TIe 
and later fIgured independently in the Enron accounting scandal, 
illustrates the problem. 
Transactions Involving Special Purpose Entities. The SEC insists that there is no bright line 
three percent test and that the level of outside funding should follow from the nature of the 
transaction. See David A. Kane, Remarks at the 28th Annual Conference on Current SEC 
Developments (Dec. 4, 2000) (on file with Tulane Law RevieW). The profession appears to 
treat the standard as a numerical rule, however. 
119. Edmund L. Jenkins, Chairman, FASB, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on 
Commerce, Trade and Consumer Prot of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce 9-10 (Feb. 
14, 2002), available athttp://www.fasb.org/news/testimony.pdf(last visited Aug. 22, 2002) 
[hereinafter Jenkins Testimony]. 
120. Id If the equity participation is minimal-at the three percent level-then it must 
own 100% of the equity. 
121. Id 
122. ERNST & YOUNG, FINANCIAL REpORTING DEVELOPMENTS: ACCOUNTING FOR 
TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL AsSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES-
FASB STATEMENT 140, at 135-37 (2001). 
123. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Structured Finance: The New Way to SecuritizeAssets, 
11 CARDOZO L. REv. 607, 607-13 (1990). There is a policy debate respecting these 
transactions. The originator lowers its borrowing costs only so long as the SPE is 
''bankruptcy remote." Some argue that this imports an inappropriate priority to the SPE 
lenders to the detriment of preexisting contract creditors and all tort creditors of the 
originator. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 WM. 
& MARY L. REv. 1055, 1055-1120 (1998) (discussing securitization and bankruptcy law); 
Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 
1077-1111 (1996)(same). 
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Back in 1993, Enron set up a joint venture in energy investments 
with Calpers, the California state pension fund. It was called Joint 
Energy Development Investments (JEDI). In 1997, Skilling wanted 
Calpers to enter into an unrelated investment arrangement with Enron. 
Calpers was willing, but only if it fIrst was cashed out of JEDI. A 
direct purchase by Enron of Calpers' fIfty percent equity stake in JEDI 
was not an option. That would have meant turning JEDI into a wholly 
owned subsidiary ofEnron whose debt would have to be consolidated 
on Enron's balance sheet. JEDI was heavily levered-its debt amounted 
to $1.6 billion by 1999:24 To avoid that result, Enron formed an SPE, 
Chewco, and used Chewco to buyout Calpers. Chewco borrowed the 
money and Enron guaranteed the 10an.l2S Between 1997 and 2001, the 
Chewco arrangement permitted Enron to recognize $405 million of 
revenues and gains respecting transactions with JEDI and Chewco.126 
Everything would have been fine except for one little compliance 
problem. Enron had never gotten around to rmding the three percent 
outside equity investor needed to qualify Chewco as an SPE. The 
Powers Report tells a sordid story here. Skilling wanted the Calpers 
takeout closed so quickly that Enron's middle managers had to fund 
Chewco's "equity" with a secret loan from Enron. A continued search 
for an equity investor after the Calpers closing proved fruitless. In the 
end, a sham transaction was constructed and concealed both from 
Enron's board and its auditor, Arthur Andersen. The transaction took a 
bank loan through some entities run by an Enron officer, Michael 
Kopper, and disguised the loan as an $11 million equity investment in 
Chewco.127 
The arrangement came to light within Enron in fall 2001, 
disqualifying its previous accounting treatment of Chewco and JEDI. 
DisqualifIcation in fall 2001 meant consolidation of JEDI and Cheweo 
124. Some of the purchase price paid by Chewco also may have come from a loan by 
JED! itself John R. EmshwiIIer, Enron Transaction Raises New Questions, WALL ST. 1., Nov. 
5,2001, atA3. 
125. Id 
126. POWERS REpORT, supra note 53, at 42; see also John EmshwiIIer, Andersen CEO 
Apparently Testified Inaccurately, WALL ST. 1., Jan. 11, 2002, at A4. 
127. See POWERS REpORT, supra note 53, at 41-47. Chewco became a limited partner-
ship with Michael Kopper as the general partner and Big River Funding LLC as the limited 
partner. The sale member of Big River was Little River LLC, of which Kopper's domestic 
partner was the sale member. Id at 47. How this was supposed to get control of Chew co 
away from Enron is anybody's guess. The $11.4 million loan was from Barclay's Bank. 
Although called a "funding agreemenf' yielding a "certificate:' the substance was clearly that 
of a credit arrangement. Id at 50; see also John R. EmshwiIIer & Rebecca Smith, Joint 
venture: A 1997 Enron Meeting Belies OJJicers' Claims They Ui're in the Dark, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 1,2002, at AI. 
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with the result that Enron's earnings for 1997 through mid-2001 were 
retroactively reduced by $405 million.128 Meanwhile, consolidation 
increased its total indebtedness by $628 million. This was not the only 
such disqualification to occur in fall 2001.129 
Another JEDI transaction which came to light later should be 
mentioned. JEDI owned twelve million Enron shares, which it 
accounted for as trading securities. Unrealized gains on the stock thus 
flowed through to JEDI's income statement. Enron, accounting under 
the equity method with the approval of Andersen, then flowed fifty 
percent of that unrealized appreciation on its own stock over to its own 
income statement. In the fIrst quarter of 2000, Enron bootstrapped its 
way to $126 million of revenue this way. But in 2001, when Enron's 
stock fell, no corresponding deductions flowed through!130 This was 
not the only way Enron used its own stock as a means to generate 
paper earnings. 
2. Fastow's $30 Million 
In 1999, Andrew Fastow organized two limited partnerships, LJM 
Cayman, L.p. (LJM1) and LJM2 Co-Investment L.p. (LJM2). The 
entities were formed to participate as the outside equity investor in 
SPEs set up by Enron. Fastow controlled LJM1 and LJM2, serving as 
the managing member of their respective general partners. J3J The 
arrangement involved an obvious conflict of interest. Enron would be 
doing transactions with entities controlled by its own CFO. But there 
was a justifIcation. LJM1 and LJM2 promised to solve the 
compliance problem that had led to the under-the-table dealings 
respecting Chewco. \32 At the same time, with Fastow in charge, 
transactions could be set up and executed smoothly and quickly. LJM1 
and LJM2 were funded with outside equity-a long list of fmancial 
institutions contributed around $390 million in exchange for limited 
partnership interests and a representation that these entities' privileged 
status meant the best Enron deals. The investors included IP. Morgan, 
Chase, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, First Boston, and Wachovia; 
128. POWERS REpORT, supm note 53, at 42. 
129. Enron Form 8-K, filed Nov. 8,2001, § 2.B. 
130. POWERS REpORT, supmnote 53, at 58-59. 
13!' With LJM2 there were two tiers of general partners between Fastow and the 
limited partnership. Id at 73-74. 
132. The Powers Report questions whether an adequate separation of control ever 
really was achieved. Id at 75-76. 
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employees of Merrill Lynch (which had marketed the interests) also 
kicked in $22 million. '33 
A scandal resulted when the terms of the transactions between 
Enron and the SPEs in which LJMl and LJM2 made the three percent 
equity investments were :fully disclosed to the public in October 2001. 
An analytically distinct problem arose for Enron with the disclosure 
that Fastow had raked in $30 million from compensation arrangements 
respecting his management of the limited partnerships. The SEC 
launched an investigation on October 22. Fastow got the sack two days 
later. He has since retained David Boies.'34 
The vociferous reaction to Fastow's self-dealing suggests a 
tentative explanation of Enron's failure centered on a loss of 
confidence. An old economy, hard-assets rIrm can weather this sort of 
disclosure by causing heads to roll and bringing in heavyweights from 
outside to clean up. Enron, however, had ceased to be a hard-assets 
company. Its survival depended on its trading operations, the success 
of which required trust and confidence among Enron's counterparties. 
The scandal in the wake of the self-dealing disclosure amounted to an 
external shock to the structure of confidence Enron had erected over 
many years. The rIrm went down with the structure, much like Drexel 
Burnham Lambert's'35 collapse of a decade ago in the wake of the 
proceedings against Michael Milken. 
This neat story gives rise to a number of questions. First, LJMI 
and LJM2 and Fastow's role in them were not exactly news in the fall 
of 2001. They had been disclosed in footnote 16 of Enron's 2000 
rmancials. Now, this disclosure was not a model of clarity. Fastow is 
not mentioned by name and the paragraphs offer only a scattershot and 
cursory description of the dealings back and forth. But the types of 
transactions between Enron and the LJM-related SPEs are clearly 
stated, along with the magnitude of the numbers involved.'36 Footnote 
16 reports: 
(a) that Enron had transferred to the LJM-related SPEs more than 
$1.2 billion in assets, including millions of shares of Enron common 
133. John R. Emshwiller et aI., How Wall Street Greased Enrons Money Engine, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 14,2002, at Cl. 
134. Enron's board went into the time-honored crisis mode and appointed a special 
committee of outside directors. This was led by William Powers, the Dean of the University 
of Texas School of Law, appointed to the board for the occasion. The committee thereinafter 
retained Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and Deloitte & Touche for legal and accounting advice. 
Enron Fonn 8-K, supra note 129, § 4. 
135. Also an Arthur Andersen client. 
136. ENRON, supra note 36, at 48; seealsoENRoN, 1999 ANNuAL REpORT 59 (2000). 
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stock and long-term rights. to p-Ufchase millions more shares, plus $150 
million ofEnron notes payable; 
(b) that the SPEs had paid for all of this with their own debt 
instruments with a face amount of $1.5 billion; and 
( c) that the SPEs had entered into derivative contracts with Enron 
with a notional amount of $2.1 billion.137 
One has to turn to Enron's 2000 proxy statement to see Fastow 
identified. The proxy statement discloses that Fastow will be 
remunerated by a "percentage of the profits ... in excess of the general 
partner's proportion of the total capital contributed to [the partnership] 
depending on the performance of the investments made."138 No actual 
numbers are given, but we are told 
(a) that "management believes that the terms ... were reasonable and 
no less favorable than the terms of similar arrangements with unrelated 
third parties;' and 
(b) that actors other than Fastow negotiated the transactions for 
Enron.139 
Enron's November 2001 Form 8-K adds that Enron's board had 
reviewed the matter of Fastow's affiliation and determined it not to be 
injurious to Enron's interests. Continuing controls were imposed-each 
LJM transaction had to be approved by the Chairman and two 
additional top officers, and the Audit Committee was to conduct an 
annual review.140 
The Powers Committee report on LJM1 and LJM2, released in 
February 2002, later would establish beyond peradventure that the 
transactions between Enron, the SPEs, LJM1, and LJM2 involved 
breaches of fiduciary duties owed by Fastow and others to Enron.141 
Terms of many sales contracts were skewed to favor LJM (and thus 
137. ENRON, supmnote 36, at 48. 
138. Enron Schedule 14A, filed Mar. 21, 2000, at 26. 
139. Id at 25-26. 
140. Enron Form 8-1(, supmnote 129, § 5.A. 
141. The most outrageous occurred in connection with the termination of LJM!. 
Fastow caused the "termination interests" to be directed to a partnership called Southampton 
Place. As a partner, Fastow made $4.5 million over two months based on a negligible 
investment. Two other Enron officers made $1 million each. POWERS REpORT, supm note 53, 
at 16. Those involved in the Southampton caper and still with the company on November 8, 
2001 were fired that day. Enron Form 8-1(, supmnote 129, § 7. 
Fastow had sold his interests in LJM! and LJM2 in July 2001 to Michael Kopper. 
Unlike Fastow, Kopper resigned from Enron in connection with his purchase of the interests. 
Enron Form 8-1(, supm note 129, § 5.A; see also Joann S. Lublin & John R. Emshwiller, 
Enron Boards Actions Raise Liability Questions, WALL ST. 1., Jan. 17, 2002, at Cl. 
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Fastow's equity interest). As a resWt of this, returns to LJM's outside 
equity investors were quite fantastic. 142 
But no one knew any of this on October 17, 2001, when the only 
news was the fact that returns to Fastow amounted to $30 million. 
Given that previous disclosures held out the possibility of a significant 
upside possibility for Fastow, why all the brouhaha? As a matter of 
corporate law, deals like this do not breach fiduciary duties on a per se 
basis. 143 If we follow the Delaware cases, the disinterested directors' 
approval means that a plaintiff seeking to make out a breach of the 
duty of loyalty has to bear the burden of showing that the transactions 
were unfair. l44 Unfairness obtains only if Fastow's $30 million was out 
of line with the returns of managers of comparable limited 
partnerships, or if plaintiff could show that the terms of the 
transactions between Enron and LJM unduly favored LJM. ill October 
2001, neither situation obtained on the face of the public record. 145 
Given the large numbers involved in the Enron-LJM SPE transactions 
and a practice of large rewards for promoters of private equity 
schemes, a fmding of fiduciary breach respecting the $30 million 
taken by Fastow would have seemed unlikely, absent Enron's other 
problems. 
We can draw several lessons from the fact that, despite all of this, 
disclosure of the $30 million taken alone caused a scandal. First, 
contrary to the efficient market hypothesis,146 actors in the fmancial 
142. See. e.g., POWERS REPORT, supra note 53, at 1 03-04 (discussing returns on LJM2). 
143. However, many, including the author, think they should. For a discussion of the 
Delaware law implications of Enron, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact, Some Early 
Reflections on the Corporate Law Implications of the Enron Debacle (2002) (working paper, 
on file with author). 
144. See Cooke v. Ooli~ No. 11,134- (DeL Ch. June 23, 1997),23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
775 (1998). Enron is an Oregon corporation. Cooke is referenced because it interprets a 
statute worded very similarly to OR. REv. STAT. § 60.361 (1999), which governs self-dealing 
transactions. 
145. Much is made of the fact that LJM2's marketing materials asserted that, because 
of the insider tie, LJM2 would get the best Enron SPE transactions. See Henriques & 
EichenwaId, supra note 8, at MB 1. 
It is noted that Fastow, in one presentation on LJM, represented that partnership matters 
took up only three hours of his time per week. ErnshwiIIer & Smith, supra note 127, at AI. 
146. The strong form of the efficient market hypothesis asserts that all information is 
incorporated into the stock price; the semi-strong form asserts that the price reflects all 
publicly disclosed information. VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE 
FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 128-30 (4th ed. 1993). Even in descriptions of market 
pricing that acknowledge considerable departures from efficiency, it is generally thought that 
stock prices are particularly likely to be accurate given a thick trading stock and a large 
market capitalization, both of which obtained with Enron. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. 
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market EfJiciency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 622-26 (1984). Of 
HeinOnline -- 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1313 2001-2002
2002] DARK SIDE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE 1313 
markets are selective so far as concerns assimilation of facts rendered 
in fme print sections of fmancials and other SEC documents. Second, 
the strength of the norm against self-dealing brought to bear in the 
fmancial community varies with corporate results. On the upside, no 
one pays much attention. The operative norm is that of the corporate 
law duty-self-dealing transactions are acceptable so long as the 
consideration stays in the same ballpark as that of comparable 
transactions. Since everyone is making money, magnanimity makes 
sense. Disturbing the side deal could destabilize a productive 
employment arrangement.147 On the downside, everything is different. 
The same officer touted as an entrepreneurial genius on the upside 
starts to look like a thief and his or her self-dealing transaction causes 
a scandal even though it already was disclosed. 
This could be called scapegoating. It is defensible nonetheless. 
The officer who succumbs to temptation on the upside assumes the 
downside risk of reputational ruin. The fmancial community and the 
law only tolerate self-dealing transactions as a matter of expediency. 
Beneath that tolerance runs a strong norm of aversion which can rear 
its head viciously in bad times. Neither Andy Fastow nor any other 
self-dealing corporate actor plausibly can express surprise when a 
spate of red ink triggers his or her denunciation as a miscreant. Legal 
liability easily could follow: The transaction that did not breach the 
duty of loyalty when entered into in good times can breach the duty by 
virtue of the fact that unrelated subsequent events make it look unfair 
to an ex post decision maker.14S 
course the $30 million figure was new, but the previously disclosed facts implied such a 
figure, at least to an audience of sophisticated investors. 
147. See Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447, 
455-56 (Iowa 1988) (concluding that self-dealing contracts costing more than comparable 
contracts were not unfair because they incentivized a successful entrepreneur). 
148. There is also a lesson here for the corporate law academics who have debated 
back and forth the question whether fiduciary constraint of self-dealing transactions should 
continue to be mandatory or should be downgraded to contractual status as a liability regime 
into which corporations opt in their charters. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1434-48 (1989) (arguing for 
opting out ,vith process controls), uith Jeffrey N. Gordon, Thr;: MandatOlY Structure of 
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1593-97 (1989) (arguing that contract failure is 
probable with broad brush opting out of fiduciary duties). Unfortunately, Enron's case will 
not end the argument It instead raises two conflicting inferences. On the one hand, the 
vehemence of the ["mancial community's imposition of the norm against Fastow suggests that 
contractual treatment may suffice. Such a deeply and widely held aversion to self-dealing 
arguably needs no support from a mandatory legal regime. The reputational ruin awaiting 
those who traverse the norm should more than suffice as a deterrent. On the other hand, 
Enron's demonstration of the norm's power supports the mandatory regime. If there were no 
,videly held norm against self-dealing, mandatory fiduciary liability would be of dubious 
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To sum up on Fastow and his $30 million, this previously 
disclosed self-dealing transaction, taken alone, makes an implausible 
candidate for a leading role in an account ofEnron's collapse. For that 
we must look to the broader terrain ofEnron's dealings with its SPEs 
and affiliated companies. 
3. SPEs and Overstated Numbers 
The confidence-based account of Enron's collapse becomes more 
compelling with a closer look at transactions between Enron and the 
SPEs related to LJM1 and LJM2.149 
a. The Watered Stock 
Recall that Enron funded the LJM-related SPEs with $1.2 billion 
of its own common stock, along with other assets, exchanged for debt 
instruments of the SPEs. A century ago, corporate law barred such 
transactions, prohibiting the use of debt or other promissory 
consideration in connection with the issue of new common stock. ISO 
The risk that insiders would take the stock and ertioy an upside play 
without ever delivering on their promises was deemed great enough to 
support a per se prohibition. Today corporate law has a more relaxed 
attitude, remitting the decision as to the adequacy of the consideration 
legitimacy. Indeed, given charter competition's historical role in assuring that legislatures 
remove outmoded mandates from corporate codes, the self-dealing mandate already would 
have disappeared from the law if it lacked normative support. Meanwhile, the norm makes it 
implausible to contend that the ancillary costs of fiduciary litigation carry no compensating 
benefit-vindication of the norm is a benefit. Finally, just as the norm imports substantive 
support for the mandate, so does the mandate support the norm, serving as a backstop 
enforcement mechanism. No more than a backstop appears to be needed-empirical studies 
of corporate law litigation show that only a very small number of shareholder derivative 
actions are brought in respect of self-dealing transactions. See Roberta Romano, The 
Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. EeoN. & ORG. 55, 58-60, 84 (1991) 
(showing small numbers of derivative actions). Of course it can be argued that these small 
numbers merely show the norm's independent prohibitive force. But that point just as easily 
can be modified so that the small numbers are seen to stem from the combination of the 
norm's power and the certainty of enforcement against violators. 
149. Only with the Powers Report, supmnote 53, did the public get a complete record 
of these transactions. The description in Enron's 2000 Annual Report was unhelpful. The 
details that led to a scandal and contributed to Enron's bankruptcy were set out in Enron's 
corrective filings with the SEC in November 2001. The famous letter to Lay written by 
Enron vice president Sherron Watkins also discussed these transactions. Text of Letter to 
Enrons Chainnan After Departure of Chief Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at C6 
[hereinafter Watkins LetteIj. 
150. See BAYLESS MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 41-42 (2d ed. 
1981). 
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to the discretion of the board of directors. lSI Accountants retain a 
healthy suspicion: Notes received in exchange for a company's own 
common stock must be booked as deductions from shareholders' 
equity.ls2 The newly issued stock is credited to the capital stock 
account at the purchase price, but the capital stock accounts elsewhere 
are debited (reduced) in the amount of the note. The result is a wash at 
the time the note is issued. As the note is paid, the reduction gradually 
is reduced, with a corresponding net increase to the shareholders' 
equity account!S3 
Such niceties, however, did not fall within the purview ofEnron's 
aggressive accounting practices. When it capitalized the LlM-related 
Raptor I-N SPEs, Enron booked the notes issued by the SPEs as 
assets on its balance sheet and increased its shareholders' equity in a 
like amount, as one would do when selling newly issued common 
stock for cash in a public offering. Enron and Andersen later thought 
better of the treatment. Unwinding it meant the sudden and highly 
embarrassing disappearance of $1.2 billion from Enron's net 
shareholders' equity!S4 
Significantly, the matter at least had been mentioned in the 
footnotes to Enron's 2000 fmancials. We see the stock going into the 
SPEs, and then some sentences later we read of "a special distribution 
from the Entities in the form of $1.2 billion in notes receivable."lss 
151. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 6.21 (b)-(c) & cmt. 1 (discussing board of 
directors' determination of adequacy of consideration for shares). 
152. EITF Issue No. 85-1: Classifying Notes Received for Capital; SEC Staff 
Accounting Bulletin No. 40, Topic 4-E: Receivables from Sale of Stock; 17 C.ER. Part 211 B 
(2002); seea/soJenkinsTestimony, supmnote 119, at 22. 
153. Say stock is issued in exchange for a $1000 note payable. At issue the following 
entries are made in the shareholders' equity section: 
Note Receivable from Issue of Shares $1000 
Capital Stock $1000 
When the Note is paid, two entries follow: 
Cash $1000 
Note Receivable from Issue of Shares $1000 
The net result is an increase in cash and an increase in equity, but it is permitted only after the 
Note is paid. GAAP extends this skepticism to accounting for all speculative debt paper, 
under the installment and cash recovery methods. See HERwITZ & BARRETI, supm note 8, at 
494-97. 
154. Enron Form 8-K., supmnote 129, § 3. See also Powers Report, supmnote 53, at 
125-26, which notes that Andersen was ready to deem the mistake immaterial. 
155. ENRON, supm note 36, at 48. 
HeinOnline -- 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1316 2001-2002
1316 TULANE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 76:1275 
b. The Equity Swaps that Weren't 
Enron used the LJM-re1ated SPEs-Talon and the Raptors I-
N-as counterparties in equity swaps.IS6 The swaps hedged Enron's 
exposure to downside risk on large block positions of publicly traded 
equity it held in its "merchanf' portfolio. Enron needed hedges of 
these exposures to protect its income statement. Because the stocks 
were accounted for as trading securities, any unrealized decreases in 
their market values were deducted from Enron's net earnings. So far 
so good: It is normal for holders of large, undiversified equity stakes, 
such as executives holding sizable positions in their own companies' 
stock, to enter into such contracts. Ordinarily this is done with a 
financial institution for a short or intermediate term. To describe a 
very simple transaction, if the stock subject to the swap goes up during 
the period of the swap, the executive pays the bank the amount of the 
price increase. Because the executive's own block of stock has gone 
up as well, the transaction is a wash so far as the executive is 
concemed.157 If the stock goes down, the bank pays the amount of the 
decrease to the executive. The bank in turn hedges its downside risk 
on the stock by selling the stock short or purchasing a put option on 
the stock. 158 
The LJM-related SPEs acted in the position of the fmancial 
institution. But they did not make hedging contracts to cover their 
exposure in the event the stock subject to the swap lost value. Such 
contracts would have been expensive if available at all. Instead, the 
Enron common stock (issued in exchange for the SPE notes) used to 
fund the SPEs was to cover any SPE loss on the swap. 
The Enron portfolio stocks under the swap did lose value. Enron 
set up the swaps just as the subject stock prices hit peaks. According 
to the Powers Report, the value of the portfolio under the swaps fell by 
$1.1 billion across five fiscal quarters, so that the SPEs owed Enron 
$1.1 billion under the contracts. Enron, using the new "fair value" 
accounting, marked the value of its rights under the swap contracts to 
156. The account in the text draws on Emon Form 8-K, supra note 129, § 5.A, Sherron 
Watkins' Letter to Lay, Watkins Letter, supra note 149, and the Powers Report, supra note 53. 
157. In the real world, the executive may swap for the return on some other investment, 
for example the return on a market portfolio such as the S & P 500 or a portfolio of bonds. 
158. Shorting the underlying stock means borrowing shares to cover the position. In 
order to borrow the shares, the short party must provide collateral, which will be cash. The 
party lending the shares and holding the cash collateral pays interest on the cash, at rate 
slightly under LIBOR. The bank pays this interest over to its swap customer, but at an even 
lower rate, pocketing a spread (around thirty basis points, depending on the customer). This 
in effect is the bank's fee. 
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market for income statement purposes. Enron's reported numbers are 
lower than the later Powers figures: Enron's Annual Report for 2000 
showed a $500 million gain on the swap contracts, which exactly offset 
its loss on the stock portfolio. This $500 million made up about one 
third ofEnron's earnings for 2000 (prior to restatement in 2001). 
Problems arose. The Enron common stock used to fund the SPEs 
with capital to support the swaps also started falling. Where its value 
fell below the SPE's exposure on the swap, the SPE was technically 
insolvent. There resulted a series of improvised restructurings of the 
transactions, carried out by Enron's middle managers and concealed 
from its board of directors.159 
Worse, the whole transaction structure followed from a very 
faulty premise. The stock protected by the swaps was not going to go 
back up. The SPEs had not hedged, so that, under the deal, their losses 
on the stock would have to be covered by the stock issued by Enron. 
Collapsing everything into one transaction, Enron was issuing its own 
common stock to itself to cover its own income statement loss, thereby 
increasing its own net earnings over the life of the swaps by a total 
figure in excess of $500 million ($1.1 billion according to the Powers 
Report). 
This one may not do under the most basic rules of accounting, 
indeed, under the most basic rules of capitalism. One issues stock to 
raise capital. One then uses the capital to do business and generate 
income. One cannot skip this step and enter the capital stock directly 
into income. The value of a firm stems from its ability to take the 
capital and earn money over time; its stock market capitalization 
reflects projections of its ability so to do. Here Enron perverts the 
system, using its market capitalization-the value of its common 
stock-to support the value of its common stock. 
At Ken Lay's direction, Enron folded the SPEs and the swaps in 
the third quarter of 2001, restating past earnings downward by almost 
$600 million. It had at least noted the arrangement in the footnotes to its 
2000 Annual Report. The Report tells us of the hedges, and we see that 
Enron owes the SPEs "premiums" totaling $36 million. Further, "Enron 
159. POWERS REpORT, supra note 53, at 98. In one particularly egregious arrangement, 
Enron's middle management had no Enron stock available to fund the SPE. Instead of going 
to the board to get more authorized, they funded the SPE with a block of the same stock being 
hedged by the swap. Needless to say, the SPE became insolvent rather quickly when the 
stock went south. Id at 114-15. The stock in the SPE was that of The New Power Company, 
an Enron startup slated to market power directly to consumers. The enterprise flopped rather 
badly. See Rebecca Smith, Short Circuit: How Enron s Plan to Market Electricity 
Nationwide Fizzled, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2002, atAl. 
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recognized revenues of approximately $500 million related to the 
subsequent change in the market value of these derivatives, which offset 
market value changes of certain . . . investments:,160 However, we are 
not told how the SPE will be covering its $500 million loss exposure. 
Nor are we told why "premiums" were due and owing. It took 
the Powers Report to clear that up. Fastow negotiated a deal for LJM 
that guaranteed a windfall profit out of each SPE even before a single 
swap was put in place. The SPE would write a put on its Enron 
common stock and sell the put to Enron. Enron would pay a premium 
on the put at the market rate for such a contract. The SPE transferred 
the premium to LJM as an immediate return on capital. For example, 
with LJMl and the Talon SPE, this was a $41 million payment, 
making for a 193% annualized return on the LJM investment.161 
ENRON-THE COURSE OF EVENTS, 2001 162 
DATE 2001 STOCK Event 
PRICE 
January 1 83.12 
February 12 79.80 Skilling named CEO 
March 26 LJM transactions restructured; 
Chewco closed out 
April 17 60 First quarter profits of $536 
million announced 
May 5 59.78 
August 14 43 Skilling resigns 
August 15 40.25 Sherron Watkins delivers letter to 
Lay 
October 15 33.17 
October 16 33.84 Third quarter loss of $618 million 
announced 
160. ENRON, supm note 36, at 48. 
161. POWERS REpORT, supm note 53, at 103-04. The Powers Report also shows 
numerous additional earnings manipUlations carried out through LlM-related SPE 
transactions. Enron transferred fmancial assets to the SPE at prices favorable to Enron right 
before the expiration of a fiscal quarter. In many of these cases, the SPE would later transfer 
the asset back to Enron at an assured profit. Id at 128-44. A family resemblance to the real 
estate flips of Charles Keating and the Lincoln Savings & Loan is noted. See Lincoln Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 905-19 (D. D.C. 1990). 
162. Robert L. Bartley, Editorial, Enron: First; Apply the Law, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 
2002, at A23; Kurt Eichenwald & Diana B. Henriques, U&b of Details Did Enron In as 
Wamings U&nt Unheeded, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,2002, at 1; EmshwiIIer, supmnote 124, at 
A3. 
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DATE 2001 STOCK Event 
PRICE 
October 17 32.20 Rumors of $1.2 billion equity 
write-off circulate on Wall Street 
October 17 32.20 401(k) plans frozen 
October 17 32.20 Wall Street JoumaJ reports Fastow 
rake of $30 millionl63 
October 18 29.00 Wall Street JoumaJ reports the 
$1.2 billion write off 
October 22 SEC launches investigation of 
Enron accounting 
October 24 16.41 Fastow terminated 
October 25 16.35 Merger discussions with Dynegy 
commence 
October 31 13.90 
November 8 8.41 Form 8-K fIled; reveals LJM and 
Chewco earnings write-offs 
November 9 8.63 Dynegy merger agreement 
executed and delivered 
November 19 9.06 Form 10-Q fIled; reveals hidden 
guarantees, cash flow crisis 
November 28 0.61 S&P downgrades Enron to junk 
status 
November 28 0.61 Dynegy cancels merger 
November 30 0.26 
December 2 0.40 Chapter 11 filing 
c. Summary 
At around the same time Enron revealed the aforementioned 
downward restatements of its previously reported results, Enron 
announced a 2001 third quarter loss of $618 million (compared with 
around $300 million profits a year earlier). Just looking at the 
numbers for the year 2000, the downward adjustment due to LJM-
related entries was $519.9 million, a significant number in view of the 
fact that Enron's restated net earnings for 2000 amounted to only $847 
million. I&! The problem went beyond the numbers, which were not 
163. John Emswhiller & Rebecca Smith, Enron Jolt: Investments, Assets Generate 
Big Loss, WALL Sr. J., Oct. 17,2001, at Cl. 
164. Enron Form 8-K, supra note 129, § 2. 
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large enough to bring down Enron, taken alone. The terms of the 
transactions showed that Enron had been pumping up its earnings by 
abusing the SPE device. Whenever economics had gotten in the way 
of a result it wanted, it had used its own high-flying common stock to 
surmount the sticking point. On the upside this might pass; with the 
stock falling through the floor this meant trouble. Even worse, Enron 
no longer had any credibility-no one can believe anything asserted by 
a firm that covers up losses by entering into sham derivative contracts 
with itself 165 
It is possible that the credibility deficit in time could have 
brought down the firm.l66 As to that we can only speculate, for 
independent reasons brought about Enron's collapse before the 
implications of its SPE accounting could be assimilated fully. 
D. Enron as a Bank Run 
As a part of Skilling's "asset light" strategy, Enron had moved 
hard assets worth billions into affiliated entities. Many were majority 
owned by Enron and consolidated into its fmancials, some of these 
even having their own credit ratings. Many more were unconsolidated 
affiliates accounted for under the equity method. We have seen that 
with its SPEs Enron could divest itself of fmancial asset, even as it 
needed to sell only a relatively small stake to outside equity investors. 
With Enron's unconsolidated affiliates, bigger outside equity stakes 
were required. 
But why would smart money from the financial community 
commit significant money as Enron divested junk assets? Leverage 
appears to provide a good working explanation. Enron wanted to 
realize as much cash as possible from its asset divestments. So in 
165. Enron's securities plaintiffs will be putting this earnings management together 
with stock sales by Enron's officers and directors to depict a classic "pump and dump" 
operation. 
166. More SPE shenanigans have come to light since the Chapter 11 filing. 
"Braveheart" is the most notorious. Enron transferred its interest in a joint venture with 
Blockbuster (to use Enron's broadband to sell movies directly to consumer subscribers), 
which never got off the ground, to an SPE called Braveheart. The SPE bought the right to 
receive the first ten years of project revenues. A Canadian bank loaned the $115 million 
purchase price to the SPE, ,vith Enron guaranteeing the revenue stream. With Enron 
bankrupt, the Canadian bank is now left holding the bag. Enron booked a $11 0 million profit 
on the sale, netting the negative assumed value of the guarantee against the purchase money. 
The transaction arguably conforms to GAAP. Keller, supra note 97, atAl5; Floyd Norris & 
Kurt Eichenwald, Fuzzy Rules Of Accounting and Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at Cl; 
John R. Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Murky ~teJ:S": A Primer on Enron Partnerships, 
WALL ST. 1., Jan. 21, 2002, at Cl. 
HeinOnline -- 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1321 2001-2002
2002] DARK SIDE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE 1321 
many cases Enron and its outside equity turned to outside lenders to 
provide debt capital for the equity aiIiliate. Had the aiIIliates 
borrowed nonrecourse to Enron, these deals would not have threatened 
Enron's stability. 
But it seems that in many cases outside lenders were unwilling to 
lend on the credit of the junk assets Enron was dumping into its equity 
aiIiliates. They insisted that Enron itself be liable on a contingent 
basis. As an example, the debt of Marlin Water Trust, an aiIiliate 
through which another aiIiliate, Atlantic Water Trust (in which Enron 
had a one-third equity interest) invested in a company called Azurix 
Corp., a joint venture that owned a water works in Britain. Marlin was 
capitalized with $125 million in equity and $915 million in debt. 
"Trigger events" in its debt contracts provided that Enron would 
become liable on its debt if either Enron lost its investment grade 
credit rating or its common stock price fell below $59.78. If either 
trigger went off, Enron had ninety days to register and sell sufficient 
common stock to pay down the debt. To the extent Enron did not raise 
the cash to pay the debt with a stock offering, Enron was obligated to 
make up the difference in cash.167 Similarly, Enron had backed $2.4 
billion of debt of another equity aiIiliate, Osprey, with a contingent 
promise to issue Enron equity, and ultimately to assume the debt, 
should the value of the stock prove inadequate.l6S 
The Marlin and Osprey debt obligations show us why Enron's 
house of cards fmally collapsed. As Enron transferred hard assets 
from its balance sheet into the affiliates, it sought cash consideration 
for the assets rather than dodgy debt paper issued by the aiIiliate. 
Some cash would come in from outside equity participants, but not 
much. The affiliates had to be levered in order to attract private equity, 
which would accordingly be putting up only a small fraction of the 
value of the assets purchased. Significant cash consideration for the 
assets therefore meant outside lenders. To swing deals in the private 
placement debt market, Enron gambled on the price of its own high-
flying stock. If the stock remained buoyant, the obligation to pay the 
debt came due only on the debt's maturity. At that time, the still-
buoyant stock would provide a painless vehicle for paying off the debt 
167. Enron Form lO-Q, filed Nov. 19,2001, Part I, Item 1. 
168. The Marlin/Osprey arrangements were pioneered by Enron together with 
investment bankers from Citigroup, Credit Suisse, First Boston, and Deutsche Bank. Some 
then sold similar arrangements to other energy companies, such as EI Paso Corporation and 
the Williams Companies, which also wished to divest junk assets. See Patrick McGeehan, 
EnrOll s Deals T~re Marketed to Companies by Wail Street, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,2002, at Cl. 
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should the value of the affiliate's assets fall short. IfEnron's stock fell 
gradually and caused the trigger to go off, Enron could get out from 
under the debt by minting more stock. It would have a problem on 
only one scenario. If the triggering stock decline was a free fall, Enron 
would be unable to bail itself out with a new stock offering and the 
debt would be accelerated directly against it. It was the last scenario 
that actually occurred. 
Here was high-leverage financing in a mode that the promoters of 
the leveraged buyouts of the 1980s never would have dared to imagine. 
The 1980s deals were old economy deals, in which lenders looked to 
the earning power of hard assets and took mortgages and security 
interests in the assets. 169 New economy company that it was, Enron 
borrowed on a virtual basis: It took on contingent obligations secured 
in the first instance by its own market capitalization and incurred for 
the purpose of divesting itself of its own assets. In the 1980s, a highly 
leveraged deal presupposed a projection that the company would 
generate earnings before interest and taxes sufficient to cover the debt. 
At Enron in the virtual 1990s, the value to back the deal came not from 
such an inside projection of what the firm could earn, but from the 
market stock price. Stock prices also result from future earnings 
projections-projections made by outside traders with limited 
information about the company. Sometimes, in runaway stock 
markets, the projections are dispensed with entirely as the traders 
chase trends. 
Unfortunately, Enron took this gamble on its own stock price in 
such a bubble stock market. And so the gamble failed. As we have 
seen, Enron's stock declined for independent reasons as 2001 
unfolded. This, together with the crisis in confidence triggered by the 
SPE disclosures, caused further price declines. Contract contingencies 
began to trigger obligations on billions of off-balance sheet debt. And, 
in a conjuring trick unimaginable to the principals of Drexel Burnham 
Lambert in their most creative moments, Enron had incurred these 
contingent liabilities without bothering fully to disclose them in its 
financial statements, whether on the balance sheet or in the footnotes. 
Indeed, it delayed public disclosure until the last possible point-mid-
November 2001. 
169. There is, however, one notable point of commonality. In the more risky 1980s 
deals, the lenders looked less to the hard assets of the borrower than to spreadsheets showing 
upward growth projections for the borrower's cash flows. Enron, when borrowing against its 
own common stock, was borrowing on the assumption that rmancial reality lay behind the 
heroic growth projections implied by a price earnings ratio of si.""<ty. 
HeinOnline -- 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1323 2001-2002
2002] DARK SIDE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE 1323 
The sudden appearance of $4 billion of additional obligations 
struck Enron with more devastating effect than would have been the 
case with an old-fashioned, hard assets company.170 Enron already was 
frantically trying to prop itself up with new borrowing,171 including a 
$1.5 billion infusion from its partner in a bailout merger, Dynegy.172 
Dynegy, on hearing of the $4 billion, immediately insisted that the $9 
billion merger price be reduced to $4.17 billion. At the same time, 
analysts reckoned that Enron needed $4 billion of immediate cash 
from somewhere to sustain its trading operation. But no cash was 
forthcoming. Enron's trading business melted away; in the last weeks 
almost all of its volume stemmed from unwind orders from parties 
going elsewhere. Dynegy waited a week after learning of the $4 
billion, and then called off the deal. This happened just after Standard 
& Poors, having concluded that there would be no rescue, downgraded 
Enron to junk status.173 Enron had nowhere to go but the Chapter, 
where it ended up in a few days' time. It was, as erstwhile CEO Jeff 
Skilling later observed, a "classic run on the bank.,,174 No wonder he 
had bailed out in AUgust.175 
Skilling's description is apt. Enron had come to look more and 
more like a fmancial intermediary, whether a bank or a broker-dealer. 
Such businesses depend on customer confidence. As we have seen, 
Enron already was looking less than confidence-inspiring by October 
2001. But a fmancial intermediary's customers do not necessarily care 
170. The list of hidden obligations kept growing. The components of the $4 billion are 
broken down in Enron's Form IO-Q, supmnote 167, Part I, Item 2. When Standard & Poor's 
downgraded Enron's debt to BBB- on November 12, the downgrade by itself triggered $1.6 
billion of contingent equity affiliate liabilities to due and owing status (including, on a belt-
and-suspenders basis, some already triggered, like the Marlin borrowings). Standard & 
Poors, focusing on Enron's unsuccessful foreign investments, had put Enron on notice of its 
concerns about the credit rating in June. Enron talked it out of a downgrade. ZeHner et aI., 
supmnote 3, at 32. The collapse ofEnron's stock price triggered an additional $3.1 billion of 
obligations, $700 million of these in connection with a derivative contract. In addition, one of 
Enron's principal credit facilities contained a "material adverse change" clause that also was 
triggered by the downgrade. Oppel, supm note 79, at C3. Jeff Skilling argues that such a 
clause is unusual in such a contract. Id In a form similar to that of a merger upset condition, 
he may be right. But conditions with similar cut-off effects are standard in debt contracts. 
What is hard to imagine is how a bank could sign a contract that required it to continue 
lending in the face of a sudden fifty percent increase in the borrower's long-term debt. 
171. It had to exit the commercial paper market in November. Enron Form IO-Q, 
supmnote 167, Part I, Item 2. 
172. Id 
173. John R. Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Corpomte veiL· Behind EnroD S Fall, A 
Culture ofOpemting Outside Public s Wew, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2001, at AI. 
174. Oppel, supm note 79, at C1. 
175. See Coy et aI., supm note 4, for a quote from an unnamed senior Enron employee 
to the effect that Skilling understood the mess he had created and resigned for that reason. 
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about earnings management and executive self-dealing transactions so 
long as their own contracts are perfonned to the letter. Here 
"confidence" in the fIrst instance means creditworthiness signified by 
an investment grade rating, particularly when the intennediary does 
business in derivative transactions. (That is why banks do this 
business through special purpose subsidiaries with independent credit 
ratings.) To lose the rating is to lose the derivatives business, as 
counterparties take their business risks to a shop able to enter into 
derivative contracts entailing no significant default risk. 
As with the watered stock and the equity swaps that weren't, a 
good part of the story of the hidden liabilities was there to be gleaned 
in Enron's 2000 Annual Report. Although many affIliates and SPEs 
were unconsolidated, the magnitude ofEnron's asset transfer program 
was apparent. Of the $23.4 billion of "Investments and other Assets" 
reported on its balance sheet, $5.3 billion (22.6 percent) represented 
investments in ''unconsolidated equity afIIliates.,,176 Footnote 9 shows 
that these entities' liabilities exceeded that of Enron-they had a total 
of $4.7 billion current liabilities, $9.7 billion long-tenn debt, and 
$6.148 billion of "other noncurrent liabilities.,,177 We also see clearly 
on Enron's income statement that its percentage share of affiliate 
earnings (accounted for under the equity method) could impact its 
bottom line signifIcantly. In 1999, this fIgure was $309 million, 
34.6% ofEnron's net earnings of $893 million. The fIgure fell to $87 
million in 2000, 8.8% of that year's reported $979 million of operating 
net income.178 
Enron's cash flow statement also presents interesting numbers. 179 
Proceeds from sales of "merchant assets;' which in Enron's accounting 
scheme generate operating earnings, in 2000 generated $1.8 billion of 
cash and $1.3 billion of "unrealized" noncash gains. Again there is a 
176. ENRON, supra note 36, at 32. 
177. Id at 42. 
178. Id at 31. Disclosures respecting the contributions to Enron net earnings of the 
proceeds of transfers offmancial assets to SPEs are murkier. Enron reports $541 million of 
extraordinary gain on asset dispositions in 1999 (60.6% of net income of$893 million) and 
$146 million of such gain in 2000 (14.9% of net income of $979 million). Id But Enron 
does not tell us how much of those figures represent sales to SPEs. It does give us reason to 
suspect that they do represent such sales when both of these figures are backed out of the 
operating cash flow section of Enron's cash flow statement, signaling a sale of assets for a 
paper consideration. In 2000, the trading and derivative operation generated $1.63 billion of 
income before interest and taxes, while "sale of asset" activities generated $889 million of 
such income. Id at 23. In the light of hindsight, both numbers, and particularly the latter, 
would be more meaningful if transactions with SPEs had been broken out separately. 
179. Id at 34. 
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signal of a sale for paper rather than money. Enron's statement of 
investment cash flows also makes interesting reading. Of $4.3 billion 
invested, $933 million is "equity investments." 
Two paragraphs above all in Enron's 2000 MD&A stand out in 
light of hindsight. They disclosed the contingent affiliate liabilities 
and triggers: 
Enron is a party to certain fmancial contracts which contain 
provisions for early settlement in the event of a significant market price 
decline in which Enron's common stock falls below certain levels 
(prices ranging from $28.20 to $55.00 per share) or if the credit ratings 
for Enron's unsecured, senior long-term debt obligations fall below 
investment grade. The impact of this early settlement could include the 
issuance of additional shares of Enron common stock. 
. .. Enron's continued investment grade status is critical to the 
success of its wholesale businesses as well as its ability to maintain 
adequate liquidity. Enron's management believes it will be able to 
maintain its credit rating. ISO 
The paragraphs omit at least two material facts-that the "fmancial 
contracts" are affiliate debt contracts and derivative contracts 
unconsolidated on Enron's balance sheet and that Enron's contingent 
liabilities under the "provisions" amount to $4 billion, a figure which 
looms large in comparison to the $1.7 billion of short-term debt and 
$8.55 billion of long-term debt booked on Enron's 2000 balance 
sheet!~1 Belated disclosure of the $4 billion total in November 2001 
was by itself sufficient to bring down the finn.ls2 
180. Idat27. 
181. Id at 33. A highly diligent reader of the fmancials might have flipped twenty-
five pages further on in the fmancials to fmd a half-way disclosure: A $213 million entry for 
"guarantees" added to total debt. A further check of a footnote states an assumption of ten 
percent probability ofiiability, implying a total of$21.3 million of obligations. Id at 52. But 
this $20 million appears to be a separate category relating to letters of credit, discussed in 
footnote 15. Id at 48. 
182. When Enron, as Chapter 11 debtor in possession, first met with its creditors it 
reported a balance sheet debt of $22 billion as of November 16 (and total debt of $39.71 
billion). Mitchell Pacelle et aI., Enron Has One-Year Restructuring Target, WALL ST. 1, Dec. 
13,2001, atA3. Some of this additional debt appears to have been with respect to a swap that 
involved payment up front to Enron by the bank counterparty of the notional amount; Enron 
was to repay that sum over five years. Enron received $3.9 billion of such hidden loans from 
1992 to 2001. Off-balance sheet accounting apparently accorded with GAAP. Daniel 
Altman, Enron Had More Than One U1ly to Disguise Rapid Rise in Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
17, 2002, at 1. Other hidden debt stems from transfers of natural gas purchase contracts 
among Enron, an offshore subsidiary, and IP. Morgan Chase. Sale and purchase contracts 
would be matched, with Enron getting a prepayment for natural gas under the sale contract 
but not making a prepayment in connection with the matching purchase contract. When it 
was netted out, Enron had an intermediate term loan from the bank, which was accounted for 
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E Summary andAnalysis 
All four of the preceding stories figure into the final account of 
Enron's collapse. Had Enron suffered no reverses in its basic business 
and no crisis of confidence, the contingencies respecting the $4 billion 
of obligations that pushed Enron into Chapter 11 might never have 
occurred. At the same time, had $4 billion of additional obligations 
not come out of the woodwork after Enron entered into a merger 
agreement with Dynegy, the merger might have been consummated. 
We can pare down the account by coupling the crisis of confidence 
and the hidden $4 billion of obligations as primary causes. The 
coupling works well-both stories involve equity affiliate and SPE 
transactions incident to Skilling's "asset lighf' strategy and aggressive 
earnings management. Both stories also involve heavy use of Enron's 
common stock as a back-up currency importing stability to an 
otherwise shaky deal structure. 
Viewed with the benefit of hindsight, the equity affIliate and SPE 
transactions appear foolish, reckless, or fraudulent. There arises a 
question as to just what the top officers of Enron thought they were 
doing. Clearly, they pursued much more than the realization of 
Skilling's promise of higher return on invested capital through 
divestment of hard assets. Short-term stakes loomed larger. Viewed in 
the short-term, Enron's asset sales to SPEs generated revenues and 
gains that helped Enron's net earnings meet market expectations 
during the interval prior to the realization of earnings from Enron's 
new investments.IS3 Had the fmancial assets sold to the SPEs been sold 
for cash to third parties at arm's length, they still would have been a 
source of funds. But one suspects that the net earnings impact of arm's 
length sales would have been much less favorable. It accordingly 
made perfect sense to put Fastow on both sides of the SPE transfers. 
His divided loyalty assured a purchase price pitched to Enron's bottom 
line, even as his limited partnership solved the Chewco problem and 
stood ready to serve as three percent outside investor. At the same 
as a sale. Kurt Eichenwald, Enron Hid Big Loans, Data Indicate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, 
at Cl; Kurt Eichenwald, Questions Raised on Enron Offshore Gas Trades, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
19, 2002, at Cl. Enron made a similar arrangement with a Connecticut utility, now an 
unsecured creditor in its bankruptcy. See Paul Zielbauer & Michael Brick, Connecticut Feels 
Fallout From Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,2002, at Cl. 
183. Studies show that when growth stocks report even small earnings shortfalls, the 
resulting stock price declines are disproportionately large. For a summary of the literature, 
see Patricia M. Dechow & Douglas J. Skinner, Earnings Management: Reconciling the 
Wews of Accounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators, 14 ACCTNG. HORIZONS 235, 
245-46 (2000). 
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time, Enron used its equity affiliates as a source of debt capital. This 
borrowing helped the afIiliates yield attractive returns for their outside 
equity investors (and presumably to provide a source of funds for new 
investments in the push to expand trading markets). Deflecting high-
leverage equity investment to the afIiliates made perfect sense for 
Enron because it had to limit direct borrowing in order to maintain the 
investment-grade credit rating on which its trading business depended. 
The equity afIiliate strategy hit a snag only with the terms 
imposed by the outside lenders. They wanted security beyond that 
afforded by the afIiliates' assets. Enron's managers responded with a 
gamble and borrowed against their own stock price. This reflects a 
belief in their own business plan. They must have figured that the 
stock price eventually would become bulletproof once the fInn was 
awash in earnings from broadband and other new initiatives. The same 
projection fIgured centrally in the LJM-related SPE derivative strategy. 
In the interim period before the new investments paid off, the sham 
equity swaps supported earnings per share. Had its stock price stayed 
buoyant, Enron might have covered the SPE's losses on the derivative 
contracts with all eyes remaining averted from the economic substance 
of the transactions. The decision to stay silent about the magnitude of 
contingent obligations similarly fIgured into the gamble. Had the 
stock price stayed up, the only downside on the borrowing was an 
incidental dilution of the common stock interest. And had the stock 
stayed up, the strategy might have worked. Unfortunately, with the 
stock price falling and Skilling pulling out of the company with no 
explanation, investors and reporters started to ask questions. l84 
So, what now seems foolish, reckless, or fraudulent, does so only 
because the gamble failed. Of course, gambling is what high-risk 
high-return businesses are all about. Rarely, however, do we see 
managers of large firms stake so much (the whole company and their 
own liberty) on so little (concealment of off-balance sheet obligations 
and earnings manipulation). 
Thus did Enron's managers cross the line from risk-averse to risk-
prone behavior. Did they do so rationally? We have seen that they had 
their reasons. We should add compensation to the list. Like most 
managers today, Enron's managers received significant compensation 
in the form of stock options. Option holding dulls the actor's 
sensitivity to degrees of distress on the downside, and at the same time 
184. mItkins Letter, supra note 149 (referring to Raptor deals); see also Kraweic, 
supra note 51, at 321-22 (describing Robert Citron of Orange County and the voters' 
acceptance of his risky investment strategies). 
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giving the actor an incentive to generate chances for upside gains of 
high magnitude. Thus directed, a group of managers certainly would 
be more disposed to high-risk strategies. It should be noted, however, 
that stock-option-based incentives tend to operate in the long term. To 
effect a tie between compensation and Enron's managers' obsession 
with short-term numbers, we need to look to Enron's performance-
based bonus scheme. These awards grew as Enron's stock price 
performed better relative to the market as a whole and as managers 
met performance criteria in respect of factors like funds flow, return on 
equity, and earnings per share. ISS Amounts paid in 2001 based on 
2000's numbers were substantial: $9.6 million for Lay; $7.52 million 
for Skilling, $3.925 million for Jeffrey MacMahon; $3.036 million for 
Fastow; and $2.3 million for Kopper.186 
But option holding and bonus taking do not, taken alone, provide 
a plausible explanation for the Enron disaster. For one thing, option 
holding now is ubiquitous among American managers. If option 
holding explains the behavior of Enron's managers, we accordingly 
should be seeing their behavior pattern everywhere instead of the 
present handful of companies beset by scandal. As yet, however, these 
rmns remain outliers. For another thing, the Enron officers gambled 
with more than other people's money. As they crossed the line to 
fraud, they staked their personal liberty. One senses such actions to lie 
outside the box of option pricing. 
For an alternative rational expectations explanation of the 
behavior of Enron's managers, we can turn to the "end period 
problem.,,187 ill this scenario, a ordinarily risk-averse rational actor 
rmds her firm in distress due to business reverses. Bankruptcy being 
the most negative outcome possible, the actor rationally becomes risk-
prone, gambling everything in one last play to avoid destruction. 
Concealment comes with the territory. This explanation would make 
sense for Enron if either the foregoing story of conventional business 
reverses turns out to be much more severe than presently known or the 
185. EnronScheduIe 14A, supmnote 138, at 15-16. 
186. Kurt Eichenwald, Enron Paid Huge Bonuses in '01,' Experts See a Motive for 
Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,2002, at AI. 
187. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fmud on 
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 691. Professor Rose-
Ackennan offers an interesting variation on the theme in Susan Rose-Ackennan, Risk-Taking 
and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEG. STUD. 277, 304-09 (1991). She 
shows how otherwise rational managers of 1980s savings and loans faced federal receivership 
if they continued conservative investment policies due to the fact that they had to pay market 
rates to their savers. Accordingly, they gambled all on risky investments. 
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allegations of a derivatives-based disaster turn out to be true. On either 
scenario, Enron's principals stumbled into distress and rationally 
started manufacturing income and concealing obligations as a way of 
buying time to turn things around and avert disaster. 
If, on the other hand, Enron's business was sound but troubled, we 
need to tell a longer story. This was a fmn where concealment became 
a way of life long before the start of the end period. 188 Enron's 
principals did not just wake up to fmd themselves in trouble. They 
created much of the trouble themselves, voluntarily and unnecessarily 
driving the fmn into an end period. They did so in pursuit of projects 
and returns that their business plan could not support. Arguably, 
rational, risk-averse actors would have moderated the pace of 
expansion, reporting negative numbers to the extent necessary to 
portray the fmn's fmancial condition accurately. To tell a compelling 
causation story on this scenario, we must look to Enron's 
organizational culture as well as its principals' economic incentives.189 
Enron fell because it pursued winning to excess. At Enron, 
\vinning was everything and everything became a tournament. Its 
business plan took unbundling to its logical conclusion, projecting a 
competitive victory over not only other fmns but vertical industrial 
organization itself. Enron's top managers wanted to be surrounded 
exclusively by winners. So they made their workplace a tournament 
without end. They created a space that, unlike the outside world of 
regulation protecting losers, valued above all winning and the risk 
taking which necessarily precedes it. Wmning also meant stunning 
earnings numbers: Where the tournament is ongoing, what counts is 
the most recent score. So important was winning at Enron that it 
became conflated with value maximization. 
Labor economics holds out a formal model of a "superstar" 
actor.190 Inspired by the distribution of returns in show business, this 
describes situations where the size of personal rewards grows in 
lockstep \vith the size of the market and both market size and reward 
are skewed to the most talented people in the activity.191 Applying the 
188. The most famous example is the Potemkin Village trading floor Skilling ordered 
set up in 1998 in order to hoodwink visiting analysts. Jason Leopold, Questioning the Books: 
Enron Executives Helped to Create Fake Trading Room, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2002, atA4. 
189. See Langevoort, Organized Dlusions, supra note 51, at 114-15,130. 
190. For a popular application of this economic theory, see ROBERT H. FRANK & 
PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY (1995). 
191. Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 845 (1981). 
For example, where consumers of music prefer to hear the most able artist perform, the 
producer gets an equilibrium unit price that is proportional to her talent. Because neither the 
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description by analogy to finns in a market, for a "superstar firm," 
small advantages in capability vis-a.-vis the firm's competitors result in 
the firm disproportionately dominating its market. No doubt Enron 
saw itself in this light-as the Tiger Woods of energy trading. Its 
problem was that, given ease of entry into energy trading and shrinking 
margins caused by successful competitors, its superstar status was in 
serious jeopardy. Energy trading turned out to be structurally unsuited 
to the continued dominance by a superstar first entrant: In a superstar 
market, there is imperfect substitution amongst competing 
producers;192 in energy trading, one proprietary trading floor turned out 
to look like another so far as concerned the customers. To realize 
Skilling's vision of being the biggest and best in energy, therefore, 
Enron had to keep going boldly where no one had gone before and 
open new markets.193 This resulted in heroic demands for new capital 
and problems with earnings figures. To keep their victory lap going, 
Enron's managers invented winning value numbers, crossing the line 
to fraud. 
Enron's managers, with a belief system biased toward winning, 
lost touch with both hard economic constraints and the rules of the 
game. Ironically, that disconnection followed readily from their 
tournament workplace environment. Of course, such a reward system 
can be accounted for as an incentive and monitoring scheme.194 But as 
price nor cost of other imputs in the market depends on talent, more able sellers produce 
more output units. The payoff to the top producer is an increasing and convex function of 
talent. The price of talent thus is an increasing function of talent, causing the distrubtion of 
income to be skewed relative to the distribution of ability. Id at 845-47; see also Glenn M. 
MacDonald, The Economics of Rising Stars, 78 AM. ECON. REv. 155 ( 1988) (extending the 
model to show a superstar market can allow for the development of young talent). 
192. Rosen, supmnote 191, at 846. In addition, (1) property rights are assigned to the 
seller so there are no free-rider problems due to nonexclusion and (2) joint consumption of 
the product by a mass audience creates a scale economy allowing a small number of 
producers to service the whole market. Id at 847. 
193. Professor Krawiec's description of the make-up of the rogue trader and the 
tournament structure of the trading floor provide a useful analogy. Krawiec, supm note 51, at 
310-14; see also Langevoort, Selling Hope, supm note 51, at 658-66 (noting that the required 
performance levels necessary to maintain the professional image can increase over time and 
push an actor to risk-prone behavior). 
194. The text uses the term "tournament structure" loosely. The usage should be 
distinguished from that of the formal economics of tournaments, which address certain 
workplace practices. More particularly, the worker exchanges compensation for a promotion 
opportunity; the employer undertakes to promote a set percentage of the employees based on 
their rank ordering in the tournament. The tournament results in economies respecting 
monitoring costs-the employer need only observe the workers' relative performance--even 
as it incentivizes the employees. See EDWARD P. LAZEAR, PERSONAL ECONOMICS 25-37 
(1995). This economic theory has been applied to large law firms. See MARc GALANTER & 
THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW Foo.! 
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corporate cultures develop, tournament schemes can do more than 
encourage strenuous efforts and IIlter out losers. They tend to produce 
winners of a certain type. 19S To be sure, such executives are ambitious, 
persistent, optimistic, and hard working. But persistence does not 
always guarantee success. Enron's managers pursued their business 
plan so persistently that they lost their flexibility.196 They continued to 
open new markets on an accelerated schedule, even though their need 
to maintain an investment grade credit rating made it impossible to do 
this and at the same time tell the truth about themselves to the capital 
markets. Nor is the relentless optimism of the tournament winner 
always a productive force. The optimistic entrepreneur labors under a 
cognitive bias, which underweights downside risk and overweights 
both the probability of upside gain and the entrepreneur's own abilities 
and contributions.197 That cognitive bias is inseparable from 
shareholder value maximization, for the big scores in the stock market 
come from fmns run by entrepreneurs rather than by conventional 
managers. On the downside, however, it can lead to errant decision 
making. 
Tournament winners get where they are because they see the 
world around them in ways that serve their purposes, sacrificing a 
measure of realism. This limitation on their perception is not 
necessarily undesirable-it contributes to their success, keeping them 
focused, flexible, and able to get the job done:93 But there can be 
significant costs when material information fails to register. At Enron, 
just as dissent was not tolerated, so was bad news systematically 
filtered out. It comes as no surprise that the most outrageous self-
dealing described in the Powers Report occurred when Enron was 
dismantling a transaction structure and wiping the transactional debris 
from its table.199 Eyes at Enron tended to be averted from such clean-
(1991). The application is controversial. See David B. Wilkins & O. Mitu Oulati, 
Reconceiving the Tournament of Lalryers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in 
the Intemal Labor Markets of Elite Finns, 84 VA. L. REv. 1581 (1998) (showing that the law 
finn tournament differs from the tournament described in the economics in significant ways, 
while asserting that a tournament metaphor remains useful in understanding law ["InTI 
practices). 
195. Donald C. Langevoort, Enron and the Organizational Psychology of Hyper-
competition: An Essay for Lany Mitchell, 70 OEO. WASH L. REv. (forthcoming 2002). 
196. Id at 142-43. 
197. See Langevoort, Organized Dlusions, supra note 51, at 139-40; Langevoort, 
Selling Hope, supra note 51, at 645. 
198. Langevoort, supra note 195, at 4. 
199. The Southampton grab of Fast ow, Kopper and others occurred in connection with 
the windup up the LJMl SPE. When Enron repurchased Chewco's interest in JED!, Kopper 
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up exercises. Actors at Enron also underestimated external threats,zoo 
particularly regulatory threats. At Enron, success always had 
depended on averting or destroying regulatory opponents. Skilling, as 
we have seen, saw nothing wrong with averting his eyes from 
insubordination within Enron's own ranks-so long as the result had 
been profitable. Unsurprisingly, tournament winners score highly on 
the Machiavellian psychological measure.201 
As Enron's leaders stepped across the line to fraud, their belief 
system trumped reality. So as to avoid confronting their own failures, 
they averted their eyes from the manifest implications of their own 
actions.202 They acted out the role of the tournament winner right up to 
the end. 
rv. ENRON AND CORPORATE SELF-REGULATION 
The preceding story supports a highly confident prediction that 
the federal securities laws' regime of ex post liability will come to bear 
on Enron's managers with considerable force. It only remains to 
complete the picture of who knew what and when. Enron's former top 
managers have shown manifest awareness of this. Skilling professes 
ignorance: ''We're all trying to figure out what happened .... This was 
a tragedy. I had no idea the company was in anything but excellent 
shape.,,203 Moreover, "I didn't do anything wrong .... I think we made 
the right decisions."204 The Fastow partnerships? These were set up to 
save Enron money; information about the $30 million "stunned" 
him.20S Billions of off-balance sheet debt obligations? "I did not know 
about that.,,206 As for Fastow, his lawyer, David Boies, has added two 
points. First, Enron's chief accounting officer did not report to Fastow. 
Second, although Fastow was aware of the operations of the SPEs, 
which his own firm managed, he was not aware of the activities of the 
negotiated a $10 million return on an initial investment of $125,000. POWERS REpORT, supra 
note 53, at 8. 
200. This is "cognitive conservatism." Langevoort, Organized Dlusions, supra note 51, 
at 135-37. 
201. Langevoort, supra note 195, at 3; see also Samuel Bowles et aI., The 
Determinants of Earnings: A Behavioral Approach, 39 J. ECON LIT. 1137, 1161-62 (2001) 
(collecting studies showing high convariance of "high mach" scores with income and 
occupational attainment, particularly in loosely structured sales organizations). 
202. See Langevoort, Organized Dlusions, supra note 51, at 144-45. 
203. Oppel, supra note 79, at C3. 
204. Id 
205. Id 
206. Id 
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other SPEs.207 Finally, Ken Lay has disavowed any knowledge of the 
numbers and side deals-they always were, he said, ''way over [his] 
head:'20~ Thus does the defense strategy emerge: Cite the complexity 
of the contractual arrangements in question, plead ignorance, and point 
the fmger downward in the chain of command. 
A. Enron and the Monitoring Model of Corporate Govemance 
The Powers Report rightly faults Enron's board for defective 
ongoing monitoring of the LJM transactions. But like all such 
reprimands, this one has the benefit of hindsight. And even as it fmds 
fault, the report also shows us that Enron's board went by the book 
when it approved the LJM transaction structure. Favorable reports lay 
on the table at the board meeting in question.209 Andersen and Enron's 
outside counsel, Vrnson & Elkins, had been involved every step of the 
way. Because of the transactions' self-dealing aspect, the Board 
required ongoing monitoring by managers representing Enron's 
interest. In addition, the Audit Committee was to review the 
transactions annually. There also was active concealment of negative 
information by middle management. This occurred both with the 
sham transaction concocted to lend Chewco the appearance of an 
outside equity investoilO and with a series of patch-up arrangements 
concluded after the swaps went sour.2l1 At only one point does the 
Powers Report account hold out hope for a plaintiff contemplating a 
duty of care lawsuit against Enron's outside directors. The three 
committee reviews of the ongoing LJM-related transactions were 
conducted quickly, lasting no more than 10 or 15 minutes, without 
probing questions being asked.212 Between Smith v. Van Gorkonf13 and 
the duty of care cases respecting fmancial institutions,214 these facts 
207. Floyd Norris, S.Re. Wants" to Question Fonner Officer, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 
2001, at C6. 
208. Alex Berenson, Chiefs U0rds Paint Hands-Off Image, but Actions Offer 
Different Weu~ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at C7. 
209. POWERS REpORT, supra note 53, at 157. 
210. Id at 46. 
211. Id at 98, 115-18. 
212. Id at 162. 
213. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Enron is an Oregon 
corporation. Delaware law is referenced as a source of persuasive points respecting the 
fiduciary duties of officers and directors of publicly traded corporations. Enron appears to 
have had more than enough in the way of internal compliance controls to excuse the board 
under the supine standard of In re Caremark Intemationai, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 
A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
214. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 846-47 (N.J. 1981) 
(finding breach of duty when directors failed to act to prevent other directors from 
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give a plaintiff a basis for argument. But a strong defense can be 
anticipated-each of Andersen, Vinson & Elkins, and Enron's managers 
had reviewed the transactions and continued to endorse them. The 
audit committee met with the Andersen partners with Enron's 
managers out of the room to ask if there was anything about which to 
worry. Andersen kept silent. 215 
Thus do the facts of the case send a strong but disturbing signal: 
Enron stumbled into its end period while following the book of good 
governance practice, at least nominally. A question arises: Why did 
our system of corporate governance, with its monitors and 
gatekeepers, fail to interpose frictions on the formulation and 
execution of the strategy so as to cause prudent modifications? 
Vigilant monitoring might have contained the recklessness, saving the 
company. As a matter of policy, the rmger points not to lower officers, 
as Skilling and Fastow would have it, but to Enron's outside directors 
and with them the monitoring model of corporate governance. 
The monitoring model holds out an objective, process-based 
system. It importunes companies to put a majority of highly qualified 
outside directors on the board and to integrate the board into its 
decision-making structure as an active participant. At the level of 
mandate, however, it only requires that boards go through the motions 
of making considered business judgments respecting corporate 
transactions. It does not and cannot make the further subjective 
inquiry into the degree of attention and quality of judgment actually 
brought to bear. Corporate counsel are well-schooled in packaging 
documentation so that compliance is well evidenced. The system 
responds to breakdowns such as Enron's by adding layers of new 
processes, each a ritualized enactment of the substance of the good 
governance. 
To see how little this can mean in terms of sustained and 
searching confrontation with problematic topics, consider the audit 
committee of the board of directors and its central place in the system. 
This was the venue within Enron for outside monitoring of accounting 
policies respecting SPE compliance and the place where questions 
should have been asked about compliance with GAAP respecting SPE 
transactions and the 2000 :MD&A's failure to provide complete 
information about Enron's contingent obligations. Audit committee 
practice became a focal point of corporate governance reform efforts 
misappropriated trust funds); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (noting 
that directors must "exercise some degree of skill and prudence and diligence"). 
215. POWERS REpORT, supmnote 53, at 161. 
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in the late 1990s, after headline audit failures at Cendant and 
Sunbeam. SEC Chainnan Arthur Levitt complained publicly about 
audit committee independence and composition. The New York Stock 
Exchange and the National Association of Securities dealers (NASD) 
responded by tightening their listing standards.216 Under the new rules, 
audit committees had to have the right to hire and rrre the auditor; they 
had to have at least three members, each of whom should be 
independent and rmancialiy literate, with at least one member having 
accounting or rmancial expertise.217 At around the same time, the 
SEC's revised proxy disclosure rules respecting audit committees. 
Starting in 2001, there had to be disclosures about member 
independence, the report had to state whether the committee 
recommended that the Board fIle the audited rmancials in the rrrm's 
lO-K report, and the committee's charter had to be attached as an 
exhibit.2ls 
For a pristine example of compliance with ali the foregoing rules, 
open Enron's 2001 proxy statemenel9 Its audit committee of five met 
five times during 2000 with its outside auditors and its inside 
managers responsible for accounting and internal controls. The 
committee was chaired by a professor emeritus in accounting from 
Stanford University. And yet despite the review and the committee's 
formal recommendation of the audited rmancials, the audit had failed 
and ,vith it the committee process. 
Two alternative reform palliatives suggest themselves as the next 
step in the regulation of audits and audit committees. The rrrst 
originated with Arthur Levitt and follows the example of Delaware 
special negotiating committees, which hire their own legal and 
business advisors.22o By extension, audit committees should hire their 
independent auditor to lead and assist them in evaluating internal 
compliance systems and the accounting treatments applied by the 
company's managers and auditors.22I Such a contrarian voice might 
have raised difficult questions about Enron's accounting policies 
216. Jeffrey Goldfarb, New Panel to Devise Stricter Oversight Proposals for 
IndependentAuditors, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1455, 1455 (Oct 2,1998). 
217. HERwrrz & BARREIT, supra note 8, at 178. 
218. Audit Committee Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.306, 229.306 (2000). 
219. Enron Schedule 14A, supra note 138, at 12-13,42-44. 
220. Se4 e.g., Weinberger v. UOp, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,709 (Del. 1983) (suggesting in 
a cash-out merger an independent negotiating committee with own counsel and investment 
banker). 
221. For a suggestion of this, see Arthur Levitt, The ''Numbers Game," Remarks at 
N.Y.U. Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998), available athttp://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/speecharchive/l98/spch220.txt (last visited Mar. 13,2002). 
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respecting SPEs and afIiliates. Whether the process of questioning 
would have led to a different accounting result and :full disclosure of 
SPE arrangements is another question. For one thing, audit committee 
members do not differ from other board members in their cooperative 
dispositions. For another thing, given a limited universe of what are 
now four big accounting rrrms, each under pressure to approve the 
same types of deals, one wonders how much lawyerly adversity can be 
imported into the system. 
The second measure comes from present SEC Chainnan Harvey 
Pitt in his rIrst public response to the Enron collapse. Under this 
measure, companies and auditors are to make a "[ c ]onscientious 
identification and assessment . .. [of] the three, four, or five most 
critical accounting principles" to the company's reporting-the 
principles involving "the most complex, subjective or ambiguous 
decisions or assessments."m They should then make a clear 
presentation to investors of the problems underlying the decision and 
report the "range of possible effects in differing applications."223 Here 
the insight is that the monitoring process can lose its way under stacks 
of technical reports. Accordingly, the process mandate needs to 
confront moments at which the managers and directors make critical 
judgments and force them to disclose not only the result and its 
justification but the competing variables and counterfactuals. By 
implication, had Enron been forced to this higher level of disclosure it 
would have followed less aggressive accounting policies. Or, 
alternatively, much of the accounting would have stayed the same, but 
Enron would have been forced to make additional pro forma 
disclosures, which would have revealed all the debt or showed how 
earnings might have been lower if all of the SPEs were consolidated. 
What are the chances that Pitt's reform would have led to 
disclosure of Enron's contingent liabilities? One suspects that many 
more than five problematic accounting treatments had material effects 
on this set of rmancials. Nothing but hindsight appears to assure that 
either ,that consolidation policy, the treatment of the swaps, or 
contingent liabilities be included on a mandated special disclosure list. 
In addition, like all other variations on the theme of process guarantee, 
this one easily could deteriorate into an empty governance ritual 
having little impact either on the quality of attention and discussion at 
board and committee meetings or on the understanding of investors in 
222. Harvey L. Pitt, Editorial, How to Prevent Future Enrons, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 
2001, atAl8. 
223. Id 
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the stock market. So long as ex post review for compliance relies on 
objective evidence in the form of a thick minute book, a process rule 
grounded in subjective "conscientiousness" merely importunes. 
Significantly, in a follow-up announcement, the SEC has 
promised to require each frrm's :MD&A to disclose critical accounting 
policies-those "most important to the portrayal of a company's 
fmancial condition ... and require management's most difficult, 
subjective or complex judgments"224-without a limiting number. 
Perhaps an objective mandate will yet emerge here. But a new 
disclosure mandate will not restore confidence in the system. Enron's 
managers concealed the information from their published fmancials 
for a reason, after all. What is needed is a third party with the 
authority to impose the rules. 
Meanwhile, if reliable boardroom "conscientiousness" is what is 
needed, the solution is an independently nominated outside director-an 
outside super monitor. This suggestion figured prominently in policy 
discussions a decade ago, when it was thought that newly emerging 
activist investment institutions could fmd it convenient to pool 
resources and nominate candidates to the boards of poorly performing, 
large capitalization frrms.225 Unfortunately, no super monitors have 
appeared because the collective action problems, which prevent 
shareholders from coordinating on and investing in their own board 
candidates persist despite concentration of holdings in institutional 
hands. We will not see super monitors absent massive federal 
intervention to change the structure of board election and proxy 
solicitation.226 
Enron, then, reminds us that the monitoring model assures us of 
little. It gives only a circumstantial guarantee of good governance 
because it only requires evidence of a "conscientious;' well-informed 
224. See Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC to Propose New 
Corporate Disclosure Rules (Feb. 13, 2002) [hereinafter SEC Press Release, Feb. 13, 2002], 
available athttp://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-22.txt (last visited Mar. 13, 2002). 
225. See Ronald 1. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An 
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863, 883-88 (1991); Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative VOting, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 
124, 133-42 (1994). 
226. Perhaps the bottom line message of Enron for corporate governance lies on the 
contrarian side, with those who suggest that excessive reliance has been placed on the 
monitoring model. In this view, a majority of outside directors is not the sine qua non of 
good governance, and enhanced presence of top managers would improve boardroom 
processes. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, 
Norms. and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.1. 
797, 805-15 (2001). Would a few additional top managers on the board have improved 
governance at Enron? There is no way to tell. But they hardly could have made things worse. 
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business judgment. The conscientiousness itself is ill-suited to ex post 
verification. In the alternative, the substance of the business judgment 
could be reviewed. But we have avoided such strict scrutiny on the 
sound theory that ex post review of risk taking would have perverse 
deterrent effects. In the chasm separating the circumstantial guarantee 
from such an actual guarantee lie untold billions of lost investment 
dollars, and not only in respect ofEnron. It is a cost of capitalism.227 
With that vision of billions in lost capital we finally encounter the 
self-regulatory corporate law scheme's last line of defense, the 
investors themselves.228 When we look at Enron's shareholders, in 
particular the institutional shareholders (and the market actors analysts 
who sell them services), we witness a failure as marked as the failure 
in Enron's boardroom. Institutional actors with significant capital 
stakes, whether debt or equity, have access to top executives. It is their 
job to ask questions when company disclosures fail to tell a coherent 
story. We have seen that in Enron's case a long list of questions needed 
to be asked. We also have seen that Enron's public disclosures, 
although presenting an inadequate picture of the company, provided a 
basis for asking every question that needed to be asked. Two stand out 
even without the benefit of hindsight: (1) Just how much contingent 
liability will be triggered if your stock falls? (2) What percentage of 
net income would disappear if your SPEs had to be consolidated? The 
questions' formulation did not require an advanced business degree. A 
227. For a more detailed discussion of the law reform agenda, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
'fWlat Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modem Business Corporation: 
Some Initial ReBections, 69 U. Cm. L. REv. 1233 (2002). 
228. The same questions can be asked in respect of Enron's debtholders: How could 
they put $8 billion into the company without asking for an explanation about the contingent 
liabilities alluded to in the MD&A? So as concerns Enron's largest banks, an agency 
explanation resonates well: The middle-level bankers in charge of new loans were not about 
to disrupt relations with a big client. Patrick McGeehan, 2 Early Enron Lenders Didn't See 
the End Coming, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, at C1 (quoting Professor Henry Hu). Questions 
also are arising about conflicts of interest-Enron's lead banks had an incentive to be 
accommodating in order to keep up the flow of investment banking business from Enron. 
There results a revival of discussion about the desirability of the Glass Steagall Act. 
The foregoing question applies with greater force to the rating agencies, who 
downgraded Enron only as the house of cards was tumbling. Contingent guarantees are not 
rocket science. In the wake of the scandal, two agencies have announced plans to speed up 
their ratings review process. Riva D. Atlas, Enron Spurs Debt Agencies to Consider Some 
Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, at C6. For a persuasive argument that the informational 
quality of ratings has declined in recent years, see Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of 
Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 
619 (1999). 
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diligent Accounting for Lawyers student who studied Enron's 
fmancials with care ought to be up to the task.229 
But the questions were not asked. Now, the usual villain at this 
point is the Wall Street analyst. These actors today are dismissed as 
mouthpieces for their own fmns' investment bankers-because 
negative reports destabilize investment banking relationships, negative 
reports are more and more rarely given.230 Certainly, the analysts 
provided no early warnings in Enron's case; indeed, many stayed 
positive even as the collapse went into its late stages.231 But the 
analysts' reputational stock fell to the floor even before Enron's 
common stock. No experienced institutional investor was relying on 
them.232 
One might have expected holders of significant blocks of stock to 
speak up. Enron had such stockholders. Janus Capital Corp. owned 
five percent of Enron's outstanding shares in early 2001. In the words 
of one Janus analyst, Enron epitomized "the opportunistic thinking of 
the new economy." Janus managers met repeatedly with Enron's 
management and included the SPEs in their questioning. Apparently, 
they did not also insist on coherent answers. Although Janus sold off 
its Enron during the period from March to October 2001, it still netted 
$200 million of losses. "We'll spend a lot of time internally on our 
experience \vith Enron," said a Janus manager whose fund still had 
four percent its assets in Enron in April.233 Alliance Premier Growth 
Fund, in contrast, still had 4.1 percent of its assets in Enron at the end 
of the third quarter of 2001. One of its managers later called Enron a 
"faith stock"-one of many fmns with a large market capitalization and 
so many moving parts that "nobody knows how they put it together." 
229. A caveat should be noted. As we have seen, Enron's disclosures were carefully 
written so as to communicate that everything was all right, assuming that Enron had integrity. 
Even so, the questions should occur to an investor with a significant stake and an everyday 
dose of skepticism. 
230. Enron did investment banking business only with firms whose analysts rated their 
stock a strong buy. John Schwartz, Man Mo Doubted Enron Enjoys New Recognition, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2002, at CS. 
231. McTague, supm note 77, at 1771. 
232. A small number of independent frrms do research companies, for a fee. As 
Richard Grant put it at the time, congressional committees were examining analysts in 
connection with the Enron collapse, the real problem is that investors do not care enough 
about getting independent and unbiased research to pay the price. Alex Berenson, 
Washington Wants Wall St Changes. But How?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2S, 2002, at C6. 
233. Aaron Lucchetti, Men Bad Stocks Happen to Good Mutual Funds: Enron 
Could Spark New Attention toAccounting, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13,2001, at C1. 
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"Shame on me," says the manager, "for not doing something" about 
the opaque fmancials.234 
Such stories imply that these investment institutions, despite their 
significant stakes, acted out the archetype of the noise trader, investing 
on market hyperbole rather than fundamental value.235 Such 
investment behavior is driven by cognitive bias rather than expert 
monitoring. These investors chase the trend as they build up their 
stakes. Then, holding significant blocks in a firm with a price earnings 
ratio of sixty, they appear to have followed what Kahneman and 
Tversky called the representative heuristic, making predictions by 
taking a short history or a small set of facts (Enron's success with 
electricity trading) and expanding it into a broader picture.236 On the 
downside, some seem to have held on even as the handwriting was on 
the wall, subjectively assessing the situation by reference to their own 
sunk costs.237 
The point is neither that agents of investment institutions always 
invest foolishly nor that such agents never intervene constructively on 
the fmancial side. Rather, the point is that there are surprisingly tight 
constraints on their utility as a governance check. It seems that even 
substantial institutional block holding, at least at the five percent level, 
provides no basis for assuming that the tough questions have been 
asked and addressed. To fmd a shareholder who takes on the 
properties of a super monitor, we presumably need a holder of a bigger 
block-a twenty-five or thirty percent owner with an inside position or 
inside agents. One hopes that such an actor, very common in the 
capital structures of firms on the continent of Europe, would have 
prevented the fatal excesses of Enron's managers. But, then, if Enron 
teaches us anything, it is to question the reasonableness of reliance on 
any corporate monitor. 
R EnroD, Generally AcceptedAccounting Principle~ andAuditor 
Independence 
In addition to being the largest bankruptcy reorganization in 
American history (as of December 2, 2001), Enron undoubtedly also 
234. Id 
235. See Andrei Shliefer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to 
Finance, J. ECON. PERSPEC., Spring 1990, at 19, 19-26. 
236. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 
PSYCHOL. REv. 237 (1973). 
237. See Daniel Kahneman & Mark W. Riepe, Aspects of Investor Psychology, J. 
PORTFOLIO MGT., Summer 1998, at 52. 
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was the biggest audit failure. But, as of this writing, it looks as if the 
liability provisions of federal securities law may never get the chance 
to work as contemplated in the case. The auditor, Arthur Andersen, 
was delivered over to federal prosecutors who avoid attempts to prove 
criminal violations of complex securities law provisions, preferring 
wire fraud theories communicable in monosyllabic words. Andersen 
accordingly was pursued not for its audit performance but for the 
overtime use of paper shredders at its Houston office in October 2001 
as Enron's condition became critical. Its punishment already has 
exceeded all expectations as of the time of Enron's bankruptcy riling. 
The indictment and conviction of the fIrm as a whole,238 rather than 
only its Houston office, pushed it toward the edge of collapse as 
foreign affiliates and audit clients alike promptly deserted it.239 
Even Enron's securities plaintiffs have distanced themselves from 
Andersen. Andersen met the plaintiff class at the settlement table in 
short order. Apparently, it had determined that no signifIcant 
protection would be forthcoming from either the pleading barrier 
erected to private accountant's liability under the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 or from a line of cases holding that, 
absent a direct fmancial interest in the client, an auditor's interest in a 
reputation for honesty and care makes an allegation of scienter 
implausible.240 Between the egregious nature of the audit breakdown, 
the documented awareness of questionable accounting at Andersen's 
headquarters,241 the ex post shredding ofEnron-related documents, and 
subsequent termination of the partner in charge,242 the plaintiffs had the 
smoking gun they needed. But to make it work, Andersen had to 
survive to fund a settlement. The plaintiffs, watching their deep pocket 
238. See Kurt EichenwaId, Andersen Charged with Obstruction in Enron Inquiry, N.Y. 
Tll\1ES, Mar. 15,2002, atAl. 
239. They have been welcomed by Andersen's delighted competitors. See Henny 
Sender, Andersen s Audit-Client Defections Come at Perfect Time for Its Overstaffed Rivals, 
WALL ST. 1, Apr. 4, 2002, at Cl. Andersen has been forced to layoff thousands of 
employees. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Andersen to Cut 27% of Us. Staff,WALL ST. 1, Apr. 9, 
2002, at C24. 
240. See Section 21(D)(b )(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(D)(b )(2), 
ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881,900 (1934). For representative cases, see Melder v. Morris, 27 E3d 
1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1994); Dileo v. Ernst & Young, 901 E2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990); 
Retsky Family Ltd. P'ship v. Price Waterhouse LLP, No. 97-C-7694, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17459 (N.D. lll. Oct. 21,1998). 
241. Jonathan Weil, EnronsAuditorsDebatedPartnershipLosses, WALL ST. 1, Apr. 3, 
2002, atCl. 
242. Thaddeus Herrick & Alaxi Barrionuevo, Jfere Enron, Andersen Too Tightly 
Knit?, WALL ST. 1, Jan. 21,2002, at Cl. 
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shrink with startling rapidity as 2002 unfolded,243 expanded their list of 
defendants, reaching out to secondary actors among Enron's banks, 
underwriters, and contract counterparties.244 
Meanwhile, Andersen's partners staked its survival on a 
restructuring proposed by Paul Volcker, hastily brought aboard so the 
rInn could avail itself of his reputation for business rectitude. Volcker 
tried to restore probity to Andersen by having it divest itself of all 
consulting, going forward as the only large accounting firm 
perfonning only the audit function. The palliative turned out to be too 
little, too late.245 
For present purposes, the more interesting question about 
Andersen is why, despite the assumption of the securities cases, a rInn 
like Andersen, for which a reputation for probity and care was as 
necessary as an investment grade credit rating was for Enron, 
compromise itself in this way? If this reputational interest cannot be 
relied upon to cause big accounting rInns (then five in number, soon to 
be four) to impose the rules on reporting companies, then significant 
law reform is required. 
1. The Violations 
Enron's collapse implicates (at least) three important accounting 
topics: (a) the off-balance sheet treatment of SPEs and equity 
affiliates, (b) the treatment of contingent obligations, and ( c) fair value 
accounting for derivatives and energy sales contracts. 
a. SPEs and Equity Affiliates 
Recall that at the time of its Chapter 11 filing, Enron already had 
admitted that its rmancial statements had overstated its earnings due to 
failure to follow the rules for qualifYing SPEs and indefensible, even 
fraudulent, treatments of SPE transactions. Some of these violations 
were technical-the failure to meet the three percent requirement with 
either Chewco or Talon, the LJMl-re1ated SPE.246 The more serious 
violations concerned the sham substance of the LJM-re1ated swap 
transactions. 
243. See, e.g., Robert Frank et aI., Andersen Cuts Enron Settlement Offer by Half, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2002, at Cl. 
244. Complaint, In re Emon Corp. Securities Litigation, C.A. No. H-01-3624 (S.D. 
Tex. Apr. 8, 2002). 
245. Se~ e.g., Devon Spurgeon & Cassell Bryan-LO\v, Can Andersen Partners Keep 
TheirFinnAlive?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2002, at Cl. 
246. POWERS REpORT, supra note 53, at 15-16. 
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Note that the identification of these violations does not by itself 
state a policy issue for GAAP. The problem could lie only with the 
audit. To see the difficulty of the substantive question respecting 
SPEs, consider the fact that Enron had thousands of additional SPEs 
and equity affiliates. As to these no violations have been identified. 
Here is the question: Would the consolidation of Chewco, JEDI, and 
the LJM-related SPEs have resulted in meaningful rmancials, or did 
many more affiliated entity rmancials need to be consolidated for a 
meaningful picture ofEnron to emerge? 
Let us take the SPEs rIrst. Under SFAS No. 140, issued in 2000, 
transfers of rmancial assets to SPEs are treated as sales by the 
transferor rIrm so long as, among other things, equity interests in the 
SPE are not returned as consideration for the assets transferred and the 
SPE gets control of the assets with the right to pledge or exchange 
them.247 All you have to do is have the SPE vehicle meet the outside 
equity requirement, and for all that appears at this time, Enron did so 
with respect to the vast majority of its SPEs. 
Now let us take up the equity affiliates. These relationships are 
dealt with under GAAP rules applicable to all parent-subsidiary 
relationships. These rules are formal; they do not inquire into the 
substance of control arrangements. Consolidation follows from 
greater than fifty percent ownership. At fifty percent equity ownership 
down to twenty percent, accounting is by the equity method, the mode 
of accounting employed by Enron for its unconsolidated equity 
affiliates. Under it, there is no consolidation of the investee company. 
Instead a portion of the income or loss of the investee flows through to 
the investor's balance sheee4s (JIe have seen that Enron's income 
statement showed significant added income under this treatment. 249) 
Significantly, vocal dissatisfaction with these rules' form over 
substance approach has been expressed within the accounting 
profession. For twenty years, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) has kept open a project inquiring into an alternative 
approach based on a substantive dermition of control. Reporting 
companies and the big accounting rIrms, notably including Andersen 
and Enron, 250 have vigorously opposed the project, criticizing the 
247. FASB, Summary of JFAS No. 140: Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of 
Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities (Sept. 2000). 
248. MICHAEL DIAMOND ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: REpORTING AND ANALYSIS 
535-540 (5th ed. 2000). 
249. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
250. Glenn R. Simpson, Power Play: Deals that Took Enron Under Had Many 
Supporters, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10,2002, at AI. 
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FASB's draft rules as unworkab1e.2S1 The opposition has succeeded 
and nothing has been done. But, in the wake of Enron, the FASB 
fmally has taken the initiative to push for a revision. The revision will 
address "strawman" situations where, as with the LJM-related SPEs, a 
second entity is indirectly controlled by a fIrst entity acting through its 
agents and a disguised transaction structure. The revision also will 
visit the question of what constitutes economic substance sufficient to 
justify treatment as an independent entity.252 A minimum ten percent 
outside equity requirement has been mooted.253 Finally, the revision 
will address equity affiliate situations where party owning fIfty percent 
or less of another entity's stock as a practical matter exercises 
control.2S4 Action by FASB is predicted for the second quarter of 
2002.255 
It should be noted that the LJM-related SPEs suffered from an 
additional infmnity under GAAP. Under SFAS No. 57, contracts 
between Enron and the LJM-related SPEs were "related party 
transactions." These include transactions with a counterparty whose 
policies are sufficiently influenced by the fIrst party so as to prevent 
one of the parties from fully pursuing its own interests. Given such a 
tie, special footnote descriptions of the transactions are required, 
including dollar amount impacts on reported earnings.256 From this it 
follows that Enron should have disclosed the impact on its earnings of 
transactions with LJM-related SPEs. 
A reform suggestion arises from the related party analysis. The 
fmanciaI and regulatory communities have been focusing exclusively 
on the rules concerning the consolidation of SPE fmancials. This 
inquiry is indeed pertinent: Had the SPEs been consolidated, 
intercompany transactions would have dropped off of both the balance 
sheet and income statement, with the result that Enron would not have 
been able to pump up its net earnings with revenues and gains from 
transactions with SPEs. At the same time, the substantive equivalent 
of that result could have been achieved through footnote disclosure of 
251. Steve Burkholder, Outlook 2002,34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rptr. (BNA) 214, 215 (Feb. 
4,2002). 
252. Jenkins Testimony, supra note 119, at 14-15. 
253. Floyd Norris & Joseph Kahn, Rule Makers Talfe On Loopholes That Enron Used 
in Hiding Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,2002, at AI. 
254. Jenkins Testimony, supra note 119, at 14. 
255. Burkholder, supra note 251, at 216. 
256. SFAS No. 57, Related Party Disclosures, fJ~ 2, 24(f) (Mar. 1982); see also Jenkins 
Testimony, supra note 119, at 16-17. 
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the earnings impact of SPE transactions.257 Arguably, such disclosure 
should be required whether or not the SPE is dealing with a related 
party and without regard to the level of outside equity capitalization. 
Even with a ten percent test, questions will continue to be asked about 
the independence of SPEs. Finally, so long as the SPE's debt is 
nonrecourse to the transferor, a consolidated liabilities statement is not 
absolutely essential to the fair presentation of the transferor's fmancial 
condition. 
b. Contingent Obligations 
In our accounting inquiry up to this point, Enron has violated 
GAAP only so far as concerns accounting matters restated in its 
disclosures of October and November 2001-the Phantom Equity 
Investor, the Watered Stock, the Equity Swaps that Weren't, and some 
related transactions. These are significant violations, to be sure. But 
as we have seen, they did not necessarily implicate the company's 
collapse. 
Part III's account of Enron's collapse also suggests a significant 
accounting problem respecting the $4 billion of equity affiliate 
guarantees that came out of the woodwork in November. As to these 
GAAP has a defmite rule. To guarantee your equity afIiliate's 
obligations is to take the disclosure treatment out of the parent-
subsidiary or parent-in vestee context for treatment under the rules on 
contingent losses. Here the case for disclosure by Enron is clear-cut. 
Under SFAS No.5, loss contingencies are divided into three classes: 
probable, reasonably possible, and remote. Probable losses should be 
accrued; reasonably possible losses should be disclosed in footnotes 
with information as to nature and magnitude; remote losses need not 
be disclosed. There is a separate rule for fmancial guarantees. Here 
even if the possibility of loss is remote, there should be footnote 
disclosure as to nature and amount.258 It follows that Enron's fmancials 
257. The SEC is suggesting that such disclosures be made in the MD&A. Harvey L. 
Pitt, Written Testimony Concerning Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by 
Enron and Other Public Companies: Before Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs 10, available athttp://www.sec.gov/newsftestimony/032102tshlp.htm (Mar. 21, 
2002) [hereinafter Pitt Testimony]. The Dodd-Corzine Bill would mandate stepped-up 
disclosure respecting transactions with SPEs in SEC filings and require the SEC to make 
formal recommendations to the FASB respecting consolidation rules. S. 2004, 107th Congo 
§§ 301, 303 (2002). 
258. See SFAS No.5, Accounting for Contingencies ~ 5 (Mar. 1975): "The Board 
concludes that disclosure of [guarantees of indebtedness of others and others that in substance 
have the same characteristic] shall be continued. The disclosure shall include the nature and 
amount of the guarantee." Id; see also FASB Interpretation No. 34, Disclosure of Indirect 
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were ill violation of GAAP for understating its obligations as 
guarantor.259 
A surprisingly strong counterargument may be anticipated. If a 
loss contingency under a guarantee involved a small number-say 
$100 million or under respecting Enron's case in 2000-an auditor 
would have room to waive disclosure under GAAP's materiality 
principle even if disclosure is otherwise required under SFAS No.5. 
Accountants take a bright-line approach to materiality. An item 
impacting pre-tax income less than five percent is clearly immaterial; 
an item is clearly material only with an impact of ten percene60 Of 
course $4 billion does not on its face pass the five percent test, even 
for Enron at its zenith. But suppose we take the $4 billion contingency 
at a time when Enron's stock was selling at almost ninety and ask on a 
prospective basis what the probability is that the guarantees' triggers 
will go off. If we were to take a highly confident view of Enron's 
future and assert that there was only a one percent chance of triggers 
keyed to stock prices below fifty going off, then the $4 billion 
contingency can be discounted by its one percent chance of occurrence 
to $40 million. That figure is sufficiently small to fly in under the five 
percent radar so long as pre-tax income exceeds $1.2 billion. 
Alternatively, with a ten percent discount rate (as was employed in 
Enron's financials with respect to an unrelated $2 billion of letters of 
credit and related obligations261), we get $400 million. Given $100 
billion of revenues there remains a basis for argument, if not a 
particularly strong one. 
An additional materiality argument can be made. The guarantees 
did not lie under the same contractual umbrella. They extended across 
a series of unrelated transactions. Aggressive accountants apply the 
Guarantees of Indebtedness of Others (Mar. 1981); HERWI1Z & BARREIT, supra note 8, at 
617-20. Note that under SFAS No. 140, a separate recourse obligation against the transferor 
of an asset to an SPE with respect to reimbursement for losses on the underlying portfolio (as 
opposed to a derivative arrangement) continues to be treated under SFAS No.5. That is the 
transferor makes an ongoing assessment of the amount of the loss in its fmancials rather than 
adjusting the obligation to fair value and reporting it in income. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 
122, at 29. 
259. And therefore were per se misleading for securities law purposes. See 
Administrative Policy on Financial Statements, Accounting Series ReI. No.4, 11 Fed. Reg. 
10,913 (Sept. 27, 1946), codified in Codification of Financial Reporting Policies § 101, 
reprinted in7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 72,921 (May 18, 1988). 
260. The SEC, in contrast, insists that smaIl misstatements may be material in some 
circumstances. See Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999). 
261. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
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materiality principle noncumulative1y.262 That is, they will take a $500 
million contingent obligation in isolation and make a separate 
materiality determination. Given separate transactions with 
sufficiently small numbers per transaction, materiality could be 
deployed as a magic wand to make $4 billion of contingent obligations 
go away. 
The materiality defense should not carry the day for several 
reasons. First, even though the transactions were separate, the trigger 
terms shared common properties. Thus the separate treatment appears 
inappropriate; even though the transactions were separate, the triggers 
gave them a cumulative material effect. Of course, once we cumulate 
the transactions we still have to discount the probability of occurrence. 
Assuming ten percent probability we get $400 million, and $400 
million is not an insignificant figure compared to Emon's stated $1.2 
billion of earnings for 2000. Second, even without the benefit of 
hindsight, some of the guarantees' trigger events were more than ten 
percent probable. Emon's stock price rode up to ninety in a bubble 
stock market in significant part on broadband projections. By the time 
the 2000 fmancials were released, broadband was in trouble and the 
bubble had burst. Third, the inference arises that the guarantees were 
concealed for the very reason that they had a material bearing on the 
credit rating on which Emon's business depended. Finally, the SEC 
has strongly objected to aggressive applications of the materiality 
principle by auditors. Among other things, the SEC staffhas reminded 
auditors and registrants that omissions and misstatements should be 
inspected both individually and in the aggregate to determine whether 
the fmancials materially misstate the position and results of the 
company.263 
c. Derivatives 
Accusations respecting Emon's trading and derivatives operation 
made after the Chapter 11 filing suggest more extensive problems 
concerning Emon's reported earnings. Even if some of these 
accusations prove to be true, blame will not necessarily devolve on 
Emon's auditor, Arthur Andersen. The new rules respecting fair value 
262. The auditor's work papers should show all immaterial adjustments on one sheet 
and should include a cumulation. What happens after that is between the partner in charge 
and the reporting company. 
263. Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. at 45,150; see also Kenneth C. 
Fang & Brad Jacobs, Clarifjing and Protecting Materiality Sf11l1dards in Financial Statements: 
A Review of SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 99, 55 Bus. LAW. 1039 (2000). 
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accounting for derivative transactions264 and for Enron's long-term 
power supply contracts are quite liberal. For example, they permitted 
Enron to book a present profit based on a projection of power prices 
ten years in the future.26S Soft though the figures may have been, any 
fault could turn out to lie with the new rules.266 Moreover, if Enron's 
traders were overstating their profits, it is not automatically the 
auditor's fault. Audits entail spot checks, not exhaustive 
reconstructions of all transactions. 
The atmosphere of suspicion suggests that the new system of fair 
value accounting for derivatives and energy contracts may be having 
perverse effects. The 1990s move to fair value accounting has been 
viewed as a breakthrough yielding more meaningful fmancial 
statements. Mark-to-market treatment came into the system to prevent 
financial institutions from using off-balance sheet accounting to hide 
losses in derivatives trading. Now the crisis of confidence triggered by 
Enron's collapse reveals a dark side. Absent a trading market, fair 
value estimates are manipulable. And in a world obsessed with this 
quarter's earnings figures, they are very likely to be manipulated 
upward. Thus does fair value accounting sacrifice objectivity and 
verifiability, once the bedrocks of GAAP. 
d. Summary 
As to the first class of Enron accounting violation, concerning 
SPE consolidation, welcome improvements to the rules can be 
expected. But it nonetheless should be noted that the central problem 
here lay not with the rules themselves but Enron's failure to follow 
them. As to the second Enron accounting problem, nondisclosure of 
contingent liability on SPE and equity affiliate obligations, GAAP 
does not seem to be in need of repair. Guarantees are supposed to be 
disclosed fully in footnotes. As to the third problem, movement to fair 
value accounting needs to be reconsidered. 
2. Incentive Incompatibility at Arthur Andersen 
We already have a case of audit failure here, only its extent 
remains to ascertained. The question is not whether GAAP was 
violated, but how a firm with substantial reputational capital staked on 
264. SFAS No. 133, AccOlUlting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities 
(JlUle 1998). 
265. See EITF Issue 98-10. 
266. Norris & Eichenwald, supra note 166, at Cl. 
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avoiding significant audit failures could have rendered a favorable 
opinion on the subject fmancials. Why did Andersen's audit team not 
pick up the sham in the swaps that weren't? Why did they let the 
watered stock pass? Was there no review of the guaranty contracts? 
We must await the results of the many investigations for the detailed 
factual account. 
A broad brush explanation can be offered presently, however. We 
turn to Enron's 2001 proxy statement, which reports $25 million of 
auditor fees and $27 million of other consulting fees to Andersen.267 
The sham in the equity swaps might have seemed like less of sham in 
light of $5.7 million of Andersen consulting billings for advice 
respecting Chewco and LJM-related transactions.268 Enron, in fact, 
was Andersen's second biggest client, nationwide. In addition, the top 
Enron officers in charge of accounting matters were former Andersen 
accountants. Enron hired away Andersen employees on a routine 
basis. Meanwhile, numerous Andersen auditors and consultants were 
permanently posted in offices at Enron. In 1993, Andersen experts 
had designed Enron's internal compliance system.269 
The inference of capture is overwhelming. To protect the flow of 
consulting fees and the value of their long-term relationship with 
Enron, Andersen's auditors permitted actors at Enron to bully them 
into signing off on dubious fmancials. Indeed, so cooperative was the 
Andersen-Enron relationship that no bullying may have been needed. 
Andersen's auditors simply mimicked the actions ofEnron's managers. 
As residents of the Enron tower, they no doubt began to internalize the 
fIrm culture, becoming risk-prone. 
Such assimilation of a risk-prone fIrm culture is absolutely 
unacceptable in an auditor. As a primary gatekeeper, the auditor's job 
is not to collaborate but to bring an objective check to the managers' 
reports. That check should be not only objective but normatively 
counterbalancing, introducing a conservatism that reins in the risk-
prone tendencies of fIrm culture. The check should also correct results 
distorted by cognitive bias.270 With that accomplished, the information 
goes to the investment community so that it, rather than the fIrm's 
managers, can make the best possible risk assessment. 
267. Enron Schedule 14A, supmnote 138, at 13. 
268. POWERS REpORT, supmnote 53, at 16l. 
269. Herrick & Barrionuevo, supmnote 242, at Cl. 
270. Cognitive limitations can impair audit quality even if the auditor has not been 
captured. See Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight 
into Secun"ties Fmud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 133, 143-63 (2000). 
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Professor Coffee offers a model of an effective fmancial 
gatekeeper that highlights three requisite elements: The gatekeeper 
must (1) be needed for a legally mandated certification, the accuracy 
of which is observable by the protected class; (2) be a repeat player 
with a significant reputational capital staked on proper performance; 
and (3) be expecting only a nominal fee from anyone client.271 As the 
factors weaken, points of flexibility in the statement and application of 
the rules make it more and more plausible for an auditor to pass on a 
questionable treatment. 272 
ill theory, the auditor's reputational interest plus a backstop threat 
of legal liability should import the requisite adverseness to the auditor-
client relationship. Until recently, such was the case. ill the 1990s, 
two factors changed. First, as noted above, the liability system was 
adjusted to make accounting finns less susceptible to liability to 
private plaintiffs.273 Second, Big Five revenues for nonaudit or 
"management advisory" services grew to fifty percent of total 
revenues in 2000, where twenty years earlier they had constituted only 
thirteen percent of total revenues.274 The result for Andersen's 
relationship with Enron is the third factor in Coffee's model above 
ceased to obtain. 
To get a sense of the degree to which Enron dominated its 
auditor, step into the shoes of the partners in Andersen's Houston 
office on January 1, 2001. The maintenance of good will with Enron's 
managers must have held a permanent top spot on their list of 
priorities. How likely, then, was it that an auditor would dare get in the 
way of the plans of giants like Lay, Skilling, and Fastow? illdeed, 
given millions in Andersen billings respecting the SPE set-ups, for an 
auditor to question the sham would have been to undercut the positions 
of Andersen superiors. So close was the relationship between 
Andersen and Enron that the Coffee model's second factor became 
compromised-Enron, and not Andersen as a whole, became the 
primary reputational concem.275 Just as Skilling gambled with Enron's 
271. John c. Coffee, Jr., The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries, 
Auditor Independence, and the Governance of Accounting 9-10 (2001) (Columbia Law 
School Center for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No. 191). 
272. Id 
273. The Big Five fIrms also lobbied intensively at the state level to assure the passage 
of statutes recognizing the limited liability partnership. I am indebted to Matthew Barrett for 
this point. 
274. Coffee, supmnote271, at 27. 
275. The term for this phenomenon is "sub goal pursuit." The leaders of subunits tend 
toward excess zeal for their units interests at the expense of the larger fIrm's interests. John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical Wew of Corpomte 
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future in order to make his numbers, Andersen's Houston office 
gambled with the reputation of the partnership as a whole in order to 
maintain the revenue flow from their profit center.276 But it also must 
be noted that Andersen's central office in Chicago was not a passive 
participant. Enron's most aggressive treatments, including LJM-
related transactions and MTM practices, were discussed in a meeting 
between Andersen's Chicago and Houston offices on February 5, 
2001. The participants acknowledged problems. But they ratified the 
status quo, noting that Enron fees could reach $100 million a year.277 
3. Reform 
The dangers posed to audit quality by the conflict of interest 
bound up in ancillary consulting arrangements have been widely 
discussed. The Big Five firms marketed their advisory services very 
aggressively. They sold tax products having a record of going over the 
line of legality.278 They also marketed SPE arrangements. 
Significantly, the more aggressive the accounting implicated in the 
products, the more important it has been that the seller firm also be the 
auditor. The sales relationship imports a favorable audit. Alternatively, 
aggressive transactional "products" have been sold by investment 
bankers complete with opinion letters from Big Five firms opining 
conformity to GAAP. The letter serves to constrain later objections 
from an auditor.279 
Former SEC chair Arthur Levitt made audit quality and auditor 
independence a primary agenda item in an accounting regulation 
initiative launched in the late 1990s. He did not achieve what he 
requested-a per se ban on consulting by auditors.28o fufluence activity 
in Washington by the Big Five firms, led by Andersen, prevented that. 
Instead, amendments to the SEC accounting rules which became 
Misconduct and An Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1135 (1977). For an 
application respecting audits, see Prentice, supmnote 270, at 184-86. 
276. For a discussion addressed to Andersen as a whole, see Ken Brown & Jonathan 
Weil, Questioning the Books: How Andersen s Embmce of Consulting Altered the Culture of 
theAuditing Firm, WALL ST. 1., Mar. 12,2002, at Cl. 
277. Internal Arthur Andersen Memorandum, from Michael D. Jones to David B. 
Duncan (Feb. 6, 2001) (on file \vith author). 
278. Janet Novack & Laura Saunders, The HustJingofX Rated Shelters, FORBES, Dec. 
14, 1998, at 198. 
279. "Robert K. Herdman, the SEC's chief account [has] called for a ban on such 
letters!' Floyd Norris, Can Investors Believe Cash Flow Numbers?, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 15, 
2002, atCl. 
280. Arthur Levitt, Editorial, WhoAudits theAuditors?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,2002, at 
A29. 
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effective in 2001 prohibited subcategories of nonaudit services-
specifically, infonnation systems design and internal audit services. 
Additional proxy statement disclosures also were required.2s1 A glance 
at Enron's 2001 proxy statement shows Enron and Andersen to have 
been in compliance.282 
a. Blaming the Rules 
The Big Five's first response to Enron was business as usual. 
Even with his ftnn's reputation on the line, Joe Berardino, the 
managing partner of Arthur Andersen, joined Enron's officers in 
pointing fmgers elsewhere. The real failure, he said, lay in the 
accounting rules themselves, which after all permit off-balance sheet 
financing through SPEs. If something went wrong with Enron's 
fmancials, then the problem lay with the rules, which ought to be 
rethought, not with Andersen's audit. Worse, the whole accounting 
system needs overhauling. Standards get set too slowly. The system's 
reliance on historical cost rather than fair value is antiquated in a world 
needing continuous disclosure for "today's 2417 capital markets.,,2S3 All 
of this turned Enron into a mess: 
Enron disclosed reams of infonnation, including an eight-page 
Management's Discussion & Analysis and 16 pages of footnotes in its 
2000 annual report. Some analysts studied these, sold short and made 
profits. But other sophisticated analysts and fund managers have said 
that, although they were confused, they bought and lost money. 
We need to fix this problem. We can't long maintain trust in our 
capital markets with a fmancial reporting system that delivers volumes 
of complex infonnation about what happened in the past, but leaves 
some investors with limited understanding of what's happening at the 
present and what is likely to occur in the future.284 
Writing about Enron a few days later, SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt 
made substantially similar observations: We need, he said, to fmd 
"solutions instead of scapegoats." We need current, as opposed to 
periodic disclosures including trend infonnation; we need evaluative 
data in addition to historical cost infonnation; and we need faster 
standard setting within the accounting profession. The SEC, for its 
281. HER\VTIZ & BARREIT, supra note 8, at 196-98. The new subcategories joined an 
existing list of prohibited services. 
282. Enron Schedule 14A, supra note 138, at 13. 
283. Joe Berardino, Editorial, Enron: A Wake-Up CaIl, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2001, at 
A18. 
284. Id 
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part, wants to foster a more cooperative environment, in which an 
auditor could look to the agency as a ''hospitable sounding board.,,28s 
Andersen and the other big accounting fIrms immediately took 
up Pitt's offer, sending the agency a joint letter amounting to a 
challenge. To restore confIdence, the SEC should supply "immediate 
guidance" to public companies respecting disclosure of off-balance 
sheet transactions, over-the-counter derivative contracts, and related 
party transactions in time to impact :tvID&A in 2001 reports. ill 
particular, the SEC should require issuers to provide more details 
respecting off-balance sheet guarantees, commitments, lease, and debt 
arrangements which could impact on credit ratings, earnings, cash 
flow, or stock price.286 
These reactions from the actors most responsible for the proper 
operation of the accounting system must be viewed as surprising, at 
least by anyone who took the time to read Emon's 2000 Annual Report 
in light of the events of October and November 2001. Few can 
question that more current value information in fmancial reports 
usefully could supplement historical cost fIgures. But this issue, which 
has been a focal point of discussion between the accounting profession 
and business community for some time, only bears on the Emon 
disaster as a possible exacerbating factor. Emon used fair value 
accounting to a signifIcant extent. Analysts confused by Emon's 
:MD&A could have been disabused of inaccurate notions about the 
frrm's fmancial condition with accurate reports of pasttransactions. 
It is true that openness in the framework of GAAP makes it 
harder for accounting frrms to say no to big clients. But how open is 
GAAP's framework? SignifIcantly, in the wake of Em on-related stock 
market reverses of early 2002, commentators began voicing the 
opposite complaint. The problem "vith GAAP, they said, is that it 
presents an exhaustive check-the-box system of rules. The auditors 
apply the rules mechanically, ignoring the substance of the clients' 
transactions.287 Even Harvey Pitt, distancing himself from his former 
clients, has chimed in: 
Present-day accounting standards are cumbersome and offer far too 
detailed prescriptive requirements for companies and their accountants 
285. Pitt, supronote 222, atA18. 
286. Judith Burns & Michael Schroeder, Accounting Firms Ask SEC for Post-Enron 
Guide, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2002, atA16. 
287. Steve Liesman, SEC Accounting Cop s Warning: Playing By Rules May Not 
Ward Off Froud Issues, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12,2002, at Cl; Leaders: The Lessons Hom Enron, 
ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2002, at 9. 
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to follow.... We seek to move toward a principles-based set of 
accounting standards, where mere compliance with technical 
prescriptions is neither sufficient nor the objective.288 
From all of this there arises a question: Wherein lies the problem with 
GAAP-too many rules, as these commentators assert, or too many 
standards, as the Big Five asserted? 
The answer is that the problem lies in neither place. There can 
never be a 100% directive rulebook in accounting anymore than there 
is in any other regulatory context. Nor can slavish rule application 
ever be trusted to yield perfect results. There is always a moment of 
judgment. Accordingly, GAAP, of necessity, mixes rules and standards 
and always will do so. Meanwhile, if we return to the application of 
GAAP to the facts of this case in this Article's previous Part, we see 
that the rules, applied in good faith, were more than adequate to pick 
up every material event in the story of Enron's collapse. Contrary to 
the Big Five's assertions, Enron's auditor did not proceed at the mercy 
of vague or incoherent rules. Contrary to Mr. Pitt's assertions, a move 
to standards solves nothing. Standards only work when the actor 
authorized to apply them is ready to take responsibility for a judgment 
call. 
Why, given a world where neither a commendation of rules nor of 
standards ever solves a regulatory problem, has the Enron audit failure 
triggered this bizarre rules versus standards debate? The most 
plausible answers are denial and avoidance. If GAAP is not 
fundamentally flawed, then the solution to the Enron problem lies on 
the enforcement side, where we encounter some highly problematic 
institutional arrangements. 
b. Deepening Crisis and Manifest Inadequacy 
The foregoing back-and-forth between the Big Five and Harvey 
Pitt occurred before the revelation of document shredding in 
Andersen's Houston office and the spectacle of a stock market going 
south due to a lack of confidence in fmancial reports. These 
developments revealed the manifest inadequacy of a strategy of cozy 
cooperation between the SEC and the Big Five. Something had to be 
done.289 
288. Pitt Testimony, supra note 257, at 5. 
289. The SEC has announced that it will be introducing a series of Enron-related 
amendments to existing disclosure rules. See SEC Press Release, Feb. 13, 2002, supra note 
224. All are welcome. None address the core problem respecting the audit function. 
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Pitt made the fIrst move, addressing the accounting profession's 
toothless internal disciplinary structure.290 He proposed an 
independent regulatory body, governed by an independent board, to be 
effectuated only with the cooperation of the Big Five.291 Critics 
pounced immediately, arguing that too many CPAs would be present in 
the proposed enforcement structure.292 And, indeed, Pitt's proposal did 
not come close to restoring confIdence in the wake of Enron. Given a 
serious capture problem, there is no assurance that a disciplinary 
structure with bite will suffice to realign misaligned incentives. After 
all, the reputational stakes remain very substantial in the absence of a 
strict regime of professional self-regulation. Yet they did not prevent 
the Enron audit failure. 
And so have actors in government and the Big Five been forced 
to return to Arthur Levitt's agenda. Congress has taken the lead, 
nothing further of signillcance having been heard from Mr. Pitt.293 
Separation between the audit function and consulting can be effected 
two ways.m The fIrst is a half-way measure under which the auditing 
fInn may not do any consulting for the audit client. Legislation to this 
effect has been introduced. 295 In addition, companies are announcing 
290. Coffee, supra note 271, at 51. 
291. Schroeder, supra note 11, at C1. The suggestion originated with Professor 
Coffee, although in a much more robust formulation. Coffee, supra note 271, at 52. 
292. Diana B. Henriques, Policing the Accountants JWth a Watchdog From the 
Accounting Business, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2002, at A12. The critics claim that the 
defendants could stall the process until the completion of overlapping litigation and that the 
absence of subpoena power will disable the enforcers from gathering necessary evidence. To 
import such power, a statute is needed. See Mike McNamee, Pitts Accounting Fix Leaves a 
Lot Broke, Bus. WK., Feb. 4, 2002, at 38,38-39. For a more plausible regulation scheme for 
the accounting profession, see Dodd-Corzine, S. 2002, 107th Congo §§ 101-104 (2002). 
293. At one point Pitt said that no issue should be off the table in Enron's wake, 
implying no opposition to significant regulation of the accounting profession. David 
Leonhardt, How WiD Washington Read the Signs? The Racels on For Tougher Regulation of 
Business, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,2002, at MBI. Later he returned to advocacy of the status 
quo. Pitt Testimony, supra note 257, at 25-27. 
294. Lesser governance reforms also have been mooted ,videly. Under one of these 
the audit committee would take entire responsibility for auditor selection. This regulation 
would be welcome. But it would not solve the problem of implied pressure stemming from 
consulting income: If management dislikes the audit result, it simply charmels its consulting 
business elsewhere. Mandatory rotation of the audit firm would ameliorate this pressure. But 
the cure would still be partial. In a world ,vith only four large audit firms, all selling the same 
advice, rotation would not insulate the auditor from pressure to sanction aggressive 
treatments. 
295. See S. 2004, 107th Congo § 201 (2002) (prohibiting accounting IIrmS from 
providing management consulting services); Auditor Independence Act of 2002, S. 1896, 
107th Congo (2002) (prohibiting accounting firms from providing management consulting 
services); H.R. 3693, 107th Congo (2002) (directing the SEC by rule to prohibit an 
accountant also providing noncredit services from being treated as independent); 
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new policies of auditor independence.296 Either way, there remains a 
problem. In a limited world of four finns, all selling the same 
aggressive products, one can still imagine pressure on the auditors to 
be cooperative. For a return to adversity, a Glass Steagall regime of 
separation may be necessary. Under this, the big firms would be 
unbundled and auditing fIrms would perform only one function. 
Sensing movement toward the more drastic solution, each of the 
big finns announced early in 2002 that it had divested itself or would 
be divesting itself of consulting operations.297 At the same time, the 
fIrms announced that they will no longer perform internal audit work 
for their audit clients.298 Additional details were conspicuously lacking, 
however. Did "divestiture" mean 100% separation between the 
auditing fIrm and the consulting fIrm? Or, were the fIrms' 
announcements designed to deflect attention from legislated 
separation, importing no commitment to permanent (or even present) 
separation? The latter quickly proved the case. When Andersen, under 
the ministrations of Paul Volcker, announced that it really was going to 
turn itself into an audit-only firm, the other four fIrms promptly 
separated themselves. Still acting in concert, they announced that they 
had no similar intentions.299 
Meanwhile, further signifIcant movement to fair value 
accounting should be deferred. If the audit system cannot be relied 
upon to apply cost-basis accounting under a rule of conservatism, it 
presumptively is unready to apply the more complex and subjective 
measures implicated by a fair value system. Conservatism and hard 
numbers are not the disease here. They are the cure. Further 
movement to fair value measures can await the restoration of 
confIdence in the audit system. It was, after all, fair value treatment 
that enabled Enron to cover $1.1 billion of losses with swaps that 
weren't. 
Accountability for Accountants Act of 2002 H.R. 3617, 107th Congo (2002) (withdrawing 
benefits ofPSLRA from auditors who perform nonaudit functions). 
296. Companies Mull Separation of Auditing, Consulting, WALL ST. 1., Feb. 4, 2002, at 
A6. 
297. Rachel Emma Silverman, Questioning the Books: Deloitte to Separate 
ConsultingServicesFromAuditBusiness, WALL ST. 1., Feb. 6, 2002, atA8. 
298. Id 
299. Michael Schroeder & Greg Hitt, Questioning the Books: Big Accounting Firms 
Break Ties JWth Andersen to Resist Changes, WALL ST. 1., Mar. 4, 2002, atAI O. 
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4. Audits and Shareholder Value Maximization 
Had Arthur Levitt still been the chair of the SEC, we would have 
heard a very different set of observations in respect ofEnron's collapse 
than those of Harvey Pitt, described above.3°O Levitt's warnings 
respecting the institutional framework and operations of the 
accounting system covered most of the salient points in the Enron 
disclosure disaster-the compromise of auditor independence, the 
tendency of issuers to manage their net earnings so as to meet analyst's 
growth expectations, and material nondisclosures justified under the 
percentage-based materiality principle. Most of all, Levitt warned that 
the entire fmancial community followed perverse short-term 
incentives: 
I'm challenging corporate management and Wall Street to re-examine 
our current environment. I believe we need to embrace nothing less 
than a cultural change. For corporate managers, remember, the 
integrity of the numbers in the fmancial reporting system is directly 
related to the long-term interests of a corporation. While the 
temptations are great, and the pressures strong, illusions in numbers are 
only that-ephemeral, and ultimately self-destructive.301 
The cultural pathology to which Levitt referred is the culture of 
shareholder value maximization, aggressively pursued. That culture 
has changed the nature of the auditor-client relationship. fu a free 
market context it is the managers and not auditors who do the value-
creating. The auditors, like the SEC, regulate the free market, and the 
present environment of value maximization does not easily concede 
authority to market regulators. fu theory, the auditor-client relationship 
should have a significant adversarial aspect. Management chooses the 
accounting policies and practices and the auditor conducts a critical 
review. If management's choices fall outside the accounting 
profession's substantive parameters, the auditor imposes compliance 
with GAAP, wielding the threat of an unfavorable opinion. fu today's 
practice context, the threat has become idle. 
The accounting profession has drifted into the role of friendly 
servIce provider, lured by management bribes characterized as 
300. See supra notes 223 and 285 and accompanying text. Ironically, even as Enron 
was running out of time, Pitt made a peace offer to the accounting profession, taking the 
occasion to acknowledge with pride his prior representation in private practice of each of the 
Big Five fInns. The tenus of this offer went on to inform the incongruous remarks he later 
made about Enron's collapse. Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks BefOre the AICPA Governing 
Council, available athttp://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch516.htm (Oct. 22, 200 I). 
301. Levitt, supra note 221. 
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consultancy fees. When Enron caused everybody to wake up and ask 
for an enforcer, the accountants at fIrst asked us to hand the regulatory 
club to someone else. The only entity equipped to pick it up was the 
government, acting in the guise of exhaustive rulemaker. Thus did the 
Big Five entreat the SEC to take over the articulation of GAAP, ready 
to abandon their own profession's historic assumption of responsibility 
respecting rulemaking. And they requested more than a transfer of the 
legislative function. They asked for legislation in the form of rules. 
This is because imposition of a standard implies voluntary analysis and 
judgment in which imposition of a rule may be ascribed to the 
rulemaker's will. The request signifies a profession in wretched 
decline. 
Harvey Pitt convened our post-Enron odyssey by announcing a 
search for "solutions" not "scapegoats." But he offered no solutions. 
The criminal justice system took over and made Andersen the 
scapegoat. No doubt the remaining Big Four breathed easier at that 
point, hoping that the storm will pass them by and that the new 
legislation will leave their consultive gravy trains on the tracks. Their 
hopes may be rewarded. But only complete separation of auditing 
from consultancy can restore them to health as a profession. 
V. CONCLUSION-EN"RON AND THE WAY WE LIVE Now 
Arthur Levitt's reference to the prevailing culture helps us grasp 
Enron's meaning for the disclosure system, the regulation of the 
accounting system, and corporate legal theory. There is nothing new 
about fraudulent financials, even from repeat players with no 
immediate plans to skip the jurisdiction. The operative motivations are 
well-known, and Enron conforms to the pattern: The frrm becomes 
risk-prone, whether it stumbles into an end period or drives itself there 
in a cultural context in which it loses touch with objective controls. 
Concealment occurs as it buys time until an external cure relieves its 
distress. 
Despite this, there is an aspect of the Enron story shaped by its 
time and place. Enron and associated actors reenacted these old 
pathologies on a stage set by the contemporary shareholder value 
maximization norm. The norm fIrst made the transition from business 
commentary to business practice in the 1980s. At the time it still had a 
sharp edge of critique. In those days, managers did not pursue 
shareholder value maximization. fustead they behaved in risk-averse 
ways, seeking to make the company bigger and safer whether or not 
that meant more for the shareholders. Actors in the capital markets 
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imposed the shareholder value norm on unwilling managers through 
the harsh medicine of the leveraged restructuring and the hostile 
takeover. 
Things changed in the 1990s. Managers internalized the norm, 
building resumes as shareholder value maximizers. Stock options 
better aligned their incentives with those of the shareholders. They 
emerged in the risk-neutral posture counseled by financial economics. 
They unbundled conglomerates and concentrated on core 
competencies. They laid off excess workers. They took care to divert 
free cash flow to their shareholders through open market stock 
repurchases. They took on the challenge of global markets. And they 
emerged as winners as they did so. The high leverage thought by 
observers in the 1980s to be the key that unlocked the shareholder 
value treasure turned out to be unnecessary. Its disappearance seemed 
to remove a threat that pursuit of shareholder value could have 
perverse effects. Many observers in the 1980s warned that high 
leverage meant underinvestment in long-term projects. In the 1990s, 
with the leverage strategy abandoned, shareholder value maximizing 
management went forward with its only apparent costs falling on the 
fIrm's disempowered constituents, the employees let go due to 
relentless cost cutting. But such losers did not matter. Proponents of 
America's system of corporate governance took a victory lap on the 
world stage. 
As the 1990s progressed, darker colors appeared in the picture. 
Some began to question whether the fabulous wealth generated 
through the combination of liberal stock option plans and rising stock 
prices had its own perverse effects. At the same time, real-world 
shareholder value maximization came to be acted out in a bubble stock 
market. The bubble expanded on projections, which, however wild, 
were built on the same components that imported content to the 
maximization norm. The norm became a big tent that encompassed 
both short-term gains in stock prices stemming from the antics of 
noise traders and the more sober fundamental value maximization 
precepts of economists, management scientists, and fundamental value 
investors. 
Managers came under pressure to satisfy both shareholder value 
constituencies. But the greater pressure, of course, came from the 
short-term maximization voice of the marketplace. As managers 
struggled to make their numbers, they were assisted by the Big Five 
accounting fIrms, who aggressively peddled tax shelter and earnings 
management ruses, termed "products." Those who saw through the 
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smoke and mirrors and suggested regulation, whether in the self-
regulatory system, like the FASB, or in government, like Arthur Levitt, 
were shouted down and subjected to threats by attack-dog 
congressmen. 
It all came to a head with Enron, where pressure to maximize and 
a culture of winning combined to draw a huge fIrm into risk-prone 
decision making. But the story is exceptional in only two respects. 
First, comes the magnitude of the numbers. Second, comes the giant 
step Enron's managers took across the line that separates aggressive 
accounting from securities fraud. Every other critical detail,302 
including aggressive treatments, auditor capture, and the cognitive 
biases that facilitated the fatal step to fraud, implicates a well-known 
business pathology and a concomitant and well-worn regulatory 
discussion. 
Meanwhile, three strong lessons emerge from the wreckage. 
First, Enron collapsed the same way banks routinely collapsed in the 
days before deposit insurance. It did so because it had largely 
succeeded in realizing Skilling's vision of becoming a fmancial 
institution. Huge fmancial institutions present special regulatory 
problems and are subject to special requirements. Enron remained free 
of such regulation, partly because of the speed of its transition and 
partly due to its own successful influence activities. Its collapse shows 
its exemption to have been unjustifIed. Emerging fmancial institutions 
should be brought into the system in the ordinary course. 
Second, even as additional regulatory implications devolve 
largely on the auditor, avoiding the rest of the self-regulatory system, 
this case controverts the often asserted claim that existing regulatory 
mandates fail the cost-benefIt test. Those who make that claim rely on 
market forces and the self-interest of inside actors who face market 
discipline to assure providers of outside capital against the existence of 
shabby shops. That the fInn with the seventh largest market 
capitalization and also the firm that preached market discipline the 
most loudly turned out to be the shabbiest of shops with the 
cooperation of outside directors, outside auditors, and institutional 
investors, highlights the limits on what self-regulation and market 
incentives can achieve. Sovereign mandate and punishment remain 
capitalism's bedrock. 
Third, a century and a half ago, conservatives steeped in the 
classical economic model of Adam Smith voiced suspicions about the 
302. To the extent of present public knowledge. 
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accumulation of significant assets within corporate organizations. 
Only when human beings owned property, they said, could individual 
interest and moral responsibility work together to keep the use of the 
property consonant with the interests of society as whole. Corporate 
ownership subverted market control of private economic power and 
diluted responsibility amongst the members of a groUp.303 We still hear 
many voices advocating market control. But we hear it in a 
fundamentally different context in which corporations, rather than 
individuals, own the producing assets. For that reason, market controls 
taken alone cannot possibly assure responsible use of economic power. 
For the same reason, we should treat with utmost skepticism actors 
who preach market discipline from positions of safety behind the 
shields of corporate entities. 
303. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIl\1ACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 43, 45, 48 55-57 (1970). 
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